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ABSTRACT 
 
My study, “Argument, Rhetoric, and Transcendence: The ‘Adherence of 
Minds’ within a Discourse of Spirituality,” addresses the questions: What 
persuades Americans to adhere to contemporary discourses of spirituality? 
What persuades audiences to adhere to the experiential truths found with this 
discourse? Furthermore, how exactly do contemporary writers of spirituality 
adhere audiences to reasonable understanding and pursuit of a union with a 
higher power? Using Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s The New 
Rhetoric as a framework, I analyze how the persuasive machinery of current 
Catholic and Anglican spirituality texts guides readers to experience and 
understand a subjective union with an ineffable God, while simultaneously 
maximizing the social inclusivity of audiences. Contemporary Catholic and 
Anglican texts serve as a representative sample of the more general 
contemporary discourse of spirituality. Via close critical discourse analysis of 
14 Catholic and Anglican texts spanning from 1983 to 2013, I explore the 
strategic cooperation of rhetorically argumentative schema found in these 
epideictic texts and unpack the implications. Overall, I find that the associative 
and dissociative schemas found in the contemporary discourse of spirituality 
can persuade diverse audiences into pluralistic communication, pragmatic 
contemplative action, and public service: all of which foster and strengthen 
human solidarity.  
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CHAPTER ONE: 
BACKGROUNDS AND HISTORIES 
 
Spirituality and Mysticism 
To begin plotting the overlaps of spirituality and rhetorical constructed 
discourse, I must first define the abstract term of “spirituality.” Generally, 
spirituality is the connection or relationship with something greater than the 
self; in the monotheistic Christian tradition, this connection to “something 
greater” is a connection with God. Defining spirituality more specifically is a 
tricky task. For example, as I will reference in the study, communicators of 
spirituality can use apophatic means of expression and argumentation: in other 
words, expression and argumentation “applied to knowledge of God obtained 
by way of negation” (OED). Why are apophatic means of expression and 
argumentation used? In the Christian tradition, God is ineffable; in other 
words, God is “too great for words; transcending expression”; the nature of 
God is “unspeakable, unutterable, inexpressible” (OED). For instance, Meister 
Eckhart, Christian spiritual authority and mystic of the Middle Ages, explains 
of spiritual truth, “If I have spoken of it, I have not spoken, for it is ineffable” 
(Katz 3). So how do the contemporary Christian authorities describe the nature 
of God if God is ineffable? This question was most recently asked of the 
current Monsignor of the Cathedral of Peter and Paul in Providence, Rhode 
Island; his answer was both simple and vast. He posited that, “God is Being as 
Idea” (Mancini) - a thoughtful answer, but again quite abstract. The 
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transcendent nature of God will be a component of this investigation; however, 
it is a component that is deliberately and appropriately abstract and difficult. 
And it is not just Catholic clergy that reveals these abstractions. Steven T. Katz 
of Boston University, scholar of Judaism and authority of spiritual linguistic 
expression, explains that “all language … is too impoverished” to capture to 
the “true unity of Being”: thus creating a communicative problem (3) - and 
regarding spirituality, these types of traits are all we need to know about the 
nature of God – for now. Theologians, philosophers, and postmodern critical 
theorists seem better equipped to philosophize about the overlap of God and 
Being.1 
For the sake of this study, we need to understand that the Christian God 
is ineffable. What other traits factor into spirituality? Various definitions of 
spirituality surface in the Christian tradition, and these definitions generally 
emphasize individuals uniting with this ineffable God. Martin Laird, an 
Augustinian monk and theologian at Villanova University, describes Christian 
spirituality as “as grounding union between God and the human person (2); 
Donald W. Mitchell, professor of religion at Purdue University and an 
authority on Eastern and Western religious dialogue, defines spirituality as 
“becoming divine by sharing in that reality at the inner most core of our 
consciousness” (Mitchell and Wiseman 32); and finally, Thomas Merton, 
renowned Catholic monk who popularized spirituality in the 1960s, describes 
spirituality as “in and through and beyond everything that we are […] it !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!Especially!relevant!in!contemporary!discussions!is!the!20th!Century!work!of!existentialism,!process!philosophy,!and!neo=orthodoxy:!Heidegger,!Levinas,!Buber,!Barth,!Bultmann,!among!others.!!
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becomes a living awareness of itself: and this awareness is not so much 
something that we ourselves have, as something that we are” (6-7).  Each of 
these definitions exhibit two general components: (1) an emphasis on the 
subjective individual and (2) the blurring of binary distinctions. In Laird’s 
definition: the individual is referenced with “the human person” and the 
blurring is signified with the “grounding union.” In Mitchell’s definition, the 
individual is referenced with “the inner most core of our consciousness” and 
the blurring is signified with “sharing in that reality.” In Merton’s definition, 
the individual is referenced with “something that we are” and the blurring is 
signified with “in and through and beyond.”  
Throughout this investigation I will conflate these primary components 
of spirituality, as recognized by experts in experiential spirituality, into my 
own usage of the term “spirituality.” Therefore, when I refer to spirituality I 
refer to a human internal process in which binary distinctions of objective and 
subjective fold into each other via a union with a Higher Power, in the case of 
Catholic and Anglican perspectives, the Higher Power is God. Since I am 
addressing Catholic and Anglican texts, I will be referring to God; however, 
this is not to undercut the Higher Powers of other traditions. In other traditions, 
such as Wiccan or Buddhist traditions, the Higher Power does not have to be 
God. Outside of religious tradition, the Higher Power may be Nature, the 
Beyond, or a general awareness of one’s place in the tapestry of life. Clearly, 
the discussion of Higher Powers opens up a Pandora’s box of possibilities and 
conceivable explorations. To narrow the scope of my investigation, I have 
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chosen Catholic and Anglican texts as a way to tame a potentially unwieldy 
topic of spirituality; so it follows that the Higher Power I will be referring to 
will be God. 
These primary components of spirituality, i.e. subjectivity and blurring 
of binary distinctions via a union with God, seem to be the same primary 
components of mysticism. So what differentiates spirituality from mysticism? 
Are they the same terms? I feel that I should address these questions, plotting 
similarities and differences of these terms to increase a better understanding of 
spirituality. First, I do so to clarify any confusion between the terms as I move 
forward in the investigation. Second, by means of definitional overlap and 
contrast between the terms spirituality and mysticism, I can increase the 
understanding of my usage of spirituality. Doing so brings in more 
perspectives: By showing juxtapositional or equitable definitional traits 
between “mysticism” and “spirituality,” I open up more windows, allowing 
more sunlight to illuminate the shadowed term of spirituality. Finally, I choose 
to discuss mysticism to show that I am not running away in cowardice from 
this crucial historical perspective that has been absorbed into, and inherited by, 
the contemporary term of “spirituality.” Mysticism is important to the present 
day development of spirituality, especially the Catholic and Anglican 
development of spirituality, and therefore cannot be ignored.  
There are two basic definitions of mysticism.  One definition is 
tangential to this study – and seems to be the most widely used; this definition 
generally pervades contemporary popular culture in a derogatory manner. The 
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Oxford English Dictionary defines this usage of mysticism as: “Religious 
belief that is characterized by vague, obscure, or confused spirituality; a belief 
system based on the assumption of occult forces, mysterious supernatural 
agencies, etc.” This definition is misleading in the context of spirituality as 
defined by spiritual authorities such as Laird, Mitchell, and Merton. The 
derogatory use of mysticism via the words “occult,” “obscure,” and 
“confused,” focuses on the vague unscientific aspect of religion as a negative 
aspect of religion. Negative vagueness in two meanings of negativity: (1) 
negative as non-existence or absence of concrete evidence and (2) negative as 
nonproductive belief. Although apophatic perspectives are inevitably bound to 
spirituality and mysticism, this popularized definition of mysticism will not 
work. The definition does not clearly sync with Laird’s, Mitchell’s, and 
Merton’s definitions of spirituality; moreover, mysticism as “confused 
spirituality” plainly cannot work for this study of spirituality.  
However, a second, more relevant OED definition of mysticism aligns 
more directly with the aforementioned definitions of spirituality by Laird, 
Mitchell, and Merton:  “belief in the possibility of union with or absorption 
into God by means of contemplation and self-surrender; belief in or devotion 
to the spiritual apprehension of truths inaccessible to the intellect.” This 
understanding of mysticism connects to the historical foundation of early 
Christianity, and more genuinely aligns with the original roots of “mysticism” 
(Greek: mystikos; Latin: mysticus), which refers to anything “hidden” (McGinn 
3). More importantly, this second definition of mysticism syncs with 
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contemporary Catholic and Anglican spirituality. The union with God and the 
activity of contemplation are both mentioned. 
From this second OED definition, it may seem that mysticism is 
equivalent to spirituality – and various 20th century theorists and theologians 
use mysticism in the manner, such as rhetorician Kenneth Burke (B. 1897 - D. 
1993) and theologian Matthew Fox (B. 1940). This equivalence is a return to 
the Christian roots of spirituality that were planted in mystic visions and 
prophecy – such as the prophets of ancient Judaism and early Christian 
monastics. Despite contemporary spirituality having its roots in mysticism, 
mysticism’s history may bind some tangential ideas to contemporary versions 
of spirituality. A caveat must be made in regard to this history.  The historical 
mysticism may bring to mind medieval mystics. These mystics are crucial to 
the tradition of spirituality, are most famous for their visions, levitations, and 
even erotic unions with Christ. Angela di Folino (1248-1309 CE), for instance, 
mystically experienced the suffering of Christ that developed into screaming 
fits of pain as well as a documented love relationship with Jesus (Furlong 148-
150). Catherine of Seinna also had a love relationship with Jesus via fantastic 
visions and mystical experience: hers were much more erotically charged and 
explicit. These are just two examples from the medieval tradition of 
extraordinary mystical experience.  
So what does this history of Christian mysticism look like?  Christian 
mysticism, which we now more inclusively refer to as “spirituality,” was used 
as early as the second century CE to characterize the inner dimensions of early 
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Christian religious realities (McGinn 3). The term was initially used in relation 
to Biblical interpretation, which is the origin and textual standard of Christian 
mystics through Christian history. Mystic interpretation was neither academic 
nor indebted to doctrinal regulation and moral obligation; rather, it required 
interpreters to “penetrate the living source of the biblical message” (3). So 
throughout Christian mystic writings, a specific type of mystical close-reading 
of the Bible is discussed in detail – relating the close-readings to the human 
unity with God. The early contemplative spiritual tradition of lectio divina 
evolved from this mystic Biblical tradition – and it is a practice that is still used 
today and referenced in numerous contemporary spiritual texts. This 
contemplative practice allows the practitioner to experience the nature of God 
through the medium of Scripture. The practitioner ponders the words as a 
means to transcend the literature and “meet God” (Funk, Tools 9). 
 In early mystic tradition, asceticism also played an important role. Early 
Christian spiritual authorities such as Antony of Egypt (250-356 CE) and John 
Cassian (360-465 CE) would often practice self-denial of bodily pleasures to 
prepare for contact with the divine. These figures were some of the first 
monastics. Inspired by Biblical stories and figures such as Moses and John the 
Baptist, they intentionally separated from society and lived in the desert to 
arrive at pure spiritual experience and connectivity with God.  These “proto-
monastic” figures are referred to as the Desert Fathers (McGinn 47-50).  
 The Christian mystic tradition continued through the Middle Ages where 
the experiential nature of Christianity met some resistance from schools of 
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rigid scholastic logic. However, mysticism continued to persevere providing 
new outlets for women empowerment in medieval society - as can be seen in 
the work of Hildegard of Bingen and Joan of Arc. As mentioned earlier when 
discussing Angela di Folino and Catherine of Seinna, many of these women 
mystics experienced extraordinary mystical phenomena and illustrated the 
phenomena in their writings. These illustrated phenomena resonated with 
European medieval audiences and helped popularize mystical practice.   
 After the Protestant Reformation, Protestant mystics joined the tradition of 
Christian mysticism. However, many of these Protestant spiritual authorities 
were not as ostentatious with their mystical experience as their medieval 
Christian ancestors. Pivotal figures such as Martin Luther (a pioneer of 
Protestantism), John Calvin (a pioneer of Calvinism), George Fox (a pioneer of 
Quakerism), and John Wesley (a pioneer of Methodism) offered new spiritual 
perspectives into the Christian tradition, referring to mystic experience in their 
work – but also quite grounded spiritual advice.  Catholics and Anglicans 
were, and are, certainly influenced by their texts.   
Unlike much of the Christian mystical tradition, contemporary spirituality 
is not concerned so much with the extraordinary; although, charismatic gifts 
and psychic phenomenon may be a part of the spiritual experience, spiritual 
experience does not revolve around their possibility as much as it had in the 
earlier Christian tradition (Keating 9-11). Contemporary versions of mysticism 
are more grounded and everyday: not as lofty or extraordinary. In A Grammar 
of Motives, for instance, Kenneth Burke explains mysticism in a practical 
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manner, that is, as the mystic paradox and the transcendent Self within the 
machinery of language: evident in something as mundane as the first person 
pronoun usage (300). In The Coming of the Cosmic Christ, Matthew Fox 
explicitly binds mysticism to Mother Earth and environmentalism. Both 
theorists see mysticism through a pragmatic lens: a much more different lens 
than that of the medieval mystics. Therefore, due to different uses of mysticism 
in the contemporary era than the mysticism of the past, I will use the term 
“spirituality” rather than “mysticism” throughout this project. Although they 
can be viewed as very much the same, the historical baggage that “mysticism” 
carries and the lofty connotations of the extraordinary may interfere with 
contemporary understandings of spirituality. Since assorted 20th century 
authorities such as Burke and Fox discuss “spirituality as mysticism” in their 
work, I will however refer to such mysticism while discussing spirituality. 
  
Contemporary Spirituality and Contemplation 
To avoid equating spirituality with solely extraordinary mystical gifts, I 
will explain what is meant by “active contemplation” - the primary subject of 
the contemporary Catholic and Anglican texts about spirituality.  Active 
contemplation is action taken to attain a state of spirituality: an action taken to 
narrow “the gap between our spirit as subject and God as object” (Merton 70). 
Unlike “passive contemplation” or the reception of extraordinary mystical 
gifts, active contemplation “is a deliberate and sustained effort to detect the 
will of God in events and to bring one’s whole self into harmony with that 
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will” (Merton 59); via constructive interiority, the individual actively nourishes 
this contemplation with meditation, reading, worship, etc. But Merton stresses 
that before establishing this connection, an individual must actively merge into 
a “unified and intuitive vision of reality” (59).  In other words, active 
contemplation involves establishing a unified vision of the union with God; 
then, the practitioner must act on and foster the union with meditative and 
contemplative methods.     
Passive or infused contemplation is arrived at after active 
contemplation is established.  Passive contemplation is the spirituality found in 
the mystics and the saints in the form of received gifts from God, i.e. visions, 
extraordinary phenomenon, speaking in tongues, etc. Spiritual gifts are just 
that: given. Thomas Keating posits that spiritual gifts do not play a crucial role 
in contemplation (“Open Minds” 9). In other words, passive contemplation is 
like a person receiving a cashmere sweater as a Christmas present from their 
spouse. They may have achieved this gift by being a loving partner over the 
last year or years; however, they didn’t actively have the “cashmere sweater 
motive” in mind when they love their spouse. The intersection of motive, 
action, and persuasion is crucial to the rhetorical strategies involved with 
contemporary spiritual texts. Since passive mystical gift reception does not 
embrace motive making and individual action, it does not hold as much 
importance to the realm of rhetoric.  
Unlike extraordinary mystical gifts that are exclusionary, the act of 
contemplation is accessible to all human beings. Contemplation is an 
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inclusionary activity; therefore, as this study will show, the audience is 
inclusive. Based on the work of contemporary Catholic and Anglican 
authorities, contemplation involves varying techniques and epistemologies 
which many faiths can adhere, not just Catholics or Anglicans. For example, 
Laird, Mitchell, and Merton all explore the inclusive intersection of Eastern 
and Western contemplation in their texts. Catholic and Anglican spiritual texts 
revolve around contemplative methods and philosophies in different ways and 
depths. Overall, the texts rhetorically depict the contemplative realm as 
expansive, diverse, and genuine: emphasizing grounded methods and practice. 
Tracing the Christian etymology of contemplation can help understand 
how contemplation is used in these texts. The term contemplation has its initial 
roots in the writing of the Bible.  Contemplation can be initially traced to the 
Saint Paul and the New Testament. In his Epistles, Paul uses the word gnosis 
to refer to the intimate knowledge of God. The word gnosis is the Greek 
translation of the Hebrew word da’ath. However, da’ath refers to a more 
experiential knowledge of God associated with love, a connotation that is not 
primarily signified by gnosis. During those early times, the Greek Christian 
Fathers (e.g. Clement of Alexandria, Gregory of Nyssa) began using a third 
term, theoria, to refer to the knowledge of God. Theoria, a term widely used 
by the Neoplatonists of the time, meant an intellectual truth, moreover a 
supreme activity of wisdom. The Greek Christian Fathers updated this term 
however. They blended the original Hebrew term da’ath with theoria arriving 
a more precise understanding of the knowledge of God: one that accounts for 
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experience and love. This version of theoria was then translated into the Latin 
comtemplatio; the Latin term assimilated into the Christian tradition. The term 
was tethered to a spiritual practice in the Middle Ages when reflection and 
prayer was deemed as the means in which to arrive at the knowledge and 
presence of God (Keating 20-21). The activity of contemplation was further 
qualified in the 1520’s by Ignatius of Loyola with his Spiritual Exercises 
(Keating 22-23). As a crucial developer of spirituality and contemplation, 
Ignatius posited that there were assorted introverted discursive methods of 
meditation in which to find God - a multiplicity of spiritual practices, rather 
than one spiritual practice. At the time, this was not received well by the 
Catholic Church who encouraged linear spirituality and prayer. Despite the 
Church restricting the early Society of Jesus (Jesuits) to one method of prayer, 
Ignatius’ theory of multi-perspective contemplation still resounds today 
(Keating 23); this flexibility is evident in the texts of Catholic and Anglican 
spiritual authorities. Much influenced by Ignatius, contemporary Catholic and 
Anglican contemplative texts posit a multiplicity of contemplative practices in 
order to arrive at a union with God. The spiritual texts in this investigation do 
not embrace traditional philosophical approaches, i.e. teleological searching 
and for a singularity of truth, but align more open explorations of spirituality 
based on a general shared assumptions of the existence of a Higher Power.  
 
American spirituality: now and then 
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The discourse of spiritualty seems to be gaining traction in America. 
What does this contemporary spiritual tradition look like? Data collected in 
recent Pew Research Institute polls and interviews, taken from a sample size of 
4,000 Americans, indicate that approximately 68% of Americans believe in 
God, not necessarily religion; while 18% of Americans consider themselves 
spiritual and also not necessarily religious (“Nones” 41). The percentage of 
Americans unaffiliated with religion has risen from 15.3% to 19.6% from 2007 
to 2012; moreover, the percentages of Americans who are affiliated with 
general spirituality, aligning themselves with “something else” / “other faith ” 
and “nothing in particular” (but not religion, atheism, or agnosticism), have 
risen 2% and 2.3% respectively from 2007 to 2012 (“Nones” 13). In the 
religious sphere, 51% of recent religious converts joined a religion in order to 
satisfy personal “spiritual needs” (“Faith in Flux” 6); conversely, 43% of 
Catholics and 39% of Protestants drifted away from the religion because their 
“spiritual needs” are being met elsewhere (“Faith in Flux” 6). 
These statistics illustrate the current American spiritual climate: 
spirituality motivates religious and spiritual identification, afflation, and 
unaffliation. Yet despite the increasing trend of “spiritual-but-not-religious” 
Americans, the trend does not mean that religion should be, or will be, 
eliminated from the equation. Quite the converse. As shown in the PEW data, 
51% of recent religious converts joined a religion in order to satisfy personal 
“spiritual needs”; therefore, spirituality remains an important part in 
contemporary American religion as well. Overall, these statistics represent a 
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growing importance of spirituality in America, implying an increased need of 
how and why this spirituality is working in contemporary discourse – a need 
that I intend to explore in this study. 
The intersection of religion, specifically Christianity, has played an 
active role in American culture since the nation’s inception. American 
democracy and celebration of the individual can be traced to the Lutheran 
Reformation. American capitalism can be traced back to the Puritan work 
ethic. American presidents, Democrat and Republican alike, still mention God 
in their speeches. Ongoing debates still rage about, the placement of “one 
nation under God” in the Pledge of Alliance. Ongoing debates still rage about 
“Christmas trees” and “Holiday trees.”  The writing and talk about these 
subjects has not dissipated in the last 15 years. Discourse has been fueled by 
the 9/11 attacks; books such as Sam Harris’s Letter to a Christian Nation as 
well as James Carroll’s Constantine’s Sword, have all contributed to the 
critical ripples, critiquing religion in America. Yet despite these factors that 
revolve around religion, it was spirituality rather than organized religion that 
originally motivated much of the rhetorically composed artifacts of the 
American Founding Fathers.  
The American Founding Fathers (e.g. Franklin, Jefferson, Paine) 
strenuously argued against the irrationality of institutional religion and dogma, 
and did so without refuting a Christian God, and without embracing atheism 
(Fuller 19-20).  This stemmed from Enlightenment principles, more 
specifically, Isaac Newton’s investigation of natural laws. Newton’s 
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investigation questioned the faith of organized, revealed religion, that is, 
Christianity. This Newtonian line of thinking led to “natural religion,” an 
opposing view of organized religion. Natural religion denies a God that 
actively interferes with the course of human history; natural religion promotes 
a deistic Creator God that formed the world and the rational laws by which the 
world operates; natural religion pushes for moral rationalism, ethics, and 
humanism, while refuting dogma, right belief, and scriptural tenets (Lambert 
172).  
Founding Fathers such as Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Paine, 
aligning with natural religion, positioned themselves as deistic, spiritual, and 
not religious. Arming themselves with Newtonian Enlightenment principles, 
these men comprehended God as a means to reasonably understand the world, 
self, and good human behavior – and found it important to communicate and 
persuade others of this awareness. Their rhetorics were sometimes a bit 
atypical. For instance, the God in the Biblical Old Testament did not align with 
the pure rationality of natural religion, therefore, president Jefferson 
audaciously “edited” the Bible, deleting the entire Old Testament; additionally, 
in the New Testament, Jefferson discarded all miracles and supernatural stories 
as well. What exactly did Jefferson retain in the Bible?  He retained any text 
illustrating Jesus’ moral teachings and any text illustrating nature orientated 
truth. This Bible was called the “Jeffersonian Bible” (Lambert 174): a public 
text that rhetorically conveyed Jefferson’s spiritual perspective.  
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 In a more direct rhetorical approach, Thomas Paine fervently spoke out 
against organized religion. He used memorable polemical remarks in order to 
heighten pathos. Paine publically posited such statements as shown in his 1794 
work The Age of Reason, Being an Investigation of True and Fabulous 
Theology (6-8):  
I do not believe in the creed professed by the Jewish church, by the 
Roman church, by the Greek church, by the Turkish church, by the 
Protestant church, nor by any church that I know of. My mind is my 
own church”; and later in this published volume, “The Jews say that 
their Word of God was given by Moses face to face; the Christians say, 
that their Word of God came from divine inspiration; and the Turks 
say, that their Word of God (the Koran) was brought by an angel from 
heaven. Each of those churches accuse others of unbelief; and, for my 
own part, I disbelieve them all. (Lambert 175) 
However, to reiterate, Paine, like Jefferson, was not an atheist. Paine 
rhetorically conveyed his own spirituality while deriding religion: in Paine’s 
own words, he believed and argued for “one God, and no more” (Lambert 
175).  
Even the architecture of Early America reveals a rhetorical expression 
of spirituality and not necessarily organized religion. The early 19th century 
American Greek revival architectural styles found in government buildings 
such as the Washington Treasury building in Washington D.C. (Hamlin, Plate 
XII) and the Massachusetts State House in Boston (Hamlin, Plate XXII), point 
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to ancient Greece. This architectural movement was not an inception of master 
architects of the time but rather can be seen as a deliberate movement 
motivated by Thomas Jefferson. As an amateur architect himself, Jefferson 
worked closely with numerous professional architects of the time in order to 
forward Greek classicism as a personal rhetorical expression (Hamlin 17-20). 
What exactly did this expression indicate to the public? In addition to the 
suggesting that America was not England, it indicates that America aligned 
with the idealization of the Western world found in the Ancient Greek culture 
(Hamlin 3-5): a culture that established the basis for democracy in Western 
civilization. This architecture also signifies other aspects of ancient Greek 
culture: humanism, spirituality, and non-religion. Ancient Greece was not a 
Christian culture but rather, a humanistic and spiritual culture.  Metaphysics 
are questioned and answered in the philosophical works of Aristotle, Plato, and 
the Pre-Socratics; in all of these philosophies, metaphysics is viewed through a 
humanistic lens. Plato’s Timeaus, for example, explains the creation of the 
universe and the distinction between the physical world and eternal world, yet 
Plato chooses to illustrate these points via an interhuman dialogue; moreover, a 
mission of Plato’s dialogue of metaphysics in this work is to ultimately 
determine the purpose of human beings. Spiritual and humanistic aspects can 
also be found in the mythology of the Ancient Greece. The ancient Greek 
myths illustrate the affairs of anthropomorphic Gods and Goddesses: gods and 
goddesses generally acting like humans, and acting in human form. The 
human/physical and superhuman/metaphysical traits cooperated within these 
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myths and consequently, humanistic and spiritual understandings cooperated in 
this ancient culture. Although there was ritual, homage, and sacrifice to the 
gods, the religion of ancient Greece was not a hierarchical rigid institution as 
seen later with Christianity. Homage to the Greek gods was largely 
individualistic; spiritual connections were made via material world vessels 
such as individual animal sacrifices. Therefore, early American Greek revival 
architecture does not point only to the Greek founders of democracy but also to 
a Greek spiritual tradition that was humanistic and not institutionally religious. 
American Greek revival architecture is a type of rhetorical composition that 
seems to represent a distinct spiritual perspective within history.  
The historical residue of spirituality clings to American culture today 
despite the wane of Greek revival architecture, and despite the displacement of 
the Enlightenment climate of the Founding Fathers with contemporary 
postmodern climate. Spirituality remains strong – and perhaps its adherence is 
even stronger than before. As shown in ancient Greek culture, spirituality is an 
individual humanistic endeavor: an individual human connection with God that 
the Founding Fathers extolled, and it is the same individual human connection 
with transcendence that seems to be gaining adherence in American culture.  
Furthermore, spiritual adherences pervade the Christian religious sphere. 
Spirituality remains integral to the history of the Catholic and Anglican faiths, 
and demands attention today more than ever. Contemporary theologians such 
as once-Catholic-priest-turned-Anglican-priest, Matthew Fox, use spirituality 
as a means to update the awarenesses and functions of religion. And although 
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other contemporary authorities in the Catholic and Anglican Churches are not 
as polemical or audacious as Fox; authorities still use spirituality to express 
their religious faith, communicate spiritual experience and realities, and appeal 
to contemporary audiences.   Overall, these statistics and histories represent the 
importance of spirituality in America, one that has always been a part of 
American culture and is becoming increasingly valued. This implies a need of 
how and why this spirituality is working in American contemporary culture – a 
need that I intend to explore in this study by looking at the pertaining textual 
discourse. 
   
New Age Spirituality  
A popular usage of the term “spirituality” today is in the context of 
New Age spirituality. This association with New Age culture can be beneficial 
to understanding contemporary spirituality. According to Robert Fuller in 
Spiritual, But Not Religious, traits of New Age spirituality include but are not 
limited to “metaphysical seeking,” holistic healing via crystal use, energies 
(the astral body, chakras, etc.) relating to higher cosmic planes, alternative 
medical systems such as “Therapeutic Touch,” a multidimensional universe 
(Fuller 115-116). Although New Age is indebted to some early 20th century 
thinkers such as William James and Carl Jung, New Age spirituality emerged 
most prominently in the late 1960s through the 1970s (Fuller 55-58).  In this 
later era, “trance channeling,” i.e. channeling spirits with a medium or Ouija 
board, became an aspect of New Age spirituality as well as more prominent 
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healing features, spiritual prophecy, and communication with angels (Fuller 
59-68).  A crucial aspect of New Age spirituality is the overall belief in the 
power of the human thought and spirit to influence external material reality. 
This component seems to sets New Age spirituality in a different category than 
Catholic and Anglican spiritualities; however, these magical aspects pervade 
Catholic and Anglican spiritualities as well. This magic can be seen in 
historical events believed by practitioners of Christian religions (resurrection 
of Christ, miracles, parthenogenesis/virgin birth, etc.) – as well as in some 
rituals and prayers. For instance, in Catholicism specifically, believers hold the 
conviction that the Bread and Wine of the Eucharist literally transforms into 
the body and blood of Christ; to quote the Revised Catholic Catechism: “in the 
Eucharist…the whole Christ is truly, really, and substantially contained” (383 
[1374]). Therefore, although New Age spirituality is outside the immediate 
scope of this study, Christian religions share the same type of perspectives 
regarding metaphysical forces affecting material reality.  Therefore, although 
this is a study of Catholic and Anglican texts, numerous implications found in 
this study may be applied to New Age spiritualities as well.    
How much of the American population actually identifies with these 
New Age approaches? Based on PEW Institute surveys, only 0.4% of the 
American population identifies with New Age (“U.S. Religious Landscape 
Study”). So who are the people buying New Age spiritual texts? How are New 
Age texts becoming bestsellers (e.g. Rhonda Byrne, Deepack Chopra) if the 
statistics reveal a lack of identification with New Age spirituality (0.4% of the 
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American population)? PEW data shows that 30% of the US public who are 
unaffiliated with a religion has had a mystical experience (“Nones” 24); and 
according to 2012 PEW research surveys, “roughly three-in-ten religiously 
unaffiliated adults say they believe in spiritual energy in physical objects and 
in yoga as a spiritual practice. About a quarter believe in astrology and 
reincarnation. In addition, nearly six-in-ten of the religiously unaffiliated say 
they often feel a deep connection with nature and the earth; about three-in-ten 
say they have felt in touch with someone who is dead; and 15% have consulted 
a psychic” (“Nones” 24). Many Americans who do not explicitly identify as 
New Age still experience and believe in New Age spiritual principles.  This 
shows that the spirituality component of New Age affiliation remains an 
important part of American culture – despite the potential stigma of publically 
identifying as “New Age.”  
The fronting of spiritual components may be a method of updating 
religion for current postmodern times. Many pseudo-scientific spiritualities 
(e.g. astrology, psychics, communication with the dead) substantially differ 
from contemporary Catholic and Anglican spirituality. In fact, adopting these 
New Age beliefs is heretical in the Catholic Church. Yet, an important 
component of New Age spirituality should be considered. As the term “New 
Age” suggests, this type of spirituality was meant to bring a “new” fresh 
spiritual awareness; it is, and was, meant to update “old age” organized 
religion (Fuller 98). Despite the primitivistic leanings toward shamanism, 
teleological truth seeking, and literalism, New Age spirituality is, and was, 
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meant to be progressive or “new” in relation to dogmatic religious spiritualties. 
This progressive aspect of spirituality is important to contemporary 
understandings of Catholic and Anglican spirituality. Spirituality and the 
rhetorical expressions of spirituality are pragmatic tools that can update how 
religion works and how religion is relevant.  This progressive view of 
spirituality syncs with contemporary postmodern understandings of the world 
(within and without religion) and, as I will demonstrate in this study, may 
contribute to the increasing general popularity of American spirituality – as, I 
will show, contemporary American spirituality seems to be gaining more 
traction because it is a more inclusive discourse. 
 
Argumentation  
Argumentation, in the context of the field of composition and rhetoric, 
is an important term in this study. Via the dimension of reasonableness, 
argumentation is a tool of persuasion that facilitates effective adherence of 
audiences. Since audience is a pivotal component of this study, argumentation 
must be defined and sketched. Furthermore, the subtitle of The New Rhetoric is 
“A Treatise of Argumentation” – and since I am using The New Rhetoric as a 
framework in this study, I find that is necessary to establish a context of the 
term “argumentation.” Therefore, I will sketch how I will be using the term in 
order to clarify the meaning and dispel any myths surrounding the term.  
Argumentation is a term that carries different baggages, different 
connotations, and different functions, depending on which disciplinary lens to 
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view it. Debate and forensics may see it as the spoken competitive 
argumentation in attempts to achieve consensus or arrive at the strongest 
position. Certain schools of philosophy, depending on which schools, may see 
argumentation bound to higher objective missions of truth – or bound to more 
subjective missions. A common everyday view of argumentation can imply a 
kind of combative state between two parties. A mother may reprimand her 
unruly child saying, “Don’t be argumentative” – which implies “do not 
question my authority.” If a friend describes another person as 
“argumentative,” the implications can be negative, that is, “disagreeable” or 
“belligerent.”  The terms “argumentation” and “argumentative,” like all uses of 
language and communicative symbols, depend on karios, audience, and topic 
for effective communicative function. Specific to this study is one general 
version of argumentation: written argumentation through the lens of Perelman 
and Olbrecht-Tyteca, rhetorical theorists who explore the techniques of written 
argumentation in their treatise, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on 
Argumentation.  
Written argumentation differs from spoken argumentation: it cannot 
react immediately to the responses of a real-time audience; instead written 
argumentation is potentially accessible to all audiences. Furthermore, as seen 
in Plato’s Phaedrus, written argumentation is permanent as an evidential 
artifact – and this allows the writer to reflect on her own thinking or memory. 
Written argumentation does not concern oratory eloquence, such as gesture, 
mnemonics, dramatic art; written argumentation moves away from the strictly 
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oratory cultures of Ancient Greece and Rome and into the post-printing-press 
era (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 6); moreover, written argumentation 
moves us into the realm of digital texts and internet rhetorics which are 
dependent on written communication. Overall, the goal of the “New Rhetoric” 
by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, is to go “far beyond” classical oratory 
based conceptions of rhetoric and dialectic, adapting these elements and 
stretching these elements to the present age; to do so, the theorists focus on 
written discourse since written discourse “occur(s) in the most varied forms” 
(6).  This allows their study to more be generalized and applicable to varied 
discourses (6).  For Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, their “present age” was 
the late 1950s, however, these thinkers’ theory of rhetoric and argumentation 
still commands relevance.  The New Rhetoric helped revive the discipline in 
the mid- late 20th century and still contributes to the scholarship and 
understanding of rhetorical composition today (Bizzell and Herzberg 1196; 
Crosswhite, “Rhetorical Unconscious” 393).  
The concept of argumentation has not remained static over the 
millennia and the “new rhetoric” is a testament to this activity. The ebb and 
flow of these concepts eventually led to the Perelmanian understanding of 
argumentation in the mid to late 20th century: one that emphasizes audience 
and the importance of humanness (Crosswhite, “Rhetorical Unconsciousness” 
393-394). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s treatise The New Rhetoric: A 
Treatise of Argumentation can be seen as a 20th century version of Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric. In Aristotelian fashion, rhetoric is generally viewed as the 
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counterpart (antistrophe) of the dialectic; however since then, Aristotle’s 
position has been updated. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca are these updaters.  
They recognize argumentation as immersed in and saturated by language and 
context; its function is reliant on audience.  Unlike Aristotle’s emphasis on 
“demonstration,” as Chaim Perelman explains in The Realm of Rhetoric, 
argumentation “flows out of a natural language” (9).  The role of language and 
writing strategies are pivotal in argumentation. There is no universal language, 
nor universal expression; therefore, the arguer makes deliberately strategic 
choices about the components of their argument – moreover, the arguer 
determines and chooses which argumentative articulations are the most 
persuasive.   
Where does logic fit into this linguistic argumentative activity?  Pre 
World War II logical positivism is largely extinct; postmodern sensibilities 
have shown that logic cannot exist in a vacuum. A number of 20th century 
thinkers, not necessarily labeled “postmodern,” articulated and influenced this 
more progressive understanding of logic.  Pragmatist John Dewey explains 
logic as a tool of inquiry: socially adaptable to (and evolving with) time, 
context, and situations (The Logic of Inquiry); Stephen Toulmin, champion of 
practical reason, sees logic as adapting to audiences; James Kinneavy asserts 
that rhetorical composition plays an epistemological role since it is active in 
determining situational contexts of meaning; Richard Lanham sees Platonic 
dialectic cooperating with Sophistical rhetoric (Berlin 187-188). Similarly to 
all of these theorists, Chaim Perelman emphasizes context, audience, and 
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practical reason in argumentation (Realm 5-8); so, in other words, logic is 
malleable since it is bound to rhetorical aims.    
Logic is inevitably bound to processes of reasoning. The topic of 
spirituality requires processes of reasoning composed of highly subjective 
personal beliefs and experience-based knowledge. Since premises within the 
discourse of spirituality are largely subjective, the reasoning process is 
generally dialectical, not analytical. Dialectical reasoning seeks the most 
probable conclusions since the premises are not “necessary” as self-evident or 
facts, whereas analytical reasoning begins with the necessary and arrives at 
new knowledge by the logical deductive relationships of those necessary 
premises (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 5). Much of the discourse of 
spirituality discussed in this investigation will not be dialogically dialectic vis-
a-vis Platonic dialogue; instead, the contemporary discourse of spirituality 
involves reasoning with probabilities and opinionated premises; therefore, 
dialectic reasoning of probabilities (i.e. a more nuanced type of inductive 
reasoning), is most appropriate for examining how a writer of spirituality 
secures, what Perelman coins, the “mental cooperation,” of readers.     
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca qualify this “mental cooperation” 
stating “all argumentation aims at gaining the adherence of minds, and, by this 
very fact, assumes the existence of an intellectual contact” - moreover, 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca qualify “arguing” as “using discourse to 
influence the intensity of an audience’s adherence to certain theses” (14). As 
my project’s title suggests, this project investigates “argument” and 
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“transcendence”: “argument” signifying the realm of dialectic exchange and 
“transcendence” signifying the realm of spirituality. In other words, this 
project examines how spiritual authorities argue their spirituality. To plug this 
synthesis into Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s definitions, this project can be 
described as an investigation into how spiritual individuals gain the “adherence 
of minds” via intellectual contact: in other words, how the contemporary 
discourse of spirituality rhetorically influences audience’s adherences to 
certain subjective understandings of spirituality. 
As mentioned, generative topics of argumentation for Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca are topics of dialectical reasoning – that is, topics involving 
probabilities. Probabilities fuel argumentation and debate; certainties do not 
require argumentation and debate, since certainties are accepted by consensus. 
Argumentation occurs when an audience requires convincing. Argumentation 
is not required if an audience considers concern premises and conclusions to be 
self-evident. Mathematics, for example, is based on premises and conclusions 
that audiences accept: 2+2=4 involve premises and a conclusion that are not 
generally argued. Mathematics involves demonstration, not argumentation 
(Perelman 9).  In argumentation, premises and conclusions may be certain to 
an individual arguer, however, there may be outside populations or parties that 
do not see such premises and conclusions as certain. The arguer strives to 
convince the outside party; this striving or motivation puts the gears of the 
argument into motion.  Outside of mathematics, there are topics that have 
phenomenological intersubjective certainty as well, and like mathematics, 
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these topics are typically not debated or explained. For example, people do not 
debate or try to persuade others about the claim, “the sky is blue.” “The sky is 
blue” can be debated via Cartesian perspectives in qualia; however, it usually 
isn’t argued. Why? Because as a human community, we agree on the 
pragmatic truth of the claim; like Aristotle’s reference to the “whiteness of 
snow” (Topics, IV, 105a), it is not a topic that puzzles people. It is generally 
reasonable to claim that the “sky is blue” or that “snow is white.” And there is 
human consensus about this claim based on the agreed concepts of “blue,” 
“white,” “snow,” and “sky” as well as the dimension of human perception. It is 
not a topic of argumentation – and according to Aristotle and Perelman, need 
not be a topic of debate (Topics, IV, 105a; Perelman 9). Spirituality, on the 
other hand, is not something that is consensually agreed upon as 
intersubjective truth; therefore, argumentation and rhetoric play cooperative 
roles within spiritual discourse in convincing audiences. Due to the pervasive 
uncertainty of the topic, this cooperation, or “rhetorical argumentation” (within 
the discipline of rhetoric) can be an effective lens to analyze this discourse, 
rather than more logical discourse (found in the discipline of philosophy). The 
topic of spirituality requires the use of practical reason: a type of reason that 
emphasizes the humanness of the reasoning process – and which The New 
Rhetoric is best equipped to unpack.   
 
Richard McKeon and the “Architectonic Productive Art” 
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Aristotle simply, yet profoundly states as the first line of the 
Metaphysics “All human beings by nature desire to know.” This aspect of 
human nature seems not to have changed much since the ancient era.  Curiosity 
still pushes us to fully understand; we still ache to know that which is 
unknown. The human desire to understand is taken as a given in this 
investigation. This investigation is concerned with the writer’s post-
understanding delivery. Once pistis (belief, faith) is established, 
communication of these understandings falls into the realm of argumentation 
and rhetorical composition. In his Rhetoric, Aristotle mentions “…all [people], 
to some extent, try to test and maintain an argument [as in dialectic] and to 
defend themselves and attack others [as in rhetoric]” (1.1.1). Spirituality, in 
relation to this insight, is concerned with the latter part of the former and the 
former part of the latter; in other words, it is my opinion that spirituality is 
concerned with maintaining an argument rather than testing an argument, and 
spiritual writers are concerned more with defending themselves rather than 
attacking others.  
Maintenance and defense of a spiritual position aligns with Aristotle’s 
epideictic (epideiktikon) category of discourse, i.e. discourse that addresses 
praise or blame. More specifically, maintaining and defending spiritual 
positions seem less concerned with blame and more concerned with the realm 
of praise (epainos). According to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, in epideictic discourse 
“all speakers praise or blame in regard to existing qualities, but they often also 
make use of other things, both reminding [the audience] of the past and 
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projecting the course of the future” (1.3.4). So although epideictic discourse 
concerns the present state of things and therefore differs from exclusively 
deliberative (which concerns the future state of things) or judicial rhetoric 
(which strictly judges past events), it still can temporally overlap deliberative 
discourse and judicial discourse.  This temporal flexibility of epideictic 
discourse allows the discourse of spirituality to be productive discourse to 
study since it can potentially allow more rhetorical avenues to be explored.  
However, “presence” and the “ present moment” is fronted in the discourse of 
spirituality;2 therefore epideictic discourse, a discourse that fronts “the 
present,” is an appropriate lens in which to view the discourse of study.     
The emerging phenomenon of spirituality is relevant to discuss, but 
there are other emerging cultural phenomena in America with their own forms 
of epideictic discourses. Surely, other phenomena and their corresponding 
discourses use argumentative schema in similar and differing manners. So 
what does spirituality demonstrate about rhetoric and argumentation that 
another discourses revolving around another phenomena do not? What is novel 
about the contemporary discourse of spirituality? Moreover, Catholic and 
Anglican epideictic versions of the discourse?  What can this show about the 
uses of rhetoric and argumentation now and in the future? What will be the 
practical takeaways from this study?  
To explore these questions, I will reach into Richard McKeon’s corpus: 
work similarly inspired by Aristotle. McKeon’s perspectives and insights into 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!2!For!a!more!in!depth!philosophical!and!theological!look!at!“presence,”!look!to!the!“event!ontology”!of!Buber,!Levinas,!or!Barth.!!
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the workings of rhetoric provide an effective and comprehensive theoretical to 
build my conclusions. Why McKeon? His theoretical analysis, almost more 
than any canonical rhetorician, is forward thinking. McKeon is concerned 
about the future of things. In his texts, McKeon constantly advises about where 
we need to go and what rhetoric should do. McKeon is a navigator of anxieties 
and potentialities; far from fear mongering, he theorizes the future and thinks 
about the role of action. Perhaps, this forward thinking pragmatism stems from 
his work with the United Nations; regardless, McKeon is a thinker to consult 
about the future of rhetoric and where it can take us as a society. In other 
words, through the lens of McKeon, I can demonstrate how a study of spiritual 
discourse and its accompanying rhetorical and argumentative techniques “do 
something in the world”: something useful and needed.  
The following study will show that subjective belief and experience 
play an active role in the discourse of spirituality. Argumentative strategies 
both increase the reasonability and the persuasiveness of the spiritual attitudes 
and actions. These strategies are flexible and adaptable. As I show in Chapter 
Two, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s argumentation is rhetorical and 
therefore can be understood as techne. Much in the same vein, and in the same 
vein as Aristotle, McKeon sees rhetoric as an art. However, McKeon qualifies 
this notion saying that contemporary rhetoric is an architectonic art (“The 
Uses” 11). McKeon’s qualifier, “architectonic,” is used in the ancient meaning 
of the word; he is implying that the rhetor is simultaneously the technician, the 
master craftsman, and the architect. The rhetor effectively uses tools of the 
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trade (e.g. words and argument), envisions a design, coordinates with 
specialists, and produces a final product (a text) (Backman xxi). More 
importantly, the architect/rhetor assumes greater responsibilities; she 
commands implications that transcend immediate textual form and function. In 
other words, an intermediary craftsman (e.g. editor) or user of the product (e.g. 
reader of the text) does not necessarily care about the transcendent implications 
of the product; the architect, on the other hand, as the grand designer of the 
product, is invested in the transcendent implications. Unlike Aristotelian 
sciences, which emphasize the productive nature of things themselves, such as 
plays, and poems, McKeon’s architectonic arts focus on the means of 
production (Backman xxiii). McKeon understands architectonic art as 
“technology itself given a rhetorical transformation” (“The Uses” 12), 
providing “the devices by which to determine the characteristics and problems 
of our times and to form the art by which to guide actions for the solutions of 
our problems and the improvements of our circumstances” (“The Uses” 11).  
So based on the argumentative strategies analyzed in this study, how do 
contemporary writers of spirituality, as grand designers of the discourse, wield 
architectonic artistry to improve our world and organize democratic 
dissonance? As I will show in Chapter Three, Catholic and Anglican discourse 
of spirituality helps audiences solve problems in their individual lives, 
providing order, peace, and serenity to chaotic lives. The texts persuade and 
teach readers about contemplative techniques, persuading readers to act on 
these teachings. These are productive implications; however, they are not quite 
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what McKeon has in mind. McKeon is a big picture thinker. Yes, spiritual 
discourse can help individuals take control of their lives but what are the 
bigger implications? What does the rhetorical composition of spirituality reveal 
about the current uses of productive architectonic rhetoric?  
In the following chapters I will demonstrate that the rhetoric and 
argumentation of spirituality rely on certain techniques, but the spiritual 
content and expression requires flexibility and freedom. The discourse combats 
traditionally dogmatic modes of truth; it allows for kairotic adaptation; it 
explores both/and relationships, allowing for expanded subjective and 
objective potentialities; it is open for interpretation, giving agency to the 
audience. In other words, spiritual texts are epideictic in an instructive manner, 
not in a demonstrative manner. McKeon clarifies this type of distinction in his 
essay, “The Uses of Rhetoric in a Technological Age.”  He explains that 
Aristotle had two Greek words which worked with the processes of 
presentation: apodeiktikos and epideiktikos. Both generally mean “to make 
known” or “show forth,” however, the prefixes qualify the words further: 
apodeiktikos precisely means “to prove” while epideiktikos means “to display” 
(“The Uses” 19). In other words, to Aristotle, apodeiktikos refers to scientific 
proof while epideiktikos refers to display oratory. It was Cicero who redefined 
the epideictic discourse category as “demonstrative,” conflating scientific 
proof and “display” (“The Uses” 19).  This Ciceronian inheritance still 
pervades conceptions of epideictic discourse today. Epideictic discourse should 
not be equated to proof, as McKeon proclaims - and contemporary discourse of 
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spirituality is a real-world example of McKeon’s proclamation in action. As I 
will show through the analysis of the discourse, writing about spirituality 
returns epideictic discourse to its original Aristotelian position: as display. 
Moreover, my analysis also qualifies epideictic discourse as educational 
display: Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s updated version of Aristotle’s 
definition. Contemporary discourse of spirituality displays subjective and 
practical perspectives, which are not demonstrable but can be considered truth. 
Communicative display is flexible and requires an artistic architect to organize 
the discourse, implant it with intention, and effectively deliver it to audiences. 
In this way, the contemporary discourse of spirituality is model example of 
rhetoric, argumentation, and writing as techne or art.  
McKeon’s “call for action” regarding epideictic discourse is a “call for 
action” that still resonates today. Contemporary discourse of spirituality 
reveals this call. As McKeon appropriately explains, mere demonstrative 
discourse of proof can be stagnant and thus problematic as a problem-solving 
tool. To heal this stagnancy, epideictic discourse must be flexible and 
pragmatic. For instance, McKeon asserts that demonstrative (and therefore, 
epideictic) rhetoric extends “to the whole field of human activity and 
knowledge” (“The Uses” 20): in other words, nothing is off-limits, including 
spiritual truths and experiences. Furthermore, demonstrative rhetoric needs not 
rely on “demonstrations by experts,” that is a “demonstration by any one 
constitutes a datum, and affects the processes of judgment” (“The Uses” 20). 
Contemporary discourse of spirituality relies upon passing the authority to the 
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practitioner so that they can be fully autonomous in their contemplative 
journeying. Demonstrative rhetoric should propel audiences into action based 
upon an evolving united opinion: action that is filled with invention and 
discovery (“The Uses” 20). Contemporary discourse of spirituality offers this 
commonplace for audiences to be led by writers and autonomously discover 
spiritual truths. Therefore, the contemporary discourse of spirituality shows a 
progressive demonstrative / epideictic rhetoric. It is “display” mixed with 
pragmatic motivations and postmodern awarenesses. As I show in Chapter 
Five, when this concoction is poured into religious fields and spheres, the 
mixture seems to dissolve ideological boundaries and hegemonic restrictions.  
A key component to the epideictic efficacy of the discourse of 
spirituality can be seen in “ commonplaces.” Hugh Blair defined 
commonplaces or “loci” as “general ideas applicable to a great many different 
subjects”: some commonplaces work with different kinds of deliveries, some 
work more particularly (974). In Blair’s example, demonstrative 
commonplaces may be the praise of a person’s “qualities of his mind” or the” 
positions that he filled” (975). These types of rigid categorical commonplaces 
found throughout the Enlightenment and Early Modern period, are not the 
commonplaces of the 21st century. Our commonplaces for discourse and 
argumentation need a broader definition, closer to Aristotle’s “common topics” 
as “places to look” for arguments (Bizzell 30-31). Kenneth Burke qualifies 
Aristotle’s commonplaces further as “outside any scientific specialty” thus 
requiring rhetorical statements (Rhetoric of Motives 51). Similar to Burke, 
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McKeon applies a similar definition to the contemporary uses of 
commonplaces. Specifically, he explains that contemporary commonplaces are 
found in “creativity.” In his 1973 essay “Creativity and the Commonplace,” 
McKeon asserts “the new interest in creativity has made ‘creativity’ a 
commonplace with many meanings and with many places in art and science, in 
practice and theory, in logic and method” (33). It is a place of “inventions and 
discoveries …expressed in the inventions of language and in genres of 
discourse … constructed by arts or actions of innovation and fixation” 
(“Creativity” 33-34). Commonplaces of creativity combat ontological 
definitions and philosophical consensuses in respect to meaning and nature. 
Rather, commonplaces of creativity productively allow for “a pluralistic 
philosophy which establishes a creative interplay of philosophies…a 
rediscovery of the commonplaces of invention and memory for innovation 
rather than the establishment of a doctrine for proselytizing and conversion 
among marked-off heresies and dogmas” (“Creativity” 34).  
McKeon’s call for creative commonplaces is profound and energizing. 
However, McKeon, like in many of his works, does not supply any concrete 
contemporary examples of creative commonplaces in action – and even if he 
did, they would be from 1973 and not from the 21st century.  The 
contemporary discourse of spirituality can fill this void. By analyzing several 
of the argumentative schema I show that by focusing on Being and subjective 
experience rather than strict rules or religious feast days, the discourse of 
spirituality allows for “interplay of philosophies.” The Gethsemani Encounter 
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shows that harmonious Buddhist and Catholic interfaith dialoging is possible 
and productive when spirituality is being discussed (Mitchell). Also, as I show 
in Chapter Five, by dissociating itself from religiousness, spiritual discourse 
resists all temptations for doctrine, heresy, or dogma establishment; moreover, 
spirituality becomes a more reasonable topic to wider audiences when it 
explicitly dissociates away from religiousness.  In other words, the dissociation 
away from rigid commonplaces of doctrine, commandments, and ideology, 
into more creative commonplaces of metaphor, personal narrative, and belief, 
is more inclusive and thus more widely persuasive.   
For instance, this creativity is demonstrated by the contemporary 
Catholic discourse of spirituality. The audience of these texts can be active 
Catholics, lapsed Catholics, liberal Catholics, or conservative Catholics. The 
commonplace of creativity allows all Catholics to effectively adhere to the 
writer’s perspective. Moreover, the overlap and similarity of Anglican 
discourse of spirituality shows a cross-denominational inclusivity. Throughout 
this study I show that within the general discourse of contemporary spirituality, 
rhetorical strategies and perspectives of Anglican writers Cynthia Bourgeault 
and Matthew Fox are almost indistinguishable from the Catholic writers. 
Furthermore, as I demonstrate, the inclusive rhetorical strategies allow all 
practitioners of spirituality to adhere to the texts in some subjective way. Even 
atheists and New Age practitioners of spirituality can understand the writers’ 
perspectives as reasonable.  
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The creative commonplace is a “commonplace of commonplaces” 
according to McKeon. Such openness of discussion in which uncertainty is 
freely negotiated requires some kind of order and organization. By a 
commonplace of commonplaces, McKeon advocates a move into 
“transformations of innovation”: in other words, pluralism fueled by invention 
(“Creativity” 36). This is a move away from reliance upon traditional 
commonplaces: that is, the comfortable familiar points of repetition that 
depend upon hindsight (“Creativity” 35). Familiar and traditional references 
have a place within a creative “commonplace of commonplaces”; however, 
these points of reference are the materials of fresh innovation. The creative 
process unites memory and invention to solve problems while not relying 
completely on past truths. Referencing past truths, rather than relying on past 
truths, can open up the inclusivity of the discourse: all audiences can 
participate and move the discussion forward (“Creativity” 35-36). It leads to 
“the establishment of the new in existence, experience, discursive exploration, 
and inclusive organization” (“Creativity” 36).  
 
Final introductory remarks 
      In this chapter I have spotlighted numerous traits that compose the 
discourse of study: contemporary Catholic and Anglican discourse of 
spirituality. First, the discourse revolves around the understanding and 
adherence of spirituality. Spirituality, in the context of this study, can be 
defined as the human internal process in which binary distinctions of objective 
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and subjective fold into each other via a transcendental union with God. 
Secondly, as I have referenced from the alignment with New Age spirituality 
and as I will show in greater depth in this study, contemporary Catholic and 
Anglican discourse of spirituality can be seen as a postmodern update to 
traditional religious discourse: an update that, as David Bentley Hart says of 
contemporary Christian thought, depends upon the “triumph of rhetoric” (3). 
Fourthly, contemporary Catholic and Anglican discourse of spirituality uses 
techniques of rhetorical argumentation and practical reason to further the 
functionality of the communication. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyeca’s The New 
Rhetoric is a framework adequately equipped to analyze such techniques. 
Thirdly, contemporary Catholic and Anglican discourse of spirituality is an 
epidictic discourse. The epidictic nature of this discourse inherits the attributes 
of display and instruction rather than demonstrative proof and ceremonial 
“praise and blame.” Finally, contemporary Catholic and Anglican discourse of 
spirituality can be seen through a McKeonian perspective. This perspective 
highlights a constructive use of freedom and rhetorical creativity, which resists 
the temptation of more totalizing modernist religious discourses.  All of these 
traits and perspectives will be further developed in this study by looking 
closely at the contemporary Catholic and Anglican spiritual texts. In the next 
chapter, I more specifically justify and explain the use of the The New Rhetoric 
framework and the overall methodology. In Chapter Three, I look at an 
important foundational set of associative argumentative schema, causal chains 
and staging, found contemporary Catholic and Anglican texts. In Chapter Four, 
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I look at a more complex and specific argumentative scheme, unlimited 
development, which depends upon causal chains and staging. In Chapter Five, 
I analyze the general argumentative strategy of dissociation found in 
contemporary Catholic and Anglican discourse of spirituality. In Chapter Six, I 
show how the strategies and schema can cooperate, explore overall 
implications of the study, and recommend further lines of inquiry. In sum, each 
chapter builds off of the previous chapter; the focus sharpens more and more 
which each subsequent section – providing, by the final chapter, a much 
clearer picture of the rhetorical construction of this discourse.  By the end of 
my study, a reader will more fully understand the pragmatic, active, and 
inclusively argumentative functionality of contemporary Catholic and 
Anglican spiritual discourse. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
METHODOLOGY, METHODS, AND FRAMEWORK 
 
In this chapter, I will explain the methodology (or “strategies of inquiry,” 
Creswell 13), methods, and framework, that I used throughout this study– and 
that I used to appropriately gauge the findings and implications. My research 
design relies on assumed knowledge claims made within the discourse of 
spirituality as well within the field of composition and rhetoric. In Chapter One 
I sketched a general landscape of these knowledge claims through an overview 
of rhetoric and argumentation as well as an overview of spirituality, mysticism, 
and contemplation within the Christian tradition. Again, not only is it 
important to demonstrate how argument, rhetoric, and spirituality are 
understood today – but also to understand, and remind ourselves of the 
historical baggage that these concepts inherit.  
I have established the background and history of spirituality; however, 
how exactly is spirituality currently being studied in the academy? What 
methods are being applied? In the last twenty years, one approach has gained 
traction within the field of religious studies: postmodern critical theory. An 
area of study has carved itself out, aptly calling itself "religious 
postmodernism," involving fresh theories of postmodern religion, secularism, 
and spirituality - as well as reworked theories of Heidegger, Derrida, and 
Deleuze.  In his 2012 book Postmodernism and the Revolution in Religious 
Studies: Toward a Semiotics of the Event, one of these theorists, Carl Raschke, 
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posits that despite this present heavy interest into the field of religious studies, 
there is a noticeable deficiency: a lack of "any serious deployment of the new 
philosophical tools provided by the postmodernist revolution in the study of 
religion"; he goes onto explain that although religion seems to be a 
Habermasian system of "communicative action," not much effort has been 
made to deploy any type of communication theory to the phenomena of 
contemporary religion (23).  Raschke's perspective is from outside of 
composition and rhetoric; however, I discuss Raschke’s remark to indicate a 
recent noticeable void in theory and understanding of the workings of religious 
and spiritual discourse: a void that requires some insight. I intend to provide 
some of that insight with this study.   
 In the field of composition and rhetoric, generative work has been done on 
institutional religious discourse, the rhetoric of religious ideology, and writing 
about faith in the college classroom (e.g. Crowley, Depalma, Ringer, Vander 
Lei) – and all of these theories I will engage with in Chapter Six. However, 
again, there seems to be a lack of investigation into the communication and 
discourses of spiritualities. My general investigation and the corresponding 
methods are meant to study and unpack the rhetorical construction of the 
discourse of spirituality and the implications of the discourse. Unlike Raschke 
and the theorists of 21st century religious postmodernism, I will not be 
theorizing the subjectivity of the writers of the contemporary discourse of 
spirituality, nor the subjectivities of the readers of the contemporary discourse 
of spirituality. Instead I will embrace discourse analysis as a research method. 
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Again, since I am studying the mechanisms of discourse rather than the 
convictions themselves, discourse analysis serves this study as the most 
appropriate and productive method. In the field of composition and rhetoric, 
not much research has been pursued regarding the contemporary discourse of 
spirituality.  Therefore, rather than plunging into field research regarding 
human subjects, a textual study of contemporary discourse of spirituality needs 
to be established. An understanding of the written product needs to be laid 
down before writing process research takes place. My study serves as that 
necessary foundation. I anticipate studying the discourse of spirituality via 
human subjects and field research after this study is complete. 
      What type of discourse am I analyzing? My sample includes 14 
contemporary Catholic or Anglican texts about spirituality. As I will show in 
this chapter, I have chosen this sample as a convenience sample. The sample 
narrows the scope of this project into a manageable endeavor, while 
simultaneously demonstrating some of the rhetorical trends within the general 
contemporary discourse of spirituality.  
     What is the sample? Below is a chart of the texts that were analyzed. I 
have organized them from most recent to least recent (Table 1): 
Text title Writer name 
(Affiliation) 
Year of 
publication 
Number of 
pages 
Tools Matter: 
Beginning the 
Spiritual Journey 
Mary Margaret 
Funk (Catholic) 
2013 205 
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The Path of 
Centering 
Prayer: 
Deepening Your 
Experience of 
God  
David Frenette 
(Catholic) 
2012 229 
A Sunlit Absence: 
Silence, 
Awareness, and 
Contemplation 
Martin Laird 
(Catholic) 
2011 192 
Into the Silent 
Land: A Guide to 
the Christian 
Practice of  
Contemplation 
Martin Laird 
(Catholic) 
2006 154 
Centering Prayer 
and Inner 
Awakening 
Cynthia Bourgeault 
(Anglican) 
2004 177 
Thoughts Matter: 
The Practice of 
the Spiritual Life 
Mary Margaret 
Funk (Catholic) 
2003 140 
Tools Matter for 
Practicing the 
Spiritual Life 
Mary Margaret 
Funk (Catholic) 
2001 167 
Mystical Hope: Cynthia Bourgeault 2001 104 
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Trusting in the 
Mercy of God. 
(Anglican) 
Inner Compass: 
An Invitation to 
Ignatian 
Spirituality 
Margaret Silf 
(Catholic)  
1999 268 
Centered Living: 
The Way of 
Centering Prayer 
M. Basil 
Pennington 
(Catholic) 
1999 219 
“Invitation to 
Love” 
Thomas Keating 
(Catholic) 
1992 123 
The Coming of 
the Cosmic 
Christ: The 
Healing of 
Mother Earth and 
the Birth of 
Global 
Renaissance  
Matthew Fox 
(Catholic/Anglican)  
1988 278 
“Open Mind, 
Open Heart” 
Thomas Keating 
(Catholic) 
1986 125 
Original 
Blessing: A 
Matthew Fox 
(Catholic/Anglican)  
1983 348 
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Primer in 
Creation 
Spirituality 
 
    How diverse is the sample? Each text is written by a Catholic or 
Anglican writer: 4 texts by Anglican writers, 10 texts by Roman Catholic 
writers. From the 14 texts, 8 texts are written by men, 6 texts are written by 
women. Regarding the credentials of the writers, 2 texts are written by spiritual 
retreat directors (Frenette, Silf), 4 texts are written by Catholic and Anglican 
clergy (Bourgeault, Fox) and 8 texts are written by those in the monastic 
vocation (Keating, Funk, Laird, Pennington). The texts represent the 
contemporary era spanning from 1983 to 2013: 3 texts from the 1980s (1983, 
1986, 1988), 3 texts from the 1990s (1992, 1999, 1999), 5 texts from the 2000s 
(2001, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2006) and 3 texts from the 2010s (2011, 2012, 2013). 
Each work is categorized by the Library of Congress Cataloging system as a 
text about “Spiritual Life,” “Spirituality,” “Spiritual Exercises,” or 
“Contemplation.”  
      What kind of discourse analysis am I administering to these texts? 
“Discourse” and “discourse analysis” have assorted meanings to scholars in 
different fields (Schiffrin 1). For this study, I have chosen to administer critical 
discourse analysis (CDA) to the 14 contemporary texts. As indicated by 
discourse analyst Teun Van Dijk, critical discourse analysis looks to 
“understand, expose, and ultimately resist social inequality”; CDA is not a 
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school of discourse studies, but rather offers a mode or a perspective for 
theorizing and analysis (352). She mentions that CDA provides an especially 
relevant perspective in the fields of rhetoric, argumentation, pragmatics, and 
stylistics (352, 358): all fields that will be addressed in this study. As Van Dijk 
indicates, CDA “does not have a unitary theoretical framework” nor is it a 
specific avenue of research, but rather, CDA navigates questions about social 
problems, society and culture, power, and the link between texts and society 
(353). Moreover, CDA looks to explain how discourse is a form of social 
action. In sum, in this study, I do not assert claims about how the texts are 
composed; I do not assert claims about cognition; rather, I analyze how the 
texts work in society, determining how the texts indicate changing power 
structures and guide audiences to action. In this study, the changing power 
structures relate to individual empowerment and social inclusivity within the 
spheres of subjective and religious belief. Therefore, critical discourse analysis 
offers the most appropriate method to navigate the following research 
questions of this study: How are rhetorically argumentative schemas are being 
strategically used within the discourse of spirituality? How do writers of 
spirituality adhere audiences in a rhetorically inclusive way? How do these 
writers to lead audiences to action? What does the contemporary discourse of 
spirituality reveal about the ways that religion is presently being culturally 
negotiated?  
     How do I specifically use critical discourse analysis in my project to 
investigate these research questions? I locate examples of rhetorical and 
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argumentative structures, (examples modeled by Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca in The New Rhetoric), extract them, and unpack the rhetorical 
implications of the examples. I evaluate the importance of the textual examples 
in accordance to the frequency of the textual occurrences.  The patterns of 
rhetorical structures and schema that most repeatedly occur throughout the 14 
texts characterize the sample most adequately. Therefore, I dissect and explain 
the most repeated rhetorical structures and schema in the context of the 
contemporary discourse of spirituality, demonstrating how the writers 
inclusively adhere audiences to the message of spiritual texts.   
    This study is not meant to solely point out that certain argumentative 
schema exist, but rather this study means to show persuasively functions of the 
discourse of spirituality. In other words, I am concerned with how the 
discourse of spirituality works, rather than merely what the components are.  I 
refer to the “persuasive machinery of the discourse of spirituality” throughout 
this study. By this I mean the active processes that theoretically affect an 
audience. Again, such machinery serves functional purposes of adhering 
audiences. I examine the argumentative schema as a means to understanding 
the pragmatic logic of projected persuasive trajectories. I do not show every 
scheme or “gear of this machine”; but rather, I show several major rhetorical 
constructions within this discourse, which reveal similar movements toward 
inclusive adherence. In brief, I do not make totalizing scientific claims based 
on this study. Instead, I use theories and frameworks to unpack various figures 
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found in the texts - and excavate how this particular persuasive adherence 
works, not merely what the persuasive adherence is.  
This is a similar technique applied by Jeanne Fahnestock in Rhetorical 
Figures in Science. In the study, she examines verbal figures as they epitomize 
a line of reasoning. Fahnestock explains that a figure is  “a representative or 
exemplary selection,” “a verbal summary that epitomizes a line of reasoning,” 
“a condensed…rendering of the relationship among a set of terms…that 
constitutes the argument and that could be expressed at greater length” (24). 
Therefore, in this study, I spotlight argumentative structures as epitomes in 
order to comment on the “relationships among sets of terms” and excavate that, 
which “could be expressed at greater length.”       
 To show my use textual epitomes to capture particular argumentative 
structures I have spotlighted Fahnestock’s methodology found in Rhetorical 
Figures in Science; however, unlike Fahnestock I am not highlighting 
rhetorical figures and tropes. Figures and tropes are generally associated with 
meanings of words, utterances, and changing significations at smaller levels - 
which can change large-scale meanings (Lanham 101)3. Rather than examine 
these impactful minutia, I examine schema, or general architectures of 
arguments found in the contemporary discourse of spirituality. A scheme, 
according to Richard Lanham’s Handlist of Rhetorical Terms, is a “highly 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 However, in Tropics of Discourse Hayden White points out that “trope” derives from the 
Classical Greek tropus, which means “turn.” Therefore, White’s understanding of tropes and 
tropics broadly encompass “turns” in logic as well - such as moves within syllogistic reasoning 
(2-3). 
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artificial pattern” of which words are woven into.4 Henry Peacham in The 
Garden of Eloquence, a popular Renaissance rhetorical handbook consulted by 
Richard Lanham, defines a scheme as “a fashion of writing or speaking made 
new by some Art” that does not change signification (28). In addition, 
Peacham defines a figure as “a form of words, oration, of sentence made new 
by the art” and he defines a trope as “an artificial alteration of a word or a 
sentence” (75). Peacham’s definitions highlight that schema create more 
general artificial newness that does not alter sentence-level or word-level 
meanings – while, on the other hand, figures and tropes rhetorically alter 
sentence and word level meanings. So throughout this study I examine the 
former: schema or deliberately arranged argumentative patterns that increase 
reasonableness and create fresh rhetorical appeals without directly change 
word and sentence level meanings. In the context of Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca’s The New Rhetoric, the schema relate directly to the rhetorical 
structures of practical reasoning.  
     Why am I not examining rhetorical figures and tropes proper? Since the 
contemporary discourse of spirituality is a relatively new area of study in the 
field of composition and rhetoric, it seems appropriate and responsible to 
examine the broad scaffolding of the arguments rather than jump to the smaller 
rhetorical units. “One must crawl before learning to walk” – as the idiom goes; 
analogously, “crawling” can be equated to understanding the larger 
argumentative schema whereas the “walking” can be equated to understanding 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!4!Whether or not the scheme changes the meaning of the words is sometimes debated but often 
ignored (Lanham 101) – and this semantic point lies outside the scope of my investigation.!
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the rhetorical figures and tropes. In a similar fashion, Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca position their section on associative schema (Part III, Chapter Two, 
“Arguments Based on Structure of Reality”) before the section on smaller units 
of relational argumentation (Part III, Chapter Three, “The Relations 
Establishing the Structure of Reality”). These smaller argumentative units 
include example, illustration, models, analogy, metaphor.5 Although these are 
important elements of the discourse of spirituality, my study would be 
overextended if I fully and responsibly explored these elements of rhetorical 
construction. Therefore, as I explain in more depth in the next chapter, I 
humbly analyze the general schema of association, the “arguments based on 
the structure of reality,” throughout this study, rather than the more focused 
“relations establishing the structures of reality.” In doing so, I can sketch a 
broad picture of the discourse and flesh out general implications while 
maintaining control over a complex discourse analysis.  
     Why do I use so much theory in a study like this?  The foundation of 
religious and spiritual discourse is built upon idea, feeling, and experience. As 
I have explained in Chapter One, the discourse of spirituality is a discourse that 
communicates ineffable and experiential complexities. These complexities 
resist not only linguistic expression, but also scientific investigation and proof. 
Since the discourse resists many empirical data gathering techniques, 
analyzing particular argumentative structures in relation to theory provides an 
appropriate excavation of the reasoning processes. By “theory” I mean 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!5!Analogy and metaphor are referred to in Chapter Six of my study to demonstrate the 
relational cooperation of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s schema. 
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primarily “rhetorical theory” which should not be confused with “philosophy.”  
My use of rhetorical theory in this study aligns with the ubiquity found in its 
refusal of traditional philosophy or a refusal of, what Rorty titles, systematic 
“normal discourse.” I embrace the evolutionary elasticity of rhetorical theory 
in this study as it cooperates with the evolutionary elasticity of spiritual 
communication and discourse. As Maurice Charland contends in his 2003 
article “The Constitution of Rhetoric’s Tradition,” “rhetoric, while not 
disciplinary, nevertheless ‘hangs together’ as a domain of knowledge even 
though it does not cohere conceptually”; rhetoric speaks to other intellectual 
genres rather than defining them or being defined by them (119-120).  
Therefore, the analysis of rhetoric in my study speaks to discursive aspects of 
religion and spirituality: aspects that resist empirical data gathering techniques 
and require theoretical exploration and at this initial foundational stage of the 
investigation.  
In this study, I have chosen to examine spiritual authorities in the 
Catholic and Anglican tradition rather than medical authorities, self-help, or 
psychological authorities in the sphere of spirituality. Strictly spiritual writers 
such as clergy, retreat leaders, and monastics, possess reliable theological 
training and backgrounds of personal spiritual experience. By highlighting 
reliable authorities, I insulate the study from a potential interfering motive that 
can skew the data: spiritual writers’ desire for monetary gain via unethical 
wielding of rhetorical power. The exploitation of spirituality and spiritual 
advice as a means to make money can potentially cloud the authenticity of 
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spiritual experiences documented in the texts. An unethical book-selling 
motive may be problematic when discussing the communication of truths and 
advice found in texts about spirituality. So I am acknowledging the motive, as 
a potential obstacle that requires economic and cultural critiques, which lie 
outside of the scope of my study. As an attempt to combat these dangers 
sometimes found in New Age and self-help subgenres of spirituality, I have 
chosen to the explore spiritual authorities primarily from monastic orders who 
write apart from the tempting (and many times twisted) marketplace ethics. I 
think we can agree that monks and nuns (and ex-monks and ex-nuns) are 
consummate authorities of spirituality and contemplation within the traditions 
of Catholicism and Anglicanism. Besides a portion of the day spent physically 
working so that the monastery and convent may sustain its livelihood, these 
initiates spend a majority of their time in prayer, contemplation, or educating 
or receiving education.6  The writers whom I have selected who are not part of 
a monastic order are knowledgeable authorities in the religious traditions: 
experientially and theologically.     
I have selected authorities in this study that convey knowledge, express 
personal experience, and provide advice based on backgrounds of spirituality – 
and wish to communicate such points successfully. As a foundation of this 
successful communication, the audience must believe the writers’ thoughts and 
perspectives within the written texts. For the writer to arrive at a “believing-
audience” or “adherence of minds,” the writer must rhetorically strategize 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!6!Information gathered from numerous daily itineraries found on official Catholic/Anglican 
monastery and convent websites.  
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particular structures of argumentation to connect the reader, albeit perhaps only 
for the duration of the read, to the writers’ own personal understandings of 
spirituality. 
      Overall, the sample of contemporary Catholic and Anglican discourse 
of spirituality can offer a representative sample of a more general 
contemporary discourse of spirituality. The conclusions drawn from this study 
reveal emerging trends in contemporary uses of rhetoric and argumentation as 
well as emerging trends in the spheres of contemporary religion and 
spirituality.  However, as a representative sample, there are clear limitations 
that are inevitable and must be taken into account: published texts are only one 
type of discourse, Catholic and Anglican texts are only two denominations of 
Christianity, Christianity is only one world religion, the writers represent only 
American Catholic and Anglican spirituality.  Despite the clear limitations, the 
following study may illuminate emerging trends that can be further studied 
within a larger discourse of spirituality, raise awareness about the constructive 
nature of this particular discourse, and open up future avenues of generative 
inquiry.  
 
The New Rhetoric: Taxonomy and Techne 
As illustrated in Chapter One, the flexible and fluid nature of spiritual 
content forces spiritual discourse to resist scientific and referential expressions.  
Spiritual content requires an openness of perspectives, frameworks, and 
rhetorical composition. Spirituality can be seen as an exemplary model of 
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resistance toward totalizing discourse: totalizing scientific discourse, logical 
discourse, and ecclesiastical discourse. Herein indicates the productivity 
behind studying rhetorical and argumentative structures that are found within 
spiritual texts. The topic of spirituality is malleable enough to sync and flow 
with the current postmodern condition and democratic relativisms: key 
components of the realm of rhetoric. And, as Kenneth Burke points out in A 
Rhetoric of Motives, it is rhetoric that can serve to “lead us through the 
Scramble, the Wrangle of the Market Place, the flurries and flare-ups of the 
Human Barnyard” (23); therefore, rhetoric provides an epideictic tool that can 
order spiritual perspectives in a communicative manner. 
Based on history and the current trends in spirituality, alluded to in 
Chapter One, it seems that the conversation about spirituality will never end 
because spiritual realities are not objectively provable. Spiritual discourse is 
naturally composed of opinions; due to the phenomenological, subjective, and 
experiential dimensions of spirituality, there is always a degree of relativism. 
Vis-à-vis Richard Rorty’s edifying discourse, spiritual discourse can be seen as 
a “protest against attempts to close off conversation by proposals for universal 
commensuration through the hypostatization of some privileged set of 
descriptions”; or in a more positive Rortyian articulation, “the infinite striving 
for truth over ‘all of Truth’” (377). Since spirituality is simultaneously 
nebulous and experiential, discourse about spirituality lends itself to “keeping 
the conversation going”; this perpetual “striving for truth,” as well as a 
perpetual desire to express and communicate the “striving for truth,” 
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necessitates argumentative and rhetorical aims. To accentuate Burke’s 
observation again, argumentative and rhetorical aims, guide us through the 
“Scramble”, “the Market Place”, and “the Human Barnyard”; in this 
investigation, the “Scramble,” the “Marketplace,” and the “Human Barnyard” 
happen to be located in the discourse of spirituality.         
If the discourse of spirituality aligns so fittingly with the postmodern 
relativisms of discourse and Rorty’s edifying discourse, why use systematic 
descriptions and taxonomies of rhetoric and argumentation? Why use 
Aristotle’s categories, viewing spirituality through an epideictic lens? Why use 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s The New Rhetoric to highlight the machinery 
of rhetoric and argumentation? Are not the systems of Aristotle and Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca totalizing? And consequently, isn’t it counterintuitive to 
use totalizing systems to analyze that which naturally resists totalizing systems, 
i.e. rhetoric?   
Richard Larson discusses this counter-intuition in his 1984 essay 
“Classifying Discourse: Limitations and Alternatives.” In this essay, Larson 
specifically criticizes the limits of categorical taxonomies as found within 
James Kinneavy’s A Theory of Discourse. To counter such taxonomic 
frameworks, Larson’s offers “scales,” rather than categories, in which to plot 
the operations and modes of discourse. He explains that scaling “can give 
much clearer direction to both analysis and creation than the more rigid 
taxonomies give”; scaling resists “making pieces of discourse conform to the 
supposed characteristics of uninformative classifications of discourse” (213).  
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Although I understand Larson’s zeal to increase the flexibility of our analytical 
tools as well as the problematic nature of Kinneavy’s more rigid categories in 
A Theory of Discourse, I think that it is rash to discard taxonomies altogether. 
Taxonomies are useful if presented as pragmatic handbooks or guidebook of 
techne that shed light on the rhetorical and argumentative machinery of 
discourse.   
To illustrate this point, I look to Walter Beale’s introductory remarks 
found in A Pragmatic Theory of Rhetoric. Written in 1987, Beale’s 
investigation can be seen as an updated more complicated version of 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric7 (8).  Both texts offer a comprehensive theory of discourse 
and rhetoric via taxonomy of discursive aims, modes, and geneses. However, 
Beale sees Aristotle’s taxonomy too restrictive and complicates it with more 
contemporary notions and contexts. Beale describes the ancient world as 
restricted by preexisting discursive genres and traditions that have logical and 
universal gravitas, whereas in the contemporary world, these discursive 
foundations “exist in creative tension with individualistic motives and novel 
forms of invention, inspired by novel situations” (108).  Although more 
meticulously categorical in his approach, Beale approaches the study of 
rhetoric in a similar manner as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca: both account 
for the more complex activity of modern discourse. In Aristotelian fashion, 
both theorists break down large concepts into smaller groupings and analyze 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!7!And can be seen as an updated version of James Kinneavy’s A Theory of Discourse (1971) as 
well. Beale implies this later in A Pragmatic Theory of Rhetoric (57-60)  – and not in his 
introductory remarks. Beale also uses “scaling” like Larson proposed; however Beale uses 
them in tandem with Kinneavy-like categories.!
! 58!
them accordingly, highlighting the relationships between the groupings. 
However, unlike Aristotle, more modern views of rhetoric such as Beale and 
Perelman’s frameworks, acknowledge the agency of the knower, and 
acknowledge that reality is not clearly defined as an independent entity 
(Lunsford and Ede 47).  Using a taxonomy may seem incompatible with more 
postmodern sensibilities, that is, it may seem to suggest regressing back to 
modernist epistemology and Enlightenment ontology; however, this is not 
necessarily the case. Beale describes his own organized categorical taxonomy 
as a collection of theories that can guide criticism and practice; moreover, like 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, he spotlights the pragmatism of the approach, 
which is not predictive and comprehensive, but rather relational (Beale 3).  In 
other words, the components of the taxonomies, and assorted taxonomies as 
entire systems, when put in conversation with each other, highlight types of 
perspectives, rather than totalizing perspectives. Therefore, in response to 
Larson’s 1984 concern, these types of frameworks and taxonomies have a 
place as a tool for understanding as long as the frameworks and taxonomies are 
presented as handbooks of guidance, and not presented as totalizing meta-
narratives. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s treatise as well as Walter Beale’s 
work are presented as handbooks of guidance – and are productive as such.    
However, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca implement a framed 
taxonomy in The New Rhetoric that differs from Beale’s A Pragmatic Theory 
of Rhetoric: Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca highlight theory but also the 
technical uses of rhetoric and argumentation. In other words, a rhetor looking 
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for persuasive strategies and rhetorical constructions can peruse The New 
Rhetoric for pragmatic and applicable techniques. Beale’s book, on the other 
hand, is a theoretical taxonomy; a rhetor does not find a usable handbook of 
direct rhetorical strategies. The practical nature of The New Rhetoric allows it 
to be parceled into bits and pieces; it is systematic but not a transcendental 
system. We need to keep this in mind throughout my study - as it may be easy 
to succumb to the temptation, misunderstanding Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca’s insights as transcendental or totalizing (Crosswhite, “Awakening” 
187). As James Crosswhite states in his 2008 article “Awakening the Topoi,” 
The New Rhetoric “does not intend to offer a model, and the complexity of 
what it does offer raises doubts about whether it can even be referred to as a 
model…It [The New Rhetoric] is nowhere as simple as the Toulmin 
model…Its [the Toulmin model’s] marketability as a model is due to its 
simplicity. The new rhetoric project has never been marketable” (187). The 
New Rhetoric’s structure is complex and flexible for use. Moreover, it is open 
and points to communal engagement. In The New Rhetoric, the authors write 
about their mission stating, “The theory of argumentation will help to develop 
what a logic of value judgments has tried in vain to provide, namely the 
justification of possibility of human community in the sphere of action when 
this justification cannot be based on a reality or objective truth” (Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca 514). As shown in Chapter One of my investigation, the 
discourse of spirituality is an epideictic discourse of open reality/open realities; 
due to the experiential quality of the discourse of spirituality, it can be viewed 
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as a discourse that naturally negotiates subjective diversity and resists 
objective truth. Therefore, by highlighting the argumentative aspects of a 
discourse of spirituality, the mission of Perelman and Olbrects-Tyteca can be 
spotlighted; that is, justifying, through discourse, “human community in the 
sphere of action” when the content resists a consensus of reality perception. 
The discourse of spirituality perhaps more than any other type of discourse 
underlines this democratic mission of The New Rhetoric - a mission that 
stresses talking/writing to each other and not past each other.       
Since effectively communicative talking/writing to each other requires 
adaptation to audience and kairos, The New Rhetoric, like Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 
can be seen as a handbook of persuasive strategies. By tracing strategies of 
rhetoric and argumentation throughout Catholic and Anglican spiritual texts, I 
gesture to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s approach of rhetoric and 
argumentation as practical craft. Therefore, by showing these strategies at 
work, I wish to illustrate that The New Rhetoric acts as a handbook of 
technological means. Simultaneously, I will spotlight how the nebulous area of 
spirituality must rely on a strategic communicative craft in order to share and 
part the “clouds of unknowing” for others. Therefore, the discourse of 
spirituality reveals The New Rhetoric as a handbook of techne – and 
simultaneously, The New Rhetoric reveals the discourse of spirituality as a 
discourse that relies on rhetorical argumentation as a craft or art. The handbook 
and this specific discourse can be instrumentally inter-reliant or reciprocal: the 
common denominator being techne. In other words, inserting a discourse that 
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resists linguistic expression (the discourse of spirituality) into a taxonomy such 
as The New Rhetoric spotlights the discursive need for a flexible craft to 
adequately express such a nebulous subject matter; at the same time, inserting 
a discourse that resists linguistic expression (the discourse of spirituality) into a 
taxonomy such as The New Rhetoric, spotlights the flexible nature of the 
taxonomy itself, thus showing that The New Rhetoric is not a rigid categorical 
Enlightenment-type of system, but rather it is a guiding tool of techne.   
In Rhetoric Reclaimed: Aristotle and the Liberal Arts Tradition, Janet 
Atwill provides a thorough look at the ancient concept of techne (7th century 
BCE - 4th century BCE). She describes three foundational characteristics of 
techne that contrast the liberal arts tradition as well as many philosophical 
disciplines of knowledge (2, 6). This perspective of techne is primary to the 
understanding of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s The New Rhetoric, as well 
as the understanding of spiritual discourse. Enlarging Atwill’s discussion to 
include The New Rhetoric and spiritual discourse can clarify a similar technical 
function of these bodies of work - and can justify how each can augment the 
other. 
First, she explains, “techne is a never static, normative body of 
knowledge. A techne is described as … a set of transferable strategies, […] 
contingent on situation and purpose. A techne neither represents reality nor 
encompasses a set of deductive postulates” (she asserts in a footnote that her 
term “normative” refers to “standardized”) (7). Clearly, The New Rhetoric fits 
with Atwill’s first characteristic of techne. The New Rhetoric provides a “set of 
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transferable strategies” of persuasion and argumentation that can (and should) 
adapt to situation and purpose; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca promote the 
transferability of these strategies remarking, “The essential consideration for 
the speaker who has set himself the task of persuading concrete individuals is 
that his construction of the audience should be adequate to the occasion” (19). 
It is no surprise that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca clearly resist totalizing 
logical and traditionally philosophical discourse (e.g. Platonic ontology, 
Cartesian rationality, Hegelian dialectical logic) in the introductory and 
concluding chapters of The New Rhetoric. This resistance is a focal point of the 
treatise in general. Also, since the discourse of spirituality allows freeplay with 
the linguistic and persuasive representations of reality, techne seems to sync 
well with the content of spiritual discourse. Atwill points out that “a techne 
neither represents reality nor encompasses a set of deductive postulates”; it is a 
craft of freeplay. Techne as freeplay works well with nebulous spiritual content 
that requires freeplay to effectively communicate such freeform content to 
audiences. 
     A second foundational aspect of techne as explained by Atwill is an 
illustration of subjective freeplay. She explains that “techne resists 
identification with a normative subject […] every exchange of techne creates 
[…] different subjectivities. As such, there are no well-defined boundaries 
between subject and knowledge” (7). As shown in Chapter One of this 
investigation, spirituality hinges upon experience, and therefore subjectivity, 
relativity, and difference are central to the writing and talk about spirituality. 
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Discourse about spirituality pushes the “boundaries between subject and 
knowledge” and consequently, requires techne to navigate past these 
boundaries and communicate these voyages in an effective and persuasive 
manner. The New Rhetoric appropriately supplies and explains strategies of 
rhetorical and argumentative techne for the writer to use when arguing spiritual 
content to an audience. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s handbook does not 
shut down subject agency and experience – but rather celebrates it as integral 
to rhetorical argumentation. The authors’ mission certainly and famously 
revolves around audience (“it is in terms of an audience that an argumentation 
develops”) yet the authors also mention that this development is based on 
opinion (5). Although adaptation to audience is a focus of The New Rhetoric, 
adaptation to audience is not a catchall that swallows up a writer’s subjectivity, 
reforms it as inauthentic, and spits out “what the audience wants to hear.” 
Subjective conviction and authenticity have a place in Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyecta’s argumentative strategies (44) – which can include subjective 
conviction and authenticity formed by spiritual experience.  
The third foundational attribute of techne according to Atwill is that 
“techne marks a domain of human intervention and invention. […] A techne is 
knowledge as production, not product; intervention  and articulation, rather 
than representation” (7). Although, more concerned with “intervention and 
articulation” than “invention,” both The New Rhetoric and the epideictic 
discourse of spirituality highlight process and action. Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca promote that “an efficacious argument […] set[s] in motion the 
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intended action (a positive action or an abstention from action) or …a 
willingness to act which will appear at the right moment” (45). The epideictic 
discourse of spirituality uses rhetorical argumentation to adhere an audience 
but rather to genuinely teach spiritual tools. These epideictic texts rhetorically 
nudge an audience to practice spirituality in their own lives, simultaneously 
convincing the audience that it is a reasonable endeavor to pursue. Overall, the 
texts advocate a process. With an audience in mind, the spiritual epideictic 
texts show the avenues of deeper experiential understanding of God; however, 
this goal is an end-in-view, or a process of production, not a final telos or 
product. As explored in Chapter Four of this investigation, rhetorical 
argumentation reinforce an active process of spirituality in these texts, by 
constantly reinforcing the reasonableness of the action. 
Less concerned with Atwill’s emphasis on invention, I wish to look 
behind the curtain at the techne of rhetorical argumentation. This techne 
aspires for “adherence of minds” based on reasonableness, and not rationality - 
what Richard McKeon calls a “techne of logos.” A democratic understanding 
of inquiry, rhetoric, and argumentation: one that aligns with McKeon’s and 
Rorty’s idea of “keeping the conversation going” rather than finding the one 
truth (Backman x-xi). McKeon’s use of “logos” in his term “techne of logos” 
as well as the aspect of “striving for truth” within Rorty’s “edifying discourse” 
both point to a unifying vision acting as the glue that quells the threat of a 
chaotic multiplicity (vis-à-vis Lyotardian relativism) and establishes order(s).8 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!8!Since!Rorty!studied!under!McKeon,!this!may!be!theoretical!residue!held!on!to!by!Rorty!from!McKeon.!And!could!possibly!explain!the!similarity!here.!!
! 65!
By analyzing these texts, I show how authors of spiritual epideictic texts 
harness both rhetorical and argumentative techne to persuasively articulate the 
topic of spirituality, adhere audiences, and suggest action.  
 
Methodical Purposing 
 In sum, my critical discourse analysis, my representative sample of the 
discourse, and my choice of discourse, scratches the surface of the larger issue 
at play in the realm of spirituality, communicative theory, and rhetoric.  I 
realize that this study requires a substantial amount of humility and restraint. 
This overall study is intended to raise questions, ignite discussion, and 
complicate existing conversations.  
 The novelty of the discourse of spirituality within the field of rhetoric and 
composition makes this a unique study; however, the argumentative devices 
examined are also evident in other discourses. Therefore, a close look at the 
“machinery” of applied argumentative schema of The New Rhetoric can 
provide new rays of light that can illuminate how these argumentative schemas 
work in other discourses. This is similar perspective to that provided by Jeanne 
Fahnestock in her 1999 look at Rhetorical Figures in Science.  In the preface, 
Fahnestock seems to realize that scholars may approach her study with 
apprehension, not because of her expertise, but because the scholars may have 
limited interest in the rhetoric of science (xi).  Similarly, I am aware that many 
scholars may not be particularly interested in religion or spirituality, given the 
general academic climate of secularity. However, I think all scholars of 
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rhetoric and composition can extract productive insights from my study of 
contemporary discourse of spirituality. Firstly, the analyzed discourse of my 
study is from the last thirty years. Therefore, it is a recent discourse, which 
reflects upon the current rhetorical and cultural trends and patterns.  Secondly, 
as shown with the PEW Institute data, the rise of spirituality in America is a 
real phenomenon that is happening now. The kairotic relevance of my study 
can reveal patterns that can have implications in other discourses and fields: a 
cultural ripple effect. Thirdly, by closely looking at the contemporary 
discourse of spirituality, my study can vanquish misconceptions about 
contemporary religion and spirituality. Religion and spirituality, I think, too 
often is written off as impractical, foolish, and unintellectual. As my study 
shows, contemporary spirituality serves a practical function; and through 
rhetorically argumentative devices, I show that is a sophisticated discourse, a 
relevant discourse with its roots grounded in two thousand years worth of 
spiritual tradition. Is it unintellectual? Yes it is: truly and beautifully. And, to 
some extent, this study celebrates the unintellectual quality of the 
communication. The discourse of spirituality navigates experiences, which the 
intellect cannot comprehend: the apophatic and ineffable. The current rise of 
postmodern critical theory in religious studies reveals a soaring relevance of 
these issues and, as scholars of composition and rhetoric, it is our 
responsibility to acknowledge and think through the implications of these 
issues.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
FIRST ANALYSIS OF ASSOCIATIVE SCHEMA: STRUCTURES OF 
REALITY AND PRAGMATIC STAGING  
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca do not 
advocate formal logic and rationality; instead, they are more concerned with 
the practical uses of reason that are tethered to rhetorical aims. However, they 
do not completely neglect the uses of logic. They explore the formalization of 
essentially non-formal characteristics of argumentation. This is an 
argumentative technique referred to as “quasi-logical” argumentation (193). 
Although in the contemporary era, we are far removed from positivist thinking, 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca realize that formal logic still has a place as a 
tool of argumentation. They must in good conscience admit logic into their 
handbook: for to avoid discussing logic would be to make a totalizing 
statement about the futility of logic. Instead they present logic as “quasi-logic”: 
one of numerous tools of argumentation to use in respect to a type of audience.  
They make it clear that in isolation, formal reasoning is an “approximate and 
imperfect” form of argumentation that is reductionist and should not be given 
primacy (193).    
In Chapter One of Part Three of The New Rhetoric, Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, explain various argumentative techniques or “schemes” 
associated with quasi-logical argumentation, such as relationships of 
contradiction, transivity, divisions of terms and claims, etc. The discourse of 
! 68!
spirituality does not front such logical elements to outwardly express rational 
appearance. Formal logic is not an appropriate mode of argumentation for the 
discourse of spirituality since spirituality is largely based upon experiential 
claims. As Episcopal priest Morton Kelsey, explains in Encounter with God, 
there is no logical certainty found in experiencable realities – only degrees of 
probability (125). Arguing probability necessarily implies reasonableness and 
rhetorical aims, rather than rationality and scientific aims. 
And this is not a new issue when addressing the discourse of 
spirituality. Thomas Aquinas’ and his fellow medieval scholastics 
systematically captured theology with formal logic – however, these efforts fell 
far from capturing the experiential nature of spirituality. Formal logic was 
deemed far too sterile and rigid to capture the open realm of possibilities found 
within spiritual experience. This was a primary point of the 12th century 
mystic, Bernard of Clarveaux: a point specifically found in his passionate 
stance against Peter Abelard and the Scholastics. Bernard claimed that sola 
ratione (reason alone) threatened genuine Christian subjective spirituality 
(Russell 382-383). Although Bernard was quite a zealot for the cause, he 
makes a valid point that can be factored into the contemporary discourse of 
spirituality: formal reasoning is not adequate in capturing the nature of 
spirituality.  
What types of general argumentative methods are used then? There 
must be some kind of communicative middle ground that is not swallowed up 
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by the Lyotardian “differend” 9 and degenerate into absolute dissensus and 
chaos. Since there is no objective material evidence that supports spiritual 
realities, differing spiritual realities can be linked to common empirical 
realities so that audiences can commonly adhere to the possibility of the 
existence of spiritual realities. In other words, spirituality must be connected to 
the material world to prove a common dimension of realness.  Such a 
connection does not have to be exclusively made through the content of the 
argument, but instead through the structure of the argument of which the 
content is bound. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca label these, “arguments 
based on the structure of reality”: a subgrouping of Perelman’s “schemes of 
association.” Instead of focusing on the agreement of formal thought, such as 
found in the quasi-logical schema, “structures of reality,” associative schema 
embrace the “agreement with the very nature of things” (191). According to 
the authors, these arguments “make use of this structure [of reality] to establish 
a solidarity between accepted judgments and others one wishes to promote.” 
With argumentative structure acting as the glue to the real world, the audience 
becomes “sufficiently secure” in the proposed beliefs, and this can “allow the 
unfolding of the argumentation” (261).  In other words, an arguer applies the 
structures of reality that are commonly associated with “how reality works”; 
then, the audience, familiar with these types of procedures because the 
procedures are commonly used, can follow and believe the argument. 
Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca clarify that by the use of the term “structures of 
reality,” they do not assume any ontological position. What they are interested !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!9!Difference!in!the!sense!of!“dispute.”!See!Jean=Francois!Lyotard’s!book!The$Differend.!!!
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in, and what I am interested in, is not an objectively described reality, but 
rather “the manner in which opinions concerning it are presented” (262). 
Figuring out an objective spiritual reality is not the goal here; instead, the goal 
in this chapter is to analyze how spiritual authorities use structures of reality to 
convey spirituality as a realistic possibility.  The structure of reality is an 
argumentative strategy that bridges the gulf between subjective spiritual 
experience and the adherence of an audience. Discourse regarding abstract 
concepts, such as spirituality, cannot exclusively rely on real world 
observations to demonstrate that their claims are reasonable – instead, such 
writers can use real world structures to demonstrate that their claims are 
reasonable. This strategy does not audaciously compromise the integrity of the 
reader/listener’s personal belief and experience; however, via “arguments 
based on structures of reality,” the writer/speaker still solicits another party’s 
adherence of values and attitudes, urging them toward “possible communion 
with regard to particular ways of acting” (74).    
Again, like the clarification made in the previous chapter, I am not 
analyzing rhetorical figures or tropes but rather the general schema or 
architecture of the arguments.  Rhetorical figures and tropes are much smaller 
units of rhetorical construction, such as analogy, metaphor, alliteration, etc.  
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca discuss some of these in Chapter Three of Part 
Three of The New Rhetoric (350-410). Although these figures and tropes 
compose the organic rhetorical system within the text, I am looking more at the 
skeleton of the argument – of which the organs hang upon and within. This 
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scaffolding is what is meant by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s “arguments 
based on the structure of reality” section, Chapter Two of Part Three in The 
New Rhetoric (261-349). As indicated in the previous chapter of my study, an 
analysis of the argumentative scaffolding is more appropriate for this study (as 
opposed to analyzing tropes and figures) because rhetorical analyses of this 
contemporary discourse has not frequented the field of composition and 
rhetoric.  An investigation into the contemporary discourse of spirituality is 
relatively new investigation; therefore, the study requires a general look at the 
rhetorical structure of the discourse rather than a microscopic examination of 
smaller rhetorical figures and tropes. 
                
Causal Chains and Pragmatic Ends 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca emphasize the importance of the causal 
chain within these argumentative structures of reality: causes leading to events 
or consequences (263-266). The causal chain is a fairly obvious and primal 
structure. Much of basic human understanding hinges upon this structure: 
human events or consequences proceed from causes. This structure of reality, 
however intuitive it may seem, is generally accepted and therefore can increase 
the believability of an argument.  
To further adhere an audience to an argument, the type of consequence 
is foundational: a causal chain must build toward a desirable end. If the end is 
not desirable, then the audience will not see the argument as reasonable. For 
instance, if speaker insists that skiing is fantastic because she finds the snow 
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painfully cold, this argument is not effective: the end is not desirable, pain is 
not desirable, therefore an audience would generally not adhere to her praise. 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca label an argument that “permits the evaluation 
of an act or event in terms of its favorable or unfavorable consequences” as a 
pragmatic argument (266). For the audience to perceive the argument as 
reasonable, the writer must argue toward a desirable,” common sense” end. 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca define “common sense” as consisting in “a 
series of beliefs which are accepted within a particular society and which the 
members of that society suppose to be shared by every reasonable being” (99).  
Therefore, this type of generally agreed upon desirable end or consequence, 
such as avoiding pain or seeking happiness, resulting from a causal chain, can 
be viewed as “common sense” because it is generally shared by all reasonable 
beings.  
The term “common sense” has differing definitions, some extending 
back into the Enlightenment. From their usage, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
imply the pragmatic definition stemming from a structure of reality: events 
leading to consequences that are desired by all reasonable beings. These types 
of consequences are common sense; they are “beyond discussion” or “do not 
deserve discussion” (57) because of intersubjective agreement (99). Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca highlight a flexible qualitative component of life that 
seems bound to happiness, a criteria of common sense. They state, “in many 
philosophies and religions happiness is presented as the ultimate justification 
of their theories” (268). According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 
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increasing the quality of life via happiness is a desirable end; happiness is a 
type of “success” that human beings tend to agree upon. They explain that in 
such pragmatic argumentation, happiness is presented as “conformity with the 
real, of harmony with the universal order” (268); thus a connection with the 
material world. 
The union with God is not a direct common sense desirable 
consequence: not as intuitively practical as, for instance, staying alive, 
maintaining hydration, or even material wealth. Attaining a spiritual 
connection with God seems to have no innate happiness or direct enjoyable use 
or immediate connection to the material world. So, what is reasonable, 
desirable, and useful about achieving a degree of union with God? Why does 
the writer of spirituality climb the causal ladder to attain such a consequence? 
Why does a writer of spirituality promote that the audience should climb this 
ladder as well? Benedictine culture whose primarily concern is self-serving 
(that is, the cultivation of their own inner life), may deem the spiritual 
connection to be an end in itself (Funk, Thoughts 14). However, how does 
spirituality interact with an audience that lives in a more normative sphere? 
How does spirituality act as a means to something common sense and 
practical?  
In contemporary Catholic and Anglican texts about spirituality, the 
desirable consequence of connecting with God is often explicitly presented in 
the introduction of the text. Authorities on the subject use pragmatic 
argumentation to convey the reasonableness of their textual endeavor from 
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their very first words and paragraphs. The authors of these texts waste no time 
in establishing practical reasons that the audience should adhere to their point 
of view; the authors waste no time in persuading an audience that they (i.e. the 
author and the audience) are not crazy or mad for pursuing a line of inquiry 
found in spirituality.    
As explained in the first chapter of my investigation, the consequences 
of spirituality are varying degrees of union with God. A reader of 
contemporary spiritual texts needs to be convinced that the outcome of the 
writer’s message is desirable – and that the author’s own desire for the 
consequence makes sense. In other words, the writer needs to convince the 
audience that their personal spiritual goal, the union with God, is a reasonable 
goal to strive after. This justifies the behavior of the writer, and establishes a 
strong ethos in which the audience can adhere. The audience can understand 
the writer’s personal mission, and adhere to the possible spiritual application in 
his or her own life. A desirable end consequence increases the reasonableness 
of an argument, however, “only in terms of agreement on the value of the 
consequences” (268).  
A primary technique of these contemporary texts is to begin with the 
end, that is, begin with the final pragmatic consequences of spirituality. The 
authors’ forewords and introductions explain the end goal of their texts – and 
consequentially, the end goal of spirituality. Many of the authors do so in 
grounded terms, that is, they answer the question, “how does a seemingly 
impractical spiritual effort, help someone out practically?” The authors 
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establish the pragmatic and common desirable consequence from their very 
first words. Doing so, establishes reasons for pursuing spirituality. The first 
paragraph of Mary Margaret Funk’s introduction of Tools Matter for 
Practicing the Spiritual Life (2001), reads as follows: 
Tools matter. In the garden of our souls we are both the farmer and the 
seed. We’ve been planted. Our awakening experience has happened. 
Staying awake is the problem. Our soul soon becomes crowded with 
weeds. If we know ourselves, we know that one disorientating factor 
can obliterate any peak experience in the blink of an eye. We try to 
pray but our thoughts are like weeds that choke the good seed. 
Sometimes we feel as if we are going mad, that we are “out of our 
mind” because our thoughts are always conditioned to keep us in stale, 
starched patterns. (1) 
This first paragraph establishes a problem that needs to be resolved. Funk 
explicitly states that “staying awake is the problem.” And the clutter, the 
conditioning, and the stale, starched patterns” can “choke” our quality of life, 
experience, and unique individuality. In other words, this paragraph implies 
that the problem lies in the temptation to sleep through life. Funk goes on in 
the introduction to explain that spirituality, contemplative activity, and 
“weeding our garden” can help us “stay awake” (1-4). In sum, the introduction 
forwards a common problem that all audiences have experienced in varying 
degrees (i.e. cluttered, unfocused quality of life), and connects this problem to 
a solution (i.e. spirituality), promising to give the audience the “tools” to arrive 
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at the solution. The pragmatic end is a richer, more ordered life found through 
spiritual means. This approach ties into Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s end 
of pragmatic argumentation, “harmony with the universal order” (268).  This 
pragmatic end, i.e. order, is one that commonly agreed upon as a desirable 
consequence; a life “crowded with weeds,” i.e. disorder, is an undesirable 
consequence. The rest of Funk’s book illustrates tools to increase the uniting 
with God, which then lead to the desirable end: order, satisfaction, and 
ultimately happiness.  
Similar to this approach, Martin Laird ends his beginning chapter of 
Into the Sunlit Land explaining that “the specific focus of this book will be on 
the practical struggle many of us face when we try to be silent- the inner chaos 
going on in our heads, like some wild cocktail party of which we find 
ourselves the embarrassed host. Often, however, we are not even aware how 
utterly dominating this inner noise is until we enter through the doorway of 
silence” (4). Again, there is a “struggle” presented: being “dominated” by 
“inner chaos” and “inner noise.” Laird implies that this is a struggle with 
disorder. His book promises to lead the audience to solution in which they can 
control of their inner states, free from domination. Such a solution promotes a 
pragmatic final consequence: spirituality as a catalyst for order, a final 
consequence that can be agreed upon as desirable by an audience.  
A third example can be seen in the first chapter of Mystical Hope by 
Cynthia Bourgeault which relates more to the “enjoyment” use of happiness 
and the pragmatic notion of happiness explained by Perelman and Olbrechts-
! 77!
Tyteca. Bourgeault’s first paragraphs illustrate the problem of despair. She 
writes that despair is the subjective consequence of particular events, such as a 
death of a loved one or losing one’s job. She offers hope as a combative 
solution to such despair, and spirituality as a means to arrive at hope (2-3). 
Similar to the other approaches, a problem is described (i.e. despair, 
hopelessness) and spirituality becomes the means to a desirable pragmatic end 
(i.e. hope). Bourgeault is explicit about the practical consequences of hope: 
“…hope is tied to outcome. We would normally think of it as an optimistic 
feeling – or at least a willingness to go on-because we get a sense that things 
will get better in the future” (3). There is a definitive push toward outcome, 
future, and resolution. Bourgeault portrays spirituality as a tool to arrive at 
improvement and an optimistic worldview. She writes, “hope is tied to 
outcome”; since spirituality is tied to hope, in her view, then spirituality is tied 
to outcome as well. This example from Bourgeault touches on the pragmatic 
use of order tethered to a desirable end (i.e. hope as orderer of 
despair/disorder), but also more explicitly portrays the “enjoyment” aspect (i.e. 
hope as a means to happiness; happiness is a common sense desirable end).      
In sum, the introductions of Catholic and Anglican spiritual texts 
promote spirituality as a tool to resolve day-to-day problems, instill order, and 
foster individual happiness/enjoyment.  An angle to view this kind of 
pragmatic resolution is through the lens of Larry Hickman’s pragmatism. In 
Hickman’s perspective of Dewey’s inquiry, spirituality can even be thought of 
as a technology meant “for the resolution of perceived problems” (Hickman 
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12). Technology, Hickman explains, “is more than just tangible tools, 
machines, and factories.  It also involves the abstract thought” (26). Spirituality 
is a form of Hickmanian technology: not a tangible tool or machine, but 
“abstract thought” bound to resolution.  Spirituality, rhetorically presented as a 
type of technology or day-to-day orderer, is bound to common sense 
consequences with desirable ends and instrumental benefits.  Since the authors 
of spirituality present these pragmatic ends in the beginning of their texts, the 
audience is inevitably bound to adherence, seeing the argument as a 
technological, useful endeavor from the very beginning.    
 
Staging: A Structure of Reality  
Firstly and foundationally, the cause has to link to the end. The 
desirable consequence is laid out at the beginning of many Catholic/Anglican 
texts addressing spirituality. How then does the progression of causes or events 
lead to the end? How do the writers “show” instead “tell” the reader that 
spiritual paths lead to desired ends?  Moreover, and more importantly to this 
investigation, how do the writers rhetorically depict this progression of linked 
causes? 
As already mentioned, the introductory chapters of these Catholic and 
Anglican texts promote pragmatic consequences. The writer teaches the reader 
how to use the tools of spirituality in order to reach these consequences. Via 
epideictic discourse, writers of spirituality attempt to “strengthen the 
adherence” of this reasonable pursuit for the pragmatic/desirable end. 
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Considering spirituality is such an abstract topic, this is a complex task for 
these writers. In a majority of these texts, the writer explicitly stages the causal 
linkage in order to make the causes and effects abundantly clear to readers. 
Such a staging techniques, or “mystical itineraries,” are evident throughout the 
history of Christian spirituality and mysticism (McGinn 149): seen in such 
texts as John Climacus’ The Ladder of Divine Ascent or Saint Bonaventure’s 
The Mind’s Road to God. 
 In the contemporary sphere, writers of spirituality seem to specifically 
utilize this technique to emphasize spiritual goals as pragmatically accessible.   
An example of this staging strategy can be seen in the work of Thomas 
Keating’s text, “Open Mind, Open Heart.” After the introductory chapters, 
which elucidate the history of contemplative prayer, Keating explains that 
Centering Prayer as a foundational contemplative method. Before doing so in 
detail, he writes in the third paragraph of Chapter Four, “Divine union is the 
goal for all Christians” (31). Although the common sense desirability is not 
clear with this statement, the goal or final destination is explicitly presented: 
“divine union.”  Like the aforementioned introductory chapters by Funk, Laird, 
and Bourgeault, Keating communicates the end before communicating the 
means to reach the end. Unlike the pragmatic approaches of the 
aforementioned writers, Keating’s argument, “Divine union is the goal for all 
Christians,” is a maxim assumed under the Christian tradition. Keating’s 
“Open Mind, Open Heart” is written for a Christian audience, a more exclusive 
audience than that of Funk, Laird, or Bourgeault. 
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Although, not explicitly pragmatic or common sense, Keating’s goal is 
still presented first, and the causal chain to arrive at such a goal is presented 
soon after the goal. Two short paragraphs after Keating’s claim that “Divine 
union is the goal for all Christians,” Keating explains that  “Centering Prayer 
can be identified as the first rung on the ladder of contemplative prayer, which 
rises step by step to union with God” (32). The metaphor of the “ladder” and 
the “step by step” activity refers to the causal chain of contingent events that 
lead to “divine union.” Keating may not have asserted the final end of 
spirituality in pragmatic terms; however, he grounds the causal chain in easy 
recipes and careful instructions. Doing so, demonstrates that such a lofty end, 
divine union with God, is an attainable for all Christians.  
In other words, the audience can easily adhere to Keating’s abstract 
goal because the steps to attain the abstract goal are doable, easy to attain, and 
concrete. The staging of causal links into easily digestible processes can 
persuade the audience to adhere to a process of achieving a daunting end goal. 
As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca rightly assert, “some ends appear desirable 
because the means to realize them are created or become easily accessible” 
(274). Therefore, establishing a pragmatic end goal as seen in Funk, Laird, and 
Bourgeault is not the only strategy to adhere an audience to abstract spiritual 
content. Tethering an abstract end goal to minute concrete stages can persuade 
an audience to see the argument as reasonable. A causal chain structure that is 
bound to the physical and mental worlds can persuade an audience that the 
spiritual end goal is reasonable – moreover, doable.       
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This is a technique seen throughout our culture: Alcoholics 
Anonymous’ Twelve Step Plan, the Kuber-Ross five stages of grief, and even 
Dante’s journey through circles of heaven and hell in The Divine Comedy. The 
technique is Aristotelian; the process breaks down an end into smaller 
contingent causes. However, it is non- Aristotelian in that the end is not final 
but constantly evolving and needing updating. In other words, these stages 
should not be seen as hierarchy, but as smaller, easier digestible pieces 
composing a larger goal. What are the rhetorical motives for doing this? 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca rightly highlight that “some ends appear 
desirable because the means to realize them are created or become easily 
accessible” (274). A careful presentation and discussion of spirituality can ease 
readers into shallow lukewarm waters rather than dropping readers into icy 
depths. Spirituality is an intimidating subject. Stages or steps rhetorically take 
the reader by the hand, like Beatrice and Virgil guiding Dante through heaven 
and hell; the reader is guided through potentially abstract chain of “places,” 
action, and cause-and-effect. Many, if not all, contemporary Catholic and 
Anglican contemplative texts implement this rhetorical structure.  
 
Centering Prayer 
For Keating, the primary goal of “Open Mind, Open Heart” is to 
convey the method and importance of a particular contemplative method to 
divine union with God: “Centering Prayer.” He promotes centering prayer to 
the reader as a “discipline designed to reduce the obstacles to contemplative 
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prayer” (31). Keating’s subtle argument here aligns with Perelman and 
Olbrecht-Tyteca’s claim that “some ends appear desirable because the means 
to realize them are created or become easily accessible” (274). Keating 
conveys that Centering Prayer makes contemplation and spirituality more 
“easily accessible.” Keating further clarifies that “Its [Centering Prayer’s] 
modest packaging appeals to the contemporary attraction for how-to methods” 
(31). Here Keating comments explicitly about rhetorical machinery and 
presentation. He points out that the “how-to methods” or staging process is an 
effective persuasive strategy to adhere a contemporary audience.  In the 
introduction of “Open Mind, Open Heart,” Keating tells readers that this is the 
case; and in the rest of the book, he shows readers that this is the case, thus, 
verifying why other contemporary writers of spirituality implement this 
strategy as well. 
Keating’s “modest packaging” of “how-to methods” pervade much of 
the text; these techniques can be most clearly seen in the appendices where he 
explicitly bullet-points the “guidelines” of centering prayer. “Open Mind, 
Open Heart” wholly and deeply explains all of the “guidelines” in order. The 
text is procedural in this way, and can represent a similar staging process found 
in most contemporary spiritual texts.  To show this explicit staging at work, I 
have chosen to highlight the appendix component of Keating’s text. The 
“guidelines” portion of the appendices reads as follows:   
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1. Choose a sacred word as the symbol of your intention to consent to 
God’s presence and action within 
2. Sitting comfortably and with eyes closed, settle briefly, and silently 
introduce the sacred word as the symbol of your consent to God’s 
presence and action within. 
3. When you become aware of your thoughts, return ever so gently to the 
sacred word. 
4. At the end of the prayer period, remain in silence with eyes closed for 
a couple of minutes. (118)  
 
Each of these numbered steps is then specifically dissected into even smaller 
pieces in outline fashion; Keating titles this separate smaller section the 
“Explanation of the Guidelines.” The above steps are mentioned again, 
however they are cut into smaller steps so that any threat of abstraction is 
reduced to simple actions. For example, step 2 is dissected as follows:  
 
2. Sitting comfortably and with eyes closed, settle briefly, and 
silently introduce the sacred word as the symbol of your consent to God’s 
presence and action within. 
a.  By “sitting comfortably” is meant relatively comfortably; not so 
comfortably that we encourage sleep, but sitting comfortably enough to 
avoid thinking about the discomfort of our bodies during this time of 
prayer. 
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b. Whatever sitting position we chose, we keep our back straight. 
c. If we fall asleep, we continue the prayer for a few minutes 
upon awakening if we can spare the time. 
d. Praying in this way after a main meal encourages drowsiness. 
Better to wait an hour at least before Centering Prayer. Praying 
in this way just before retiring may disturb one’s sleep pattern. 
e. We close our eyes to let go of what is going on around us and 
within us. 
f. We introduce the sacred word inwardly and as gently as laying 
a feather on a piece of absorbent cotton. (119) 
 
This second staging tier demonstrates two aspects of the rhetorical technique. 
First, Keating breaks down the initial “guidelines” into smaller explanations. 
Doing so can increase the adherence of the audience by increasing the 
accessibility of the information. For instance, Keating’s abstract phrase 
“silently introduce the sacred word as the symbol of your consent to God’s 
presence and action within,” may cause confusion and discouragement to a 
reader. The information seems a bit vague - as does the language. The 
language seems vague not because Keating is an incompetent writer or rhetor, 
but because spirituality is vague content in and of itself. Keating, aware of this 
natural vagueness and complexity, combats a potential disconnect with the 
audience by providing further smaller steps which explain the initial steps via 
smaller more physical concrete actions (e.g. closing the eyes, sitting positions), 
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and concretizing an internal experiential process via simile (e.g. “introduce the 
sacred word inwardly and as gently as laying a feather on a piece of absorbent 
cotton”).   
The staged presentation of the content plays an important role in 
relaying the content as more digestible. Keating chooses to deliver the 
Centering Prayer process in a particular format: the outline. The purpose of 
appendices, according to the Chicago Manual of Style, is to provide 
“explanations and elaborations that are not essential parts of the text but are 
helpful to the reader seeking further clarification” (1.82); however, Keating’s 
appendices can be representational of a larger trend within the discourse of 
spirituality: the ordered rhetorical presentation via a staging technique. 
Outlines, numbered lists, and bullet-points provide easily digestible visual 
presentation. This ordered presentation is not only reserved for the appendices 
of these texts. Staged presentation, many times numbered lists accented with 
indentation, can be found within the chapter prose of contemporary 
contemplative texts. If the instruction requires steps or stages, then the authors 
generally recognize that outlines and lists deliver the content clearly and 
fittingly; outlines and lists structure the staged/stepped content in a 
staged/stepped manner. Indentations, single numbers, single letters, and 
punctuations visually demarcate particular steps and stages. In this way, 
presentation harmonizes with the content. Moreover, the unity of content and 
presentation seamlessly conveys a single picture and message to the reader, 
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therefore portraying Centering Prayer as contemplative method of spiritual 
attainment - a how-to method, a harmony without noticeable dissonance.   
 
Multiple Chains 
Centering Prayer is a relatively popular topic in contemporary Catholic 
and Anglican contemplative texts because it simplifies a complex subjective 
process into a series of four step accessible actions. The persuasive power of 
Centering Prayer is found in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s observation. In 
other words, explicitly displayed and easily do-able causal chains are a 
structure of reality that can increase the reasonableness of a claim. Despite 
Keating’s linear hierarchy of Centering Prayer in his prose and appendices, as 
well as in the work of the Keating’s disciples (e.g. Cynthia Bourgeault’s 
Centering Prayer and Inner Awakenings, David Frenette’s The Path of 
Centering Prayer: Deepening Your Experience of God), contemporary spiritual 
writers have also generatively complicated this notion. Why complicate such 
tidy rhetorical structures? Linear oversimplification of a complex topic can be 
recognized by an audience. An audience may recognize that something may be 
lost. The complexity of spirituality and contemplation demands a degree of 
sophistication and depth. Therefore, many if not all of these writers are sure to 
highlight or imply that there are multiple causal chains that leads toward the 
union with God. Much in line with Ignatius of Loyola, these authors endorse 
contemplative multiplicity. Centering Prayer still has a place in this 
! 87!
contemplative discussion; however, these writers recognize that Centering 
Prayer is one way, not the only way to unite with God.  
For instance, M. Basil Pennington, in his 1999 book Centered Living: 
The Way of Centering Prayer (despite the singularity implied by the title: “The 
Way of Centering Prayer”), confesses that “I would never want it to be taken 
that I think Centering Prayer is the only or even necessarily the best way for 
each person to enter into the contemplative dimension of his or her life” (xxv).  
Pennington offers Centering Prayer as one technique among many 
contemplative techniques. His admission leaves room for the individual and 
individual sets of experiences. Since spirituality is such an open topic that 
resists scientific and referential definition, the discourse of spirituality allows 
for a multiplicity of practices and actions. Moreover, Pennington’s admission 
outwardly combats any threat of totalizing discourse. It is an explicit 
demonstration that spirituality opens up discourse and practice beyond 
dogmatic linearity usually associated with Catholic and Anglican institutional 
traditions.    
Although Pennington chooses to highlight Centering Prayer as one 
contemplative method within his book, other authors choose to illustrate 
numerous aspects and methods of spirituality in their chapters.  These authors 
do not explicitly build spiritual concepts and techniques as one causal chain of 
contingent events/consequences; rather, these writers showcase multiple chains 
leading to the same general destination. For example, Morton Kelsey’s 
Encounter with God fills most of his book with deeply sophisticated and 
! 88!
academic looks at spirituality, ineffability, and philosophy.  Kelsey, then 
grounds these concepts in the conclusion of his book; here, he discusses 
“rules” in which a practitioner can experience a Christian spiritual reality (171-
212). These rules are meant to deepen the spiritual experience. Kelsey explains 
the rules as “not a blueprint for a sealed-in relationship with spiritual reality” 
and “not a philosophical system” but rather “suggestions” and “their real value 
lies in being tried out” (174). Although Kelsey loftily subtitles his book A 
Theology of Christian Experience, Kelsey binds a scholastic theological 
exploration to practical rules, such as “keeping a journal” and/or “keeping a 
record of dreams.” Kelsey grounds these “rules” stating that “these rules are 
much like the practical ones which athletes must follow; they are empirical 
rules for spiritual training” (174-175).  This statement, the last statement of his 
introductory section before explaining each rule individually, reveals a 
persuasive motive of Kelsey. He connects the pursuit for deepening spirituality 
to concrete physical training tasks of athletes, and uses the words “practical” 
and “empirical” to punctuate spiritual practice rather than theological theory.  
All of Kelsey’s rules are equally valuable avenues to arrive at a deeper spiritual 
end. Kelsey’s rules can, but are not required to, cooperate. He is not promoting 
one path with ascending steps like the Centering Prayer approach of Keating or 
Pennington, but rather twelve paths of potential means of spiritual “training” 
which can potentially enhance each other or work in isolation.  
Unfortunately, Kelsey’s approach is not without faults. There remains a 
problematic rhetorical choice made by Kelsey. Kelsey’s term “rules” carries 
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with it an imperative connotation: necessary and commanded, similar to the 
Ten Commandments or the Rules of Saint Benedict. “Rules” imply that 
following them are means to ends, so this term persuasively accents the causal 
chain structure of reality; however, since “rules” carries with it an imperative 
connotation, it does not as persuasively emphasize the agency of reader. 
Kelsey, by merely the use of the term “rules,” establishes an authoritative 
power dynamic: a top-down commanded set of instructions. If a reader does 
not follow a “rule,” then the reader is “breaking” a rule or ignoring a rule. 
Although Kelsey’s use of the term “rule” effectively highlights the seriousness 
and reality of spiritual experience (a rhetorical mission he alludes to in Chapter 
One, “The Perplexing Religious Scene” found in Part One, “The Reality of 
Spirit,” page 15), the term also can objectively isolate the reader, and ignore 
the need for situational and contextual malleability. In other words, the top-
down objectivity implied by the word “rule” may discourage a reader.  
Contemplative spirituality is a bottom-up individually subjective endeavor, and 
therefore, the reader needs to be given more explicit agency. 
I highlight this problematic aspect of Kelsey’s text to illustrate an 
evolution of the causal chained structure of reality, as well as the evolution of 
contemporary spiritual discourse. Morton Kelsey’s Encounter with God: A 
Theology of Christian Experience is a crucial Anglican text on the nature and 
practice of spirituality; however, the book also hails from 1975. The book is 
progressive for its time, promoting multiple avenues to deepen spirituality; 
however, Kelsey still feeds top-down knowledge to the reader. Needless to say, 
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the rhetorical approach of multiple causal chains has been revised since the 
seventies. The more recent approaches demonstrate how the causal chain 
structure used in more recent spiritual discourse provides more agency to 
subject, thereby increasing the rhetorical power and adherence of an audience.    
       For an example, I refer back to Mary Margaret Funk. Funk’s Tools 
Matter: Beginning the Spiritual Journey (2013) and Tools Matter for 
Practicing the Spiritual Life (2001), like Kelsey’s Encounter with God, offer a 
constellation of practices and attitudes toward the common goal of spirituality. 
Funk’s emphasis on “tools” in two of the titles reveals a differing rhetorical 
approach from Kelsey’s approach. “Tool,” an easy one syllable word, carries 
impactful persuasive power.  The Oxford English Dictionary defines “tool” in 
two general ways: (1.) as “the means of effecting something” which implies a 
causal chain of means to ends, or events to consequences, and (2.) as “a 
mechanical implement for working upon something, as by cutting, striking, 
rubbing, or other process, in any manual art or industry; usually, one held in 
and operated directly by the hand” which implies practical grounded 
application. “Tool” emphasizes the instrumentality of the spiritual process; the 
process is possible and bound to concrete usability and accessibility; tool as 
“held in and operated directly by the hand” implies a degree of individual use.  
Furthermore, “tool” emphasizes the causal process. “Tool” implies that it is 
something that is a means to an end: a “means to affecting something.”  For 
instance, the practice of fasting (which is labeled by Funk as a “tool”) may lead 
to attitude changes regarding humility; humility may link with a person not 
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attaching themselves to worldly possessions; detachment from material goods 
may result in more energy devoted to spiritual development; more energy 
devoted to spiritual development leads to a deeper connection with God.  A 
“tool” implies an instrumental practice that will aid the arrival at a particular 
goal: in these texts, the common goal is a deeper connection with God. 
In Funk’s two texts, she stresses assorted pragmatic methods that can 
be used to reach a deeper spiritual destination: some of these tools as general 
as “humility” or “watchfulness of thoughts,” some of these tools as specific as 
“fasting” or the monastic environment of “the cell.” The pragmatic approach 
allows the possibility of spiritual endeavor to audiences of all spiritual stages; 
moreover, it allows the possibility of spiritual endeavor to many audiences of 
all experiences and life situations. For instance, due to Funk’s rhetorical use of 
“tools,” busy parents with three infant children and full time jobs may find 
certain spiritual pursuit possible and therefore find Funk’s stance reasonable. 
How so? Despite not having time or energy to implement Funk’s more time 
consuming tools of “manual labor” or “fasting,” busy readers may have time to 
practice basic “positive prayer tools,” i.e. specific mantras, short prayers, etc. 
(Funk, Tools Matter for Practicing 110-128). Unlike “rules,” “tools” are 
adaptable; readers can adapt certain tools to their life, while not adapting other 
tools. Funk’s presentation empowers the individual reader; readers can pick for 
themselves which parts of Funk’s instruction are more easily digestible and 
manageable, rather than requiring a consummate understanding and 
application.  Funk’s presentation of spirituality as a set of assorted causal tools 
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allows these texts to be more accessible to various readers: more accessible, 
and more persuasive. Instead of dictating “rules,” and emphasizing spirituality 
as a “herculean task” as Morton Kelsey does (172), Funk emphasizes the 
agency of the reader, the instrumentality of the practices, and accessibility of 
her suggestions.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
By looking at these specific structures of reality as framed by Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca, I have highlighted some specific gears and levers within 
the rhetorical machinery of these contemporary texts.  I have explored how 
causal chains and pragmatic desirable ends, and ease and accessibility can 
increase the reasonableness and accessibility of arguments.  And this 
exploration is not merely a cerebral exercise, but it is fraught with practical 
implications. I return to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s mission of The New 
Rhetoric: “to develop what a logic of value judgments has tried in vain to 
provide, namely the justification of possibility of human community in the 
sphere of action when this justification cannot be based on a reality or 
objective truth” (514). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s theory of rhetoric and 
argumentation balances community, action, and relativism in a functionally 
democratic manner. The speaker/writer is at the center of their theory as a 
member of the community of minds, persuading an audience to adhere to their 
stance. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca recognize that an audience has the 
power and freedom to not adhere to persuasive strategies; individuals are 
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empowered to listen or not listen (17-18). In order to gain the audience’s 
attention, writers of contemporary contemplative texts implement particular 
“structures of reality” to ground ineffable, nebulous, and mystical concepts and 
practices in an everyday reasonableness found in the material world. Writers of 
these contemporary texts, using persuasive techniques based on structure of 
reality, lead an audience to multiple avenues of individual action; and if writers 
do not display these multiple avenues explicitly, these writers imply that 
multiplicities exist. By highlighting or implying multiple causal chains of 
action, these writers empower the audience to make choices in their own lives 
regarding spirituality. The writers’ explicit confidence in the audience’s 
individual choices reveals another layer of persuasive strategy. Instead of 
“talking down” to an audience or dictating a single teleological avenue of 
spirituality, these authors offer audiences multiple tools or rules (i.e. accessible 
causal chains or means-to-ends) in which to deepen spiritual experience. These 
contemplative texts are epideictic; so like a student positively responding to the 
praise of an instructor’s comments, a reader can positively respond to the 
writer’s explicit confidence in the agency of the reader.  Celebration of reader 
agency seems to be a crucial rhetorical component woven into these structures 
of reality. Causal chains imply that readers can act or think via means to arrive 
at ends; pragmatic ends imply that readers can use spirituality in a self-
fortifying manner; the multiplicity of spiritual strategies imply that readers are 
empowered enough to choose spiritual avenues for themselves.  
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As suggested early in the article, “structures of reality” can bind 
ineffable spiritual concepts (something that “cannot be based on reality or 
objective truth”) to the physical world in order to convey reasonableness and 
thus strengthen audience adherence. And, simultaneously, structures of reality 
can also celebrate and energize individual agency within the “sphere of action” 
via causal chains and pragmatic ends. In sum, structures of reality act as two 
sides of the same coin within the discourse of spirituality. When these two 
aspects are synthesized within the discourse of spirituality, a rhetorical balance 
is achieved: a balance of communicative interdependence (between writer and 
audience), as well as active independence (an individual reader as a part of the 
audience). Therefore, a Catholic and Anglican contemporary epideictic 
discourse of spirituality can justify the “possibility of human community in the 
sphere of action when this justification cannot be based on a reality or 
objective truth” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 514): the mission of The New 
Rhetoric, a mission that can act as the lifeblood of healthy democracy.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SECOND ANALYSIS OF ASSOCIATIVE SCHEMA: UNLIMITED 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
As seen in Chapter Three, writers of Catholic and Anglican 
contemporary contemplative texts use several interrelated argumentative 
schema to demonstrate the reasonableness of a spiritual unity with God. Staged 
causal chaining(s) and pragmatic arguments both play a structural role, 
associating spiritual ineffable subjective realities to concrete effable objective 
reality. These structures compose a strong foundation of reasonableness, 
persuasion, and adherence of value, attitude, and action. However, a question 
remains: When do the readers of the spiritual texts /pupils of the epideictic 
discourse, actually reach their goal(s) via the contemplative methods and 
attitudes? What happens then?    
For instance, through months of training, perhaps a novice practitioner 
finally experiences a form of transcendent union with God.  Or perhaps, a 
novice practitioner makes a habit of daily contemplative practice so her life is 
more hopeful and ordered – and therein, she finds a renewed sense of joy. Are 
these finite goals based on achieving a product? Both yes and no. As I will 
show in this chapter, writers of contemplative texts suggest that a practitioner 
of contemplation does not stop practicing because they have arrived at a goal. 
Contemplative attitude and practices are infinite processes that require upkeep 
and sustenance.  According to the contemporary spiritual texts, a deepening 
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union with God is not entirely based upon the product of knowledge attained 
from the union; rather, it is based upon the ongoing sustained process of 
spiritual deepening (Bourgeault, Centering 70; Laird, Into 53). According to 
the fourteenth century contemplative text, The Cloud of Unknowing, “It is well 
said that man naturally desires to know. Yet at the same time, it is also true that 
no amount of natural or acquired knowledge will bring him to taste the 
spiritual experience of God, for this is a pure gift of grace. And so I urge you: 
go after experience rather than knowledge” (188).  Although not a recent text, 
The Cloud of Unknowing remains a medieval spiritual text that profoundly 
influences Centering Prayer (Frenette xix), Thomas Merton (82-83), and many 
(if not, all) current Catholic and Anglican contemplative texts. So 
consequently, current Catholic and Anglican contemplative traditions inherit 
the point of view from this book: experience should be sought after via active 
prayer.  
Experience based spirituality can be traced even further back in 
Christian history: back to 400 C.E. Augustine of Hippo posited some profound 
questions in his 1600 year old spiritual autobiography The Confessions, 
specifically Chapter One, Book One. Here, he asks God,  “Grant me, O Lord, 
to know and understand which should come first, prayer or praise; or indeed, 
whether knowledge should precede prayer. For how can one pray to you unless 
one knows you?” Although not a card-carrying contemplative or mystic, 
Augustine is sophisticatedly attune to the subjective dimension of Christianity; 
therefore, he answers his own question much like a contemplative or mystic. 
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He writes, “they that seek shall find Him, and they that find him shall praise 
him” (1.1). Augustine emphasizes experiential seeking first, before praise. 
Experiential action leads to knowledge.   
But this entire discussion of experience, prayer, action, and knowledge 
still begs the question: where does the experiencing end? When does the 
contemplative action stop? In the sixth century, Gregory of Nyssea defined the 
activity of contemplatio as “resting with God” (Bourgeault, Centering 67). Can 
the continuing action be seen as an end? Can the process be seen as the 
product? How is Gregory’s “contemplatio as rest” viewed by the author of The 
Cloud of Unknowing and Augustine? All of these writers describe a kind of 
end in “rest.”  The writer of The Cloud of Unknowing states that experience 
cultivates love, and love is full of rest. He/She admits that “rest” does seem 
like a counterintuitive term; however, he/she explains: “I call it [contemplative 
experience] rest because your spirit does rest in a freedom from doubt and 
anxiety about what it must do; and because during the actual time of prayer, it 
is secure…that it will not greatly err.” He/She continues to paradoxically 
define “rest” as “a work that begins here on earth but will go on without end 
into eternity” (188). The use of paradox reveals that the author’s concept of 
rest is not a typical understanding of the term: it is “rest” that is active and 
working. Moreover, it is a type of spiritual rest found in “freedom” that 
continues forever. In The Confessions, Augustine famously describes “our 
hearts are restless until they can find peace in you [God]” (1.1).  Under the 
guise of an “end,” Augustine alludes to “rest” found in a divine union with 
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God; although this union can be found via mystical experience, Augustine is 
presumably pointing to an end in the afterlife. Therefore, like the author of The 
Cloud of Unknowing, “rest-as-an-end” is never found on Earth; rest remains an 
end-in-view, a functional placeholder, and an ideal.  
The spiritual ends and pragmatic consequences discussed in Chapter 
Three are contingent on one another, and have foreseeable stopping points or 
goals. These goals can be achieved – but then the spiritual journey continues.  
For instance, through months of practice, a practitioner can become skilled 
using a contemplative scriptural reading method, lectio divina, to deepen her 
spiritual intensity; this “deepening process” is an achieved goal, a temporary 
fulfillment. According to the writers of contemplative texts, lectio divina will 
deepen a practitioner's relationship with God and help them find order and 
happiness in their life (Funk, Tools Matter for Practicing 9-16; Bourgeault, 
Centering 65-68); however, this is a micro-means to micro-ends - and certainly 
important. But there is a macro-scheme as well: a large scheme that scaffolds 
the rhetorical construction of Catholic and Anglican spiritual texts. I am 
referring to the notion of “rest” found in The Cloud of Unknowing and 
Augustine’s The Confessions: again, the end-in-view, the functional 
placeholder, the ideal. 
I use The Cloud of Unknowing and The Confessions to illustrate an 
inherited history of Christian spirituality.  Unlike systematic theology or 
logical Medieval Scholasticism, spirituality embraces experiential, recursive, 
and ineffable substances. This type of humanness, openness, and flexibility is 
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similar to what unsettled the Catholic Church about Ignatius of Loyola’s 
Spiritual Exercises in the 1570s after Ignatius’ death in 1556 (Keating 23-24; 
Ganass 48-49).  Conversely, it is no surprise that Thomas Aquinas remained 
“the doctor of the Church” up until the 20th century; Aquinas concretizes issues 
of ineffability, such as the existence of God (1.1.2) or the “substance of 
angels” (1.1.50) via Aristotelian deductive logic.  In other words, with his 
summas, Aquinas teleologically arrives at conclusions or products and the 
Roman Catholic Church embraced this approach for an extended period of 
time. On the other hand, Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises as well as The Cloud of 
Unknowing celebrate the ambiguity and individuality of the experiential 
spiritual process in a non-teleological manner. Both non-teleological texts were 
not as triumphantly received by the Catholic Church, nor were they 
commissioned by the Catholic Church as was the case with Aquinas’ summas.   
So the communicative strategies used by Ignatius and the author of The 
Cloud of Unknowing can serve as a springboard into a discussion of 
contemporary communicative strategies. The same rhetorical emphases are in 
place. The same questions can be asked: How do authors of contemporary 
spiritual texts wield non-teleology in a reasonable and effective persuasive 
manner?  How do these authors promote the ongoing the journey as 
destination, rather than the destination as destination? How do these authors 
persuade readers to embrace the restless “rest” that is found in unending 
contemplative process? These questions lie at the heart of the systematic anti-
system. To better understand the complexity of this precipitous overarching 
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structure of associative argumentation, I look to Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca’s discussion of unlimited development. 
 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s Unlimited Development  
In The New Rhetoric, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain the 
argumentative scheme of unlimited development as “insist[ing] on the 
possibility of always going further in a certain direction without being able to 
foresee a limit to this direction, and this progress is accompanied by a 
continuous increase in value” (287). Of course, “value” here does not mean a 
purely numerical increase or quantitative increase, but rather as an attitudinal 
pattern that leads to potential action; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca refer to 
value as “an admission that an object, a being, or an ideal must have specific 
influence on action and on disposition toward action and that one can make use 
of this influence in an argument, although the point of view represented is not 
regarded as binding on everybody” (74). In other words, unlimited 
development persuades an audience to particular attitudes of action via 
rhetorical gesture toward limitless direction. It is clear that an author writing 
about ineffability or philosophically vague content such as religion or ethics 
would find this technique to be especially useful. Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca touch on examples from Sartre and Calvin to show how unlimited can 
be implemented.  In such examples, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain, 
the writers spin the openness and vagueness of the content in a persuasively 
advantageous way - rather than highlight the deficiency of concrete 
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articulation. For instance, Calvin, in his “Prefatory Address to King Francis,” 
mentions that one cannot go too far in the direction of goodness and virtue 
(287). This would be a basic scheme of unlimited development. Instead of 
concretizing the terms “goodness” and “virtue” in a scientific, Aristotelian, or 
even Thomist manner (i.e. in a way that can be attained), Calvin points to an 
unending direction as the place to go rather than the place to stop.    
Contemporary epideictic texts about spirituality, as well as historical 
texts about spirituality such as The Cloud of Unknowing, promote the union 
with God as the goal of unlimited development used to adhere an audience to 
spiritual attitudes and contemplative actions.  A general example of this can be 
seen in the discussion of spiritual “doorways” in Into the Sunlit Land (2006) by 
Martin Laird:  
 
I shall speak of three doorways that must be passed through in order to 
discover this depthless depth within, but indeed I could have said 30 or 
300 doorways, for they seem endless. But in truth there are no 
doorways. We should always be wary of applying linear notions of 
progress to our prayer life and asking ourselves ‘What stage am I in?’ 
‘How far have I progressed?’ Whatever ‘progress’ is supposed to mean, 
it certainly doesn’t work like that.” (53)  
 
Here, Martin is not eliminating the use of staging process, after all, he is using 
the construct of the staged “three doorways” to explain to and adhere an 
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audience; however, he is discounting the stages as ends in themselves.  He 
explains that, “There is nothing that separates us from this depthless depth 
whose ground is God. Paradoxically, however, this is only seen to be the case 
after crossing threshold after threshold. The present moment is a present 
moment opening into a pathless path” (53).  In other words, as shown in 
Chapter Three of my investigation, I show that micro-level goals are used in 
these texts to instruct and persuade an audience; “staging” has a place in the 
minds of practitioners and in the spiritual texts – however, readers and 
practitioners should not rely on stages as ends.  The macro-level goal or end of 
the spiritual journey is fathomless – and this is the ultimate goal of the spiritual 
journey; the process is the end – an end that develops unlimitedly. As Laird 
explains in A Sunlit Absence (2011), “we do not have to move through any 
doors, for Christ is also the door itself” (11).  
 
Cycles, Seasons, and Spirals  
How do writers account for a practical linear staging process that leads 
toward nonlinear unlimited development? How do the writers present this 
complex paradox in a communicative manner? Moreover, how do they present 
this “both/and” distinction in a persuasive manner? Writers emphasize the 
ongoing spiritual process via cyclical, seasonal, and spiral spiritual trajectories 
in order to account for the causal chains within an unlimited development 
construct.   
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Each of these techniques emphasizes equal parts recursivity and 
progression. David Frenette discusses a cyclical spiritual approach in his book 
The Path of Centering Prayer: Deepening the Experience of God. After 
touching on the complex distinctions between "states" and "stages" within 
contemplation, he defends the "season" metaphor in which he uses throughout 
The Path of Centering Prayer book (8). He mentions that "season of the year 
unfold in linear time": a year has a beginning and an end, a linear structure 
within an unlimitedly developed structure, i.e. time (9). The metaphor indicates 
a sense of progressive movement, a standard contemplative maturation that can 
be unlimitedly developed just as time unlimitedly develops. Therefore, the use 
of “seasons” promotes an underlying understanding of unending growth and 
maturation as a practitioner repeats contemplative methods and maintains 
spiritual attitudes. Frenette goes on to explain that seasons "recur in different 
ways, as an organic cycle, every year. Each of the four seasons has its own 
richness, challenges, and natural attraction for different people" (9). This 
second dimension of the metaphor accounts for difference: the categorical 
differences of contemplative methods (silence, lectio divina, stages of lectio 
divina, sacred breath, etc.) as well as subjective differences (individual 
aptitudes and opinions of different methods). Therefore, Frenette's choice of 
the season metaphor balances a “both/and” distinction of spirituality: stressing 
difference and uniformity, as well as a micro-level linear staging process 
within a macro-level unlimited developed module.  
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As shown with Frenette's "seasons," recursivity plays an important role 
in contemplative and spiritual texts. Why do the writers stress cyclical 
recursivity? Why not rather depict the spiritually unending process as purely 
linear, in which a practitioner eventually arrives at a union with God? Such an 
approach would surely be clearer and more persuasive. However, recursivity 
serves an important purpose. Recursivity emphasizes the process dimension of 
spirituality that requires upkeep, maintenance, and real world action. 
Spirituality is an active pursuit that revolves around action; it does not revolve 
around passive divine revelation that strikes a believer like lightning, nor is it 
solely based on capturing experiences to gain finite knowledge. To quote 
contemporary mystical theologian Matthew Fox, “The mystic is keen on the 
experience of the Divine and will not settle for theory alone or knowing about 
the Divine” (Coming 48). Recursivity emphasizes the never-ending 
experiential spiritual activity of the practitioner. Moreover, it emphasizes the 
relationship between the continuous spiritual development and unlimited 
development. This purposely vague relationship is effectively explained in 
David Frenette's discussion of "amen." Frenette defines “amen” as the 
surrender to an alignment with God which leads to" freer and more sustained 
action"(4). He states "at some point, all contemplative practices end with the 
attitude of amen - so be it, let it be- radical consent to receiving God. That is 
the reward of the interiority, the secrecy, the living relationship with God." (6). 
In other words, contemplative practices maintain an ongoing process, a "living 
relationship" with God, and the "ends" are that process of amen.  Frenette 
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indicates that the unending-ends of contemplative practices are that of more 
freedom and more adaptable action.  
The improved quality and nature of action within contemporary 
spiritual texts can be seen in Cynthia Bourgeault’s 2004 book, Centering 
Prayer and Inner Awakening. In this book, she promotes “stations” rather than 
“stages” or “ladders” in a way that promotes kairotic empowerment and 
freedom. She tells readers that stations or spirals represent circular fluid 
spiritual process rather than rigidly linear movement toward a union with God 
(69).  In her explanation she suggests that kairos requires a fluid spiritual 
process. Illustrating fluidity of the lectio divina contemplation strategy, she 
writes:  
 
Some days the mind will be full and sparkling, and your meditation 
will be filled with insights. Some days the feelings will be deeply 
engaged, and you’ll find the words of scripture catapulting you into 
prayer. Other days, for no explicable reason, the feelings just won’t 
come; in this state you find yourself skipping oratio and dropping 
straight into contemplatio. Sometimes, having spent that time in 
contemplation, you move out of it into an oratio that stirs itself to new 
depths; or an insight that began to incubate in the stillness will lead you 
back into the meditatio. It can go in any direction, always simply being 
attentive to the movements of the spirit. (69-70)   
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According to Bourgeault, the practitioner’s situation is not bullied into 
particular rigid stages of a spiritual process, but rather, the practitioner is able 
to adapt the spiritual process to the kairotic moment. In turn, Bourgeault fronts 
the agency of the individual practitioner. The practitioner, not spiritual 
authorities nor God, decides if a particular spiritual technique is appropriate. 
This emphasis on individual agency, free play, and active spirituality is seldom 
stressed as explicitly in Early Christian, Enlightenment, and early 20th century 
texts about spirituality and mysticism.  This exclusive contemporary quality 
links back to my Chapter Three discussion of multiple chains of causality; 
however, this rhetorical approach takes multiplicity a step further. Here, 
freedom and play have more of an active role; here, the practitioner has more 
power.   
 
Ethos-based Incarnations of the Ideal  
The scheme of unlimited development is vague. The persuasive power 
of the scheme lies in the strategic use of the vagueness.  The scheme of 
unlimited development promotes unlimited movement toward a macro-level 
ideal. As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain in The New Rhetoric, "the 
conception of an unlimited direction with hierarchized terms, one will present 
at the end an ideal which is unrealizable" (289). However, the vague 
unrealizable ideal is only one side of the coin. There needs to be something 
that humanizes the ideal. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca do not neglect this 
dimension. They go on to discuss the "realizable terms" which "incarnate" the 
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ideal. These "incarnations" or "realizable terms" act as a "mirror" or an 
"image" "ever purer, and ever closer to the ultimate term" (289). The realizable 
terms are tangible motivators that promote progress; without the "incarnations" 
or “realizable terms," schemes of unlimited development would easily frustrate 
the reader from adhering to argument, and discourage the reader from 
understanding the promoted values as reasonable.  
Within contemporary spiritual texts, the unrealizable term or ideal is 
the rather vague: “divine union.” In The Cloud of Unknowing and The 
Confessions, as already discussed, the unrealizable term is “rest” with God. 
These destinations remain vague despite that that process of “divine union-ing” 
with God subsumes grounded dimensions of practice and action. So how is this 
ideal or unlimited direction incarnated? Many times In contemplative texts, 
writers refer to themselves as the incarnated ideal reference point. They use 
themselves as the ideal in human form. Most of these writers are monks or 
nuns who devote their lives to spiritual perfection, and therefore, they can 
wield their own ethos as a realizable and reasonable model of the ideal.  
The argumentative technique of wielding ethos as an incarnated ideal 
of divinity, is widely used in Catholic and Anglican texts about spirituality. 
Most writers about spirituality implement this technique in some way. For 
instance, Basil Pennington in Centered Living: The Way of Centering Prayer, 
describes the beginning stages of his “transformation” of “empowering Love 
that cherished and affirmed” him. He frames the spiritually internal enrichment 
with an anecdote of a trolley ride returning home from church. Although the 
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trolley ride was a mundane daily activity, Pennington recognizes a substantial 
spiritual awareness during one particular trolley ride. The conditions of the 
trolley car, a cabin tight with other people, helped Pennington understand the 
spiritual connectivity of himself, other human beings, and God (17).  The 
concrete details of the trolley ride anecdote as well as Pennington’s 
personalized unity with God both assist the reader of the text to humanize the 
unrealizable ideal. Pennington points to himself as the human face of the ideal. 
And clearly, this serves another rhetorical function as well: bolstering his own 
ethos to the reader. This fortified ethos persuades the reader to adhere to the 
text, since Pennington has proclaimed himself as an authority of spiritual 
experience.10 
Mary Margaret Funk uses human reference points in a different way 
than Pennington to facilitate an incarnation of the ideal. She uses historical 
figures as archetypes of spiritual practice and development. These human 
beings serve to illustrate certain spiritual practices and incarnate the unlimited 
ideal. For example, in the first chapter of Tools Matter: Beginning the Spiritual 
Journey, Funk discusses the history of the early Christian Desert 
contemplatives. After establishing the context of this history, she spotlights 
Desert Father, John Cassian, as an example of early Christian asceticism (6-
17). Funk uses Cassian as an example of someone who practiced 
“renunciation,” or the ability to “lay down our very self and merge with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!10!This!overall!narrative!identification,!which!can!be!found!in!spiritual!discourse,!also!plays!an!important!role!in!moving!the!argument!outside!of!the!rational=world!paradigm!when!adhering!belief!and!action;!this!aligns!with!Burkean!identification!and!poststructuralist!thought.!See!the!work!of!Kevin!McClure!and!Hayden!White!for!a!comprehensive!discussion!of!narrative!identification.!!!!
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Christ’s own consciousness of the Father through the gift of the Holy Spirit” 
(15). The merging process is highly abstract as is Funk’s explicitly 
unrealizable  that “All ascetical practices should be modified in the light of the 
goal: God” (16). However, she uses Cassian as a human reference point, 
showing the unrealizable as realizable; John Cassian practiced esthetic 
renunciation, and describes his own merging union with God within his 
mystical texts. Cassian does not only serve as evidence that the merging 
process is possible but also serves to humanize a lofty ideal.  
These historical incarnations, rather than present day incarnations, can 
demonstrate that the unrealizable spiritual ideal has maintained importance and 
traction throughout millennia. Historical references, especially those as old as 
John Cassian (about 360 – 435 CE) rhetorically function to remind a reader 
that spirituality has seemingly always assumed a role within human 
civilization. And this can be reassuring to the reader, just as Funk explains at 
the end of the chapter on Desert Contemplatives. She writes, “What is so 
welcoming about these teachings is that we are not alone. Others have gone 
before us and have done this inner work” (17). Contemplation, an activity that 
can potentially isolate a practitioner from human community, is framed as a 
historical inheritance that inserts a practitioner into the narrative of human 
history.  Using history, Funk incarnates the ideal in a consoling and reassuring 
(and therefore, persuasive) manner.   
Funk is explicit about these historical figures to orchestrate a shared 
incarnation. She writes in Thoughts Matter: The Practice of Spiritual Life, that 
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early Christian contemplatives, such as John Cassian, provide a “common 
language to express a shared religious experience” (14).  In other words, 
Cassian and other historical spiritual figureheads provide incarnated common 
referents to unite audience understanding and persuasion. Funk’s approach 
brings the reader into the discourse community of contemplative writing and 
talk. As a member of the discourse community, the reader can be more 
comfortable with the message of the writer – and with ethos of Funk. Overall, 
both the membership into the discourse community and an increased 
concretization of spiritual practices via the “common language” of incarnation 
helps combat the danger of an audience becoming lost or discouraged when 
trying to digest the abstract spiritual process of unlimited development.    
Pennington’s incarnation strategy, via his own experiential authority, 
and Funk’s incarnation strategy, via historical authority, augment the writer’s 
respective ethos. In Pennington’s case, he establishes and reinforces himself as 
the authority on spirituality through illustrated personal experience; as a 
monastic, he has been through the spiritual journey and remains engaged with 
the contemplative process of uniting with God. Fronting these subjective 
experiences, Pennington increases the trust that an audience has toward him, 
and consequently, increases the audience adherence to the text. With Funk’s 
incarnation strategy, she reinforces her credible ethos by projecting herself as a 
learned authority on spirituality – and as an authority that can initiate readers 
into the discourse community of spirituality. Not only does her monastic 
vocation require that she engage in the contemplative process, but she is also a 
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knowledgeable teacher of the history of spirituality. Unlike some writers of 
spirituality in the Catholic traditions, such as Keating, Frenette, and 
Pennington, who avoid using a plethora of historical reference points, Funk 
uses the history of Catholic spirituality in an effectively persuasive manner; 
she incarnates the unrealizable ideal while simultaneously increasing the 
credibility of her ethos.  
 
Matthew Fox’s Incarnations of the Ideal  
 A writer’s ethos is not always bound to the incarnation of the ideal. 
Sometimes the ethos of the writer is not perfectly in relation to the ideal. Some 
writers of spirituality, albeit a minority of them, are not actively monastic; 
although these writers have experienced divine unities with God, the writers do 
not front their experience as evidence in the way that Pennington does. Also, 
some writers may use historical authorities in differing way than Funk. 
Historical authorities may serve as reference points to provide multiple 
perspectives into spirituality; in other words, the writers evoke, not so much 
the historical authorities’ spiritual experiences, but rather the historical 
authorities’ insights. For example, in Centering Prayer and Inner Awakening, 
Cynthia Bourgeault (who is an Episcopal Priest and not a Catholic monastic), 
like Funk, references John Cassian; however, unlike Funk, she references 20th 
century theologian John Main’s analysis of Cassian’s writings, rather than 
Cassian’s experiential unity with God (Centering 63-64). Although useful 
rhetorical touchstones, these perspectives do not function as explicit 
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incarnations of the unrealizable ideal; the reference points are used to increase 
the power and clarity of the argument, as well as reinforce author credibility. 
So a question remains, how do writers of contemporary spiritual texts 
incarnate the unrealizable ideal if the writers do not rely on personal 
experiential illustrations or historical experiential illustrations? Are there other 
rhetorical options? By analyzing the progressive articulations of spirituality 
found in Matthew Fox, some other rhetorical options can be spotlighted.   
Matthew Fox’s journey of writing and publishing about spirituality has 
been unique. Although he has experiential background as a Dominican priest, 
theologian Matthew Fox compromised much of his Roman Catholic ethos over 
the years. As a Dominican priest in 1976, Fox began and sustained a 
progressive institution of spiritual learning, The University of Creation 
Spirituality at Mundelein College in Chicago, moving it to Holy Names 
College in Oakland, California seven years later (Fox, Pope’s War 77-78). 
This university taught Creation Spirituality, a Fox coinage. “Creation 
Spirituality,” to quote Fox’s letter to Cardinal Ratzinger in 1988, “liberates 
peoples from consumerism and materialism, dualism and patriarchy, 
colonialism, anthropocentrism and arrogance, boredom, homophobia, adultism, 
and the trivializing of our lives” (Pope’s War 83). Throughout Fox’s corpus, 
which extends from the mid-1970s to today, he promotes additional liberations 
such as a feminist overhaul of the Catholic Church, strong advocacy for 
“Mother Earth,” and a “Vatican III” Council. Therefore, it is no surprise that 
Fox has been officially silenced (or was attempted to be officially silenced) by 
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the Catholic Church in 1988 (Fox, Pope’s War 99-100) – and in 1993, he was 
excommunicated.    
Fox’s numerous texts differ from the contemplative texts of Funk, 
Laird, and from those inspired by Keating and Merton. In his texts, Fox tackles 
worldly problems. He discusses spirituality (which he titles “mysticism”) as a 
means to deflate these problems and bring about world peace and harmony. As 
he states at the beginning of The Coming of the Cosmic Christ, he had a dream 
on March 15, 1986; Fox writes that the dream was “about the devastation our 
planet is currently undergoing because we lack a living cosmology. I call this 
devastation ‘matricide,’ or the killing of the mother, for this is how the dream 
spoke to me” (1-2). This vision implies that Fox is a mystic; however, unlike 
the mystics that he discusses in a majority of his work (e.g. Meister Eckhart, 
Hildegard of Bingen, St. John of the Cross), Fox does not use his own personal 
mystical experiences to fuel the argumentative machine. This seems to be an 
effective argumentative choice based on reasonability. Fox’s content is edgy 
and new (especially for 1980s and 1990s Catholic and Anglican audiences); 
therefore, Fox does not front his own experiential visions  since it could 
confound the differentness of his theology, and damage his credibility. After 
all, as Thomas Merton explains in his posthumously published Notes on 
Contemplation, madness, neurosis, and personal contemplation can easily be 
conflated  (110-114).  
So because Fox’s ethos seems potentially problematic to audiences, 
how does he craft unlimited development without depending on his ethos? 
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Moreover, how does Fox blend his own version of Catholic 
spirituality/mysticism in a reasonable manner? How does he deliver his 
uniquely progressive pro-mystic arguments in a grounded way that can make 
sense to an audience?  Fox is certainly attentive of the subjective dimension of 
spirituality, as shown in the aforementioned illustration of his own mystical 
experience or “dream.” However, in his texts, Fox explicitly spotlights 
spirituality/mysticism as bound to the material world, i.e. nature or “Mother 
Earth.”  There is no mistaking his underlying sympathy for pagan spiritual 
traditions. For instance, in his “Twenty-one Running, Working, Experiential 
definitions of Mysticism” found in The Coming of the Cosmic Christ, he is not 
bashful in promoting rich panentheistic aspects of spirituality, using scripture 
as well as mystical authorities such as Meister Eckhart to reinforce his claim 
that “healthy mysticism is panentheistic” (57).  
Moreover, in his final definition of mysticism, Fox describes 
mysticism/spirituality as “globally ecumenical” (65).  Fox understands 
spirituality as a part of all faiths and creeds can unite all faiths and creeds. This 
type of global ecumenism quite a progressive concept for Fox to promote in 
the Catholic tradition; however, this concept is not new to Christianity.  
Protestant thinkers, such as John Dewey (A Common Faith) and Friedrich 
Schleiermacher (the fifth speech, “The Religions,” from On Religion: Speeches 
to its Cultured Despisers), have been promoting ecumenicalism for centuries. 
Ecumenism can be an incarnation of realizable possibility within the 
unrealizable scheme of unlimited development; the mystical unlimited 
! 115!
development becomes humanized in a pluralistic worldly manner. Global 
ecumenicalism morphs the unlimited development scheme, which is abstract 
and theoretical, into a grounded practice of reality. Fox explains this shift as 
ushering in a “new era”: ecumenism moves “from the classrooms of academia 
to the sweat lodges and the sun dances and the solstice rituals of native 
peoples’ religions” (Fox, Coming 65).  Although ecumenism is an ongoing 
process (albeit utopian) that requires upkeep, Fox’s dream incarnates the 
unrealizable infinitude as a realizable human process. Fox’s approach is 
pluralistic, differing from the individualistic illustrations used by Pennington 
and Funk; however, the incarnation serves a similar persuasive purpose. 
Another incarnation of the unrealizable procession can be linked to 
Jesus Christ. On the surface, this is seemingly obvious; after all, Jesus Christ is 
most pivotal of Christian symbols of incarnation. Jesus is God made human: a 
more understandable, less abstract conception of God. The symbol of Jesus 
aids the mystical practitioner’s knowledge of the ineffable: Jesus represents 
equal parts human and God, the logos made flesh. According to the highly 
influential 5th-6th century mystic Pseudo-Dionysius, such types of religious 
symbols work in a two step process within the mind of a practitioner: first, the 
perceptible or material symbols point the practitioner in the direction of 
conceptions that are not perceptible, and second, the spiritual practitioner must 
reach beyond that conception for that which paradoxically “transcends 
knowledge” (53). Jesus as an incarnation of God is an epistemological 
stepping-stone to know the unknowable and ineffable God.  
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Despite the vague activity of knowing, Jesus Christ is a clear symbolic 
incarnation of the ineffable. However, incarnating ineffable knowledge differs 
slightly from incarnating the scheme of unlimited development. The 
“ineffable” refers to “that which cannot be expressed” according to the Oxford 
English Dictionary: “that” in this definition is many times assumed to be 
knowledge or product based. An example: God is an ineffable being, therefore 
Jesus incarnates or helps make the ineffable content become more effable 
content. Unlimited development differs because there is no explicit being or 
thing to make effable: unlimited development is action or process based.  So 
how does the symbol and concept Jesus Christ work to illustrate a process? 
How is Pseudo-Dionysius’ approach to symbols of incarnation updated for a 
contemporary pragmatic era?  How does Jesus Christ work within Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s unlimited development scheme as a means to adhere 
an audience, share attitudes, and take action?   
Again, Matthew Fox tethers the concept of Jesus Christ to individual 
spiritual practice and global ecumenism. The approach is central to his 
philosophy and rhetorical delivery. A clear place to see this at work is in Fox’s 
The Coming of the Cosmic Christ. The title of the book can reveal much of this 
persuasive agenda. From the term “cosmic Christ” alone, the audience 
becomes aware that Fox is not referring to the historical Jesus, nor just the 
Christian Christ. The title indicates that Fox is casting a wide net; he is 
addressing the universal “cosmos” in relation to Christ. Moreover, the word 
“coming” implies that Fox is looking to the future in this book: not exclusively 
! 117!
the past, not exclusively tradition. In sum, the title suggests a future orientated 
universality revolving around “Christ.” 
The title sparks interest. Beside the alliteration and the word choice, the 
book does not seem like a text written by a (at the time) Roman Catholic priest. 
The provocative title possesses an appeal and a mystery. However, the title 
also has a downfall. Initially, the book sounds like Fox is zealously 
proclaiming rapture, the second coming of Jesus, and the “end times.” 
However, this would be a misreading, albeit a common and understandable 
misreading.  Fox does not choose the word “Christ” merely to conclude the 
melody of alliteration. Theologically and etymologically, “Christ” does not 
have the same meaning as “Jesus.” Jesus is a proper name representing the 
proper name Yeshua; Christ is an adjective describing Jesus (Christos in Greek 
meaning “anointed one”) (McKenzie 432).  Fox draws out this distinction in 
his own terms. He explains that the name “Jesus” alludes to the historical 
Jesus, and points to “a anthropomorphic and antimystical Christianity”; 
“Christ,” moreover the “cosmic Christ” dialectically “dances” between the 
personal and the cosmic; the “Cosmic Christ” encompasses the historical Jesus 
and simultaneously moves beyond anthropomorphism to the ineffable (Fox, 
Coming 79). Ultimately, the term “Christ” in Fox’s spiritual texts illustrates the 
unlimited development toward an ineffable ideal (i.e. the union with God) 
while, at the same time, referring to (and reminding the reader of) Jesus Christ, 
a realized, model of unlimited development in human form.       
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The term Christ not only encompasses a past historical incarnation, but 
also points to the realizably grounded potentiality that mystical practice can 
help execute. In other words, Fox’s use of Christ points at the future more 
explicitly than most contemporary spiritual texts.  Fox’s texts are calls to 
action and individual spirituality is the vehicle of such action. He demands that 
a paradigm shift can and must be made: a paradigm shift away from 
Enlightenment rationalism, away from the patriarchal to the feminist, and away 
from modern spirituality toward postmodern mystical spirituality (Fox, 
“Mystical Cosmology” 29). As I have shown in the previous chapter as well as 
this chapter, contemporary Catholic and Anglican texts about contemplation 
and spirituality persuade the reader to engage in present and practical spiritual 
action. The writing techniques used by these assorted contemporary monastics 
and clerics ground an abstract subjective process in concrete action.  Matthew 
Fox advances this approach one large step further.  His perspective on 
contemporary Catholic and Anglican spirituality (because he is a part of both 
traditions) is thoroughly prescriptive. Chapter One of The Coming of the 
Cosmic Christ is saturated with subheadings of problematic issues, such as 
“Mother Earth is Dying,” “Creativity is Dying,” and “Wisdom is Dying”; but 
Fox is sure the end this chapter with the subheading “Our Mother is Dying, but 
Not Dead,” leaving room for hope, solution, and future action (11-34). And as 
Fox clearly indicates throughout the rest of The Coming the Cosmic Christ, 
mystical / spiritual practice can help stop the “matricide.”     
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Unlike many early Christian mystics who tried to relay the linear 
essence of spirituality, Fox’s understands that spirituality is situated in kairotic 
human moments; his attention to kairos is like Bourgeault’s aforementioned 
descriptions of the fluid stations of lectio divina. In fact, similar to Bourgeault, 
Fox explains in Original Blessing that his prescriptive spiritual paths are 
spiraled and do not ascend like a ladder. He writes that “like the movements of 
a symphony, each of the paths spirals in and out of the others until the spiritual 
journey expands and expands”: movements that resist Enlightenment parsing 
and linearity (23).  The fluid spiraling movement of Fox’s spiritual stations of 
development allow for kairotic adaptation.  However, unlike Bourgeault’s 
kairotic moments that revolve around an individual spiritual practitioner’s day-
to-day obstacles, Fox’s spiritual kairotic moments are global and communal.  
For instance, in Original Blessing, he discusses a global spiritual response to 
global unemployment booms (14), and throughout The Pope’s War, he 
discusses religious ecumenism as a solution to Catholic oppression of women. 
These are global problems, communal moments, of which the mystical process 
can adapt to and help solve. Fox’s rhetorical composition certainly forwards 
mysticism as a pragmatic technology, emphasizing causal chains as means to 
resolve a worldly problem; an attention to kairotic adaptation is central to the 
resolution process. Fox has published a plethora of books: most adapting 
mystical practice to worldly problems. Framing texts around global problems 
may seem like an obvious technique to get published: one that most writers use 
to propel and sustain their writing careers.  However, in the context of Catholic 
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and Anglican spirituality, adaptation to global kairotic moments is not a 
common rhetorical approach. Contemporary contemplative and spiritual texts 
are usually centered on the individual practitioner or seeker, like the example 
from Bourgeault’s book – or in Funk’s books. Fox rhetorically depicts 
spirituality as a technological instrument of global resolution ecumenism – 
which can be used by the individual and the whole, both leading to human 
solidarity. The goal of human solidarity is the incarnation of the unending 
mystical process. It is a realizable ideal, albeit a group ideal, of the unending 
spiritual process that rhetorically humanizes these efforts.         
 
Process and Product 
Although writers of spirituality and contemplation use incarnated 
“products” to communicate an abstract goal, they still praise the immediate 
“process.” The immediacy that is tied to kairotic moments, is crucial to the 
persuasive nature of the unlimited development scheme, the rhetorical 
construction of these texts, and the relationship to real world action. The 
unlimited development scheme allows kairotic flexibility due to its emphasis 
on argumentative structure rather than argumentative content.  
For example, lectio divina is a contemplative practice that is praised 
and explained by many contemporary Catholic and Anglican writers of 
spirituality. Lectio divina is a contemplative reading practice that, with enough 
practice, allows the practitioner to arrive at a union with God by pondering the 
symbolic, allegorical, and moral meanings within texts, traditionally Scripture. 
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Benedict of Nursia, in the pivotal 6th Century Catholic monastic guidebook, 
The Rule of St. Benedict, provides exact times in the day and in the week in 
which monastics should engage in lectio divina with Scripture (Chapter 48). 
Benedict turns this practice into a law.  However, Mary Margaret Funk 
disagrees with the containment of lectio divina in “law.”  In Tools Matter for 
Practicing the Spiritual Life, she writes that lectio divina is “not from the 
outside as an imposed ‘law,’ but an impulse from the deepest regions stored in 
our souls” (14). So Funk contemporizes the early Benedictine concept of lectio 
divina.  First, she asks the rhetorical question “What if I’m not attracted to 
Scripture?” then explains that “Some individuals, especially women, find it 
[Scripture] violent, sexist, too academic, and full of memories of childhood 
catechism or family malformation. Scripture isn’t a helpful starting point for 
people today.” (16). Funk proposes that beginning practitioners should perhaps 
begins lectio divina with The Cloud Unknowing.  
She also indicates that lectio divina can be done anywhere; it does not 
have to be methodically scheduled in a structured fashion as proposed by 
Benedict.  Although structure can help the process, Funk explains that “more 
important than how we do lectio divina and what lectio divina is, is that we do 
it”; she explains that one can lectio experience or nature; lectio can even be 
done while drinking coffee on the back porch (16). In her texts, Funk 
demonstrates the contemporary adaptation of the structure of unlimited 
development. With this argumentative scheme, she permits room for kairos 
and subjective individuality and identity. She illustrates that a practitioner can 
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live one’s life while doing lectio divina, rather than requiring cloistered 
monastic vocation.  
Contemporary texts about spirituality certainly concern the future. This 
is shown in Matthew Fox’s books about healing the Earth via mystical practice 
and solidarity, as well as smaller level pragmatic means to pragmatic ends 
(Chapter Three). However, while concerned with the future, writers that use 
structures of unlimited development also emphasize the present moment.  The 
present moment is a conglomeration of working processes, whereas many 
times, the future is a culmination of products formulated by processes. As I 
have illustrated, Matthew Fox’s perspective promotes that mystical practice 
will lead and mystical solidarity which will lead to the incarnated product of 
utopia. “Products” are many times future based. Processes are many times 
based in the present moment. Although the unlimited development scheme 
concerns versions of these components, there is a powerful rhetorical emphasis 
on the present moment. 
In her well-known article, “Learning the uses of Chaos,” Ann Berthoff 
stresses present moment “process” in a generative manner to this discussion. In 
the article, she addresses the inventive uses of chaos in the writing classroom; 
however, she also touches on key notions of meaning-making within the 
writing process. Berthoff writes, “Meanings do not come out of the air; we 
make them out of a chaos of images, half-truths, remembrances, syntactic 
fragments, from the mysterious and unformed”; she emphasizes ambiguity, 
using I.A. Richards slogan as a mantra: ambiguities are the “hinges of thought”  
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(648). The rhetorical use of the unlimited development scheme in spiritual and 
contemplative texts reveals a “use of chaos” and ambiguity. Much spirituality 
helps us order the ambiguities of the world, writing about spirituality helps us 
order the ambiguities of spirituality. In other words, writing about spirituality 
does not ontologically order spiritual ineffability, but rather helps us 
epistemologically order spiritual ineffability. Contemplative and spiritual texts 
demonstrate Berthoff’s point: writing processes and products order chaos in a 
way that celebrates the chaotic nature of chaos; after all, as she explains, “The 
chief use of chaos is that it creates the need for that dialogue” (650). And I will 
add that the dialogue is unending, much like spiritual practices themselves. 
Why? Because both revolve around open processes, rather than closed 
products.  
The “uses of chaos” persuasively extend to the reader of a text as well. 
The activity of reading allows the audience to engage in the present moment as 
they digest the words on the page. Reading situates the audience in a process 
based present moment: the process of reading. Although a task of a writer is to 
order the chaos for an audience (as well as themselves), the audience must still 
process the text via hermeneutic understanding. In other words, the audience 
still tames the chaos of the writer’s ideas for themselves. Since the apophatic 
ideas found in mysticism and spirituality are so difficult to subjectively tame, 
the audience must constantly be productively engaged in the present moment 
via the written product.  The skill of the writer of these texts is to persuade the 
reader to continually engage – and not resign the hermeneutic task.  
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Subjective Belief: Mastering Tyche and Chaos 
In a sense, the freedom bound to ineffable content is wild. The task of 
the communicator, writer or speaker of spiritual content is to tame the content 
so that an audience feels comfortable with the content: intellectually and 
practically. Communicators of spiritual content must do so carefully; they 
cannot be heavy handed with the reins. If the wildness is too tame, the 
ineffability becomes portrayed as effable; the content is manipulated into 
something that it is not. So the communicator must be responsible to the 
content and depict it as it is. In other words, the logos or connection to reality 
must have a degree of accuracy. With the topic of spirituality, the accurate 
referential connection lies with the non-referential.  Overall, the unlimited 
development schema provides an appropriate structure to allow an appropriate 
wildness, freedom, and reference of non-reference (i.e. the unrealizable ideal) 
while still maintaining scaffold, coherence, and direction toward a goal.  
In Rhetoric Reclaimed, Janet Atwill discusses the ancient Greek 
concept of tyche. Tyche is a somewhat vague term – and this is appropriate 
because it refers to a vague topic. Tyche refers not to the metamorphous of 
chaos into order, but rather, to the ordering of chaos while not altering the 
chaos. So this is a much more liberal concept of taming wildness, than Francis 
Bacon’s influential Enlightenment “knowledge is power” proclamation in 
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Book One of Novum Orangium11 (Bacon 4). Atwill lists a series of meanings 
of the term that are found in Greek myth and thought, and are all interrelated: 
“an act of god,” “an agent or cause beyond human control,” “providence,” 
“fate,” and “chance” (93-94). Atwill remarks that all of these versions of tyche 
share indeterminacy and emphasize the limits of human knowledge. To 
demonstrate the nature of the indeterminacy, Atwill illustrates that the goddess 
Tyche. Tyche is the Greeek goddess of the sea, symbolizing indeterminate and 
unpredictable change, tossing around without direction with the waves and 
winds of the sea. Simultaneously, Tyche guilds ships through tumultuous sea 
conditions, providing direction and ordering the chaos for human vessels (95). 
Atwill equates this navigation with techne and rhetoric: two components that 
guide an audience through unpredictable content, taming the wildness of ideas.   
The nature of Tyche puts a deified face on the “both/and” simultaneity: 
both unpredictable and predictable, both ordered and chaotic, both controlling 
navigator and slave of natural elements.  A similar “both/and” relationship is 
seen in Kenneth Burke’s work. The most famous example: the pentad in A 
Grammar of Motives, which implements the same type of paradox. Each of 
Burke’s five dramatic elements is simultaneously distinct and merged (Burke, 
Grammar, xix). And why does Burke endorse, rather than resolve, the 
“both/and” relationship? Because he celebrates ambiguity. Burke tells his 
readers that “instead of considering it our task to ‘dispose of’ any 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 “Human Knowledge and human power meet in one; for where the cause is not known the 
effect cannot be produced.  Nature to be commanded must be obeyed; and that which in 
contemplation is as the cause is in operation as the rule.”  
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ambiguity…we rather consider it our task to study and clarify the resources of 
ambiguity”; such resources are, according to Burke, “”transformations,” 
“distinctions,” “interrelationships,” “overlap,” and “alchemic opportunity” 
(xix). To connect this back to Atwill, the effectively communicative wielding 
of these Burkean resources is in the realm of techne. That is, rhetoric (and I 
will add “argumentation”) seems to be a craft, a skill, or an art that, like the 
goddesss Tyche, navigates the tumultuous seas without actually calming the 
very same seas.  Tyche is a variation of Berthoff’s writing student who 
wrestles with “chaos”: navigating chaos with the technology of writing while 
simultaneously respecting that very same chaos. 
Many of such tumultuous seas are based around the cryptic working of 
personal belief within writing and reading. Contemporary Anglican and 
Catholic texts about spirituality and contemplation all pivot on belief: the 
writer’s belief and the audience’s belief about the transmundane. The reading 
audience can certainly be a seeker of belief or may not possess any Christian 
belief as well. For instance, in reading a text about Centering Prayer, the 
audience can be looking for more spiritual direction as well as a spiritual 
direction. Epideictic discourse, in The New Rhetoric perspective, is a vehicle 
that propels belief or propels a desire for belief; the discourse is educational 
and praises an action system (54). These epideictic texts about spirituality use 
the argumentative structure of unlimited development to guide, not to 
strongarm, an a reader down a certain spiritual path: a path that the reader can 
adapt to their own beliefs. 
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Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca clearly state that “Epideictic discourse, 
as well as all education, is less directed toward changing beliefs than to 
strengthening the adherence to what is already accepted” (54).  Their 
perspective is reinforced by contemporary spiritual texts; unlike older Christian 
texts which threaten the reader with hellfire and damnation, new Catholic and 
Anglican texts respect readers’ subjectivity. The contemporary approach found 
in these spiritual texts supports the Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca perspective 
on the term “argumentation,” and supports the way that I am using 
“argumentation.” Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain that educational 
argumentation should respect an audience’s belief system and align more with 
“rhetoric” rather than “the ancients’ dialectic” (54). This is the same type of 
epideictic argumentation that contemporary Catholic and Anglican spiritual 
texts apply. 
Both Atwill’s “tyche” and Berthoff’s “chaos” can be seen as syncing up 
with subjective belief: in particular, this can be shown via Sharon Crowley’s 
examination of belief in her book, Toward a Civil Discourse: Rhetoric and 
Fundamentalism. Like Atwill and Berthoff discussion of indeterminacy, 
Crowley describes “belief” as indeterminate in relation to external reality (69). 
She explains that there is no survival mechanism attached to belief; therefore, 
without dire consequences, humans can maintain mistaken beliefs. Moreover, 
belief can be learned through discourse and performance, again, which can be 
mistaken. Crowley demonstrates this indeterminacy to show that belief is 
“need only be true (in the sense of ‘seemingly consonant with reality’) within 
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the contexts where such consonance is useful to the believer”; in other words, 
belief is merely useful “conjecture” (68-69).  
Ralph Waldo Emerson, American Transcendentalist and writer of 
spirituality, provides perhaps the most telling perspective into the collision of 
experience, personal belief, and the pragmatism of universal spirituality. 
Throughout his essays, he allocates equality between individuality, 
universality, and human solidarity: a spiritual perspective that celebrates 
subjective belief amidst the seeming chaos of the world. In his essay, 
“Experience,” Emerson writes: 
 
A man’s genius, the quality that differences him from every other, the 
susceptibility to one class of influences, the selection of what is fit for 
him, the rejection of what is unfit, determines for him the character of 
the universe. A man is a method, a progressive arrangement; a selecting 
principle, gathering his like to him wherever he goes. He takes only his 
own out of the multiplicity that sweeps and circles around him. (195) 
 
 In other words, human beings use personal individual belief to guide 
themselves through the chaotic world. And how is this guidance communicated 
to others? Individual subjective belief finds a communicative home within 
epideictic discourse where, in varying levels, individual belief is praised.  The 
scheme of unlimited development within epideictic discourse displays that 
“man is method” in a “progressive arrangement”: always moving, via the 
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ordering function of personal belief, toward a goal that ultimately cannot be 
materially reached.  
The argumentative scheme of unlimited development leaves room for 
the guidance of individual belief; it leaves room for those specific beliefs that 
an individual pragmatically conjectures. The scheme permits this subjective 
space because the scheme is a structural construct; it does not dictate the 
content. Instead, the scheme is a persuasive arrow pointing in an unending 
direction toward a godhead.  Moreover, the persuasive arrow is navigational. It 
provides a direction in which an individual can journey through the chaos. 
Spirituality, contemplation, belief, techne, writing, rhetoric, and argumentation 
all combine to serve this practical purpose: subjective navigation through 
external and internal indeterminacy and chaos.  I did not include religion in 
this list of subjectively navigational components. Although religion affects 
individual belief, ideology plays a central role in religion and is tricky to plot. I 
will expound on the connection and the disconnection between spirituality and 
religion in the next chapter, Chapter Five.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s argumentative scheme of unlimited 
development adherers a reader to a certain single point of view: that of 
transcendental oneness with the ineffable. Perhaps the scheme may seem so 
vague and free that it may devolve into chaos; however, the writer has a certain 
direction in mind. A structure of reality scheme can adhere a reader to that 
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direction. Therefore, a rigid motive is involved. After all, the writer argues for 
the reasonableness of one direction, toward one general value (Perelman, 
Realm 89). This is the dimension of argumentation: an appropriate and 
effective backbone structure leading to reasonableness.   
But as a backbone can only do so much for a human body, the structure 
can only do so much to adhere an audience. It is the rhetorical dimensions that 
tweak the structure, allow for kairotic flexibility, and incarnate the unrealizable 
ideals. As I have shown in this chapter, different writers implement different 
rhetorical strategies to dress up the unlimited development schema. The 
rhetorical dressings in these texts dispel the Platonic notion that rhetoric is 
superfluous trickery, and simultaneously dispel the Ramusian separation of 
rhetoric and philosophy/argument. Contemporary spiritual texts embrace and 
proudly display the antistrophos of rhetoric and dialectic in a way that 
illustrates a primary mission Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s The New 
Rhetoric.       
And texts themselves can only do so much to adhere an audience.  A 
body needs more than its anatomy; it also requires physiology. Just as the 
human body requires active processes to maintain one’s Athenian breath and 
Promethean spark, texts require active processes to maintain the life of the 
message. These particular spiritual texts are amalgamations of the spiritual 
processes of writer and reader embedded in the processes of reading and 
writing: a complex recursive nesting sequence that requires equal complexity. 
The cooperation of rhetoric and argumentation found in the ever-active scheme 
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of unlimited development provides that complex framework: structuring 
ambiguity while simultaneously allowing the ambiguity to flow.         
 Overall, the processes found in the unlimited development may address 
and allow ambiguity; however, the processes are still processes of association.  
In The New Rhetoric, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca define the processes of 
association as “schemes which bring separate elements together and allow us 
to establish a unity among them, which aims either at organizing them or at 
evaluating them, positively or negatively, by means of one another” (190). The 
processes of association found in contemporary texts of spirituality 
demonstrate that writers’ organize their epideictic discourse both positively 
(cataphatic) and negatively (apophatic) via several associative argumentative 
schema: unlimited development playing a primary role. Although an intricate 
associative tapestry of paradoxical and “both/and” relationships, the unlimited 
development schema serves persuasive purposes. As I have shown, unlimited 
development found in spiritual texts forms unities and juxtapositions that can 
guide audiences through (and with) abstract thoughts into concrete and 
realizable action, constructing associative bridges between ineffable realities 
and material realities in effectively communicative ways.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ANALYSIS OF DISSOCIATIVE SCHEMA: MOVEMENT AWAY FROM 
RELIGION 
 
In Chapters Three and Four, I have discussed the 
rhetorical/argumentative structures and techniques of association: specifically, 
“structures of reality,” as conceived by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. 
According to the two thinkers, structures of reality “establish a solidarity 
between accepted judgments and others one wishes to promote” (261); they are 
associative because they unite separate components together as a means to 
organize or evaluate particular opinions – and they do so rhetorically (190). In 
other words, as shown in examples from contemporary Catholic and Anglican 
texts, a discourse of spirituality implement these associations: uniting ineffable 
and/or experiential referents to realistic, understandable structures (cause and 
effect, staging, pragmatic arguments, unlimited development). I have shown 
that these strategies adhere audiences to their arguments, opinions, and 
teachings.   
This chapter, Chapter Five, seemingly turns away from the 
aforementioned rhetorical constructions seen in contemporary discourse of 
spirituality (however, as we will see in Chapter Six, all of the constructions 
ultimately cooperate). Associative structures serve crucial functions within 
contemporary Catholic and Anglican discourse about spirituality. Without 
associative argumentation strategies, communication would be ineffective at 
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adhering an audience; after all, the discourse of spirituality is saturated with 
nebulous, ineffable, and subjective referents. However, dissociation, an 
inversion of associative argumentation, can also serve a valuable persuasive 
function. In this chapter, I argue that dissociation is a pivotal, macro level 
argumentation strategy upon which contemporary discourse of spirituality 
rhetorically pivots. 
As discussed in Chapter One, the terminology surrounding the 
discourse of spiritualty significantly overlaps. Sometimes vocabulary conflates 
into itself: terms such as “spirituality,” “mysticism,” “contemplation,” and 
even “meditation” can signify different dimensions and practices to different 
writers within particular communities (Ganass 63). Sometimes communities 
and writers overlap discourse to be more ecumenical. One community can 
speak across communities, graciously absorbing them, sharing terms and ideas: 
such as seen in Matthew Fox’s work. However, other times, a religious 
community defines itself according to domination. Dominations can be as large 
as “Christianity” or “Buddhism,” or as small as “liberal Catholicism” or 
“orthodox Judaism.” Within these religious denominations and categories, 
exclusively can fuel the disocurse: particular rituals, philosophies, beliefs, and 
symbols (including language[s]). The discourse of spirituality occurs within 
these separate religious spheres. Religious communities can many times 
provide the foundational hub of belief in which spiritual subjectivity and 
contemplative action radiate (Merton, New 146-148). Despite the overlap, 
difference plays a central role in separating spirituality from religion, and 
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separating accompanying discourses from each other in strategically 
argumentative and persuasive manners. Throughout this study, I examine the 
Catholic and Anglican textual spheres - and I would be deeply remiss if I did 
not discuss the deliberate rhetorical differences between spirituality and 
religion: a dissociation that packs substantial persuasive power. 
The distance between spirituality and religion contributes to the 
growing popularity of spirituality in America – a trend seen from the 1960s 
until today, and a similar point that Robert Wuthnow makes in his book After 
Heaven: Spirituality After the 1950s (54-56). Through numerous sociological 
case studies, Wuthnow illustrates examples of Americans growing up in the 
sixties leaving organized religion while maintaining spiritual sentiments and 
convictions (54-56).  However, since After Heaven is a sociological 
investigation, Wuthnow does not explicitly explore the rhetorical composition 
(and compositions) involved with this distancing movement. The distance 
between spirituality and religion is deliberately and persuasively wielded so to 
gain such popularity.  How does emphasizing separation, difference, or 
dissociation boost the adherence of audiences? To answer this question, I will 
explain the theoretical framework of dissociation as depicted by Pereleman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca. Next, I will discuss the differences between religion and 
spirituality, Finally, I will show and analyze dissociation at work within 
contemporary Catholic and Anglican texts, connecting it to the emerging 
phenomenon of spirituality. Doing so, demonstrates the harmonious workings 
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of spirituality within religion(s), and the powerful synergy of individuality and 
inclusivity found in the discourse of spirituality. 
 
Dissociation 
In The New Rhetoric, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca define the 
processes of dissociation as:  
 
…techniques of separation which have the purpose of dissociating, 
separating, disuniting elements which are regarded as forming a whole 
or at least a unified group within some system of thought: dissociation 
modifies such a system by modifying certain concepts which make up 
its essential parts. It is the way that these processes of dissociation are 
characteristic of all original philosophical thought. (190) 
 
And in The Realm of Rhetoric, Perelman defines dissociative action as 
“separating elements which language or recognized tradition have previously 
tied together” (49).  Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca are clear that the 
separation is not the primary function in itself, but rather the functionality of 
dissociation lies in modifying the structures of the separated independent 
elements and profoundly changing “the conceptual data that are used as the 
basis for the argument” (412). Administering such a drastic “new structuration 
of reality” offers a calculated haymaker, not merely not a powerful jab; it 
offers a “compromise solution to incompatibilities” that is resolutely 
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“inescapable” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 415). As an argumentative 
maneuver, dissociation is blatant and bold. Therefore, the strategy does not 
hide in plain sight. The audience can many times figure out that something 
new or revolutionary is being proposed.  Dissociation is a difficult strategy to 
administer in discourse because it requires arduous work and extensive 
justification on part of the writer. However, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
are convinced that, if done well, the argumentation scheme holds significant 
force because it proposes a new solution that can lead to the resolution of 
conflict and reconciliation. 
Dissociation seems to side with the interpretation of “argumentation” as 
content based: dependent on the seeking of truth.  However, the scheme 
extends a powerful persuasive pull as well. As we will see, rhetorical elements 
subtlety work within the scheme. Overall, dissociation is not often addressed 
by rhetorical tradition since it is a strategy used primarily in philosophical 
thought: systematically thinking/rethinking that which reinvents a coherent 
version of reality (Perelman 126; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 414). 
Perhaps this is evidence of a Ramusian inheritance that we still latch onto 
today: separating philosophy from rhetoric. Yet, dissociation as explained by 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, and demonstrated in contemporary discourse 
of spirituality, unites “truth-seeking” and rhetoric.  As we will see, dissociation 
redefines particular concepts in original ways – and the very newness in 
contrast with the original definition, can conjure a strong persuasive pull.  
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Alan Gross, in his 2000 article “Rhetoric as Technique and a Mode of 
Truth: Reflections on Chiam Perelman,” demonstrates several historical 
examples of dissociative argumentation at work. The most compelling example 
is Plato’s Phaedrus. Gross explains that in this dialogue, as in many of the 
Platonic dialogues, Plato consistently depends on dialectic as a dissociative 
device. Describing the dialectical method, Socrates indirectly refers to 
dissociation in the Phaedrus as the second part of a movement from blame to 
praise within discourse. Socrates asserts that the first part of the dialectical 
movement is “perceiving and bringing together in one idea the scattered 
particulars” (265d) and the second part of the movement is “dividing things 
again by classes, where the natural joints are, and not trying to break any part, 
after the manner of a bad carver” (265e). Gross points out that this second part 
of the dialectical movement is dissociative (327).  
However, Plato does not merely discuss the process from a distance; in 
a complex dissociative matrix, Plato applies the two-part-dialectical-process to 
the dialogue itself. For instance, although the audience may initially assume 
that the dialogue is truly about love, the dialogue dissociates the issue of love 
from the true issue: falsity and truth. The dialogue shifts with this dissociation. 
After this shift, the effective use of rhetoric is dissociated from the instruction 
of truth via Socrates’ “Great Speech” (276c). In other words, eloquent 
speech/writing cannot adequately capture the truth. Thus, the entire dialectical 
voyage ends in praise of the dialectic and in blame of rhetoric – and the 
argument depends on dissociative shifts (Gross 327-328).  
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Gross also points out that, as shown in the Phaedrus, dissociation is a 
“mode of truth” that conveys to the audience that a certain new point of view is 
“true” whereby invalidating an old point of view. Clearly, this movement is 
integral to philosophy and the proposal and adherence of idea ideas. Yet, 
dissociation is not only seen in philosophy; it can also be seen in science as 
well. Scientists strive for objectivity; therefore, scientific theories usually 
cancel out and replace one another according to empirical evidence: a 
dissociative movement. With science, the quest for truth is more absolute and 
finite than in philosophy; however, the rhetorical dimension of dissociation 
ensures that this absolute way of thinking and listening is merely instrumental 
in its purpose. For example, the law of gravity is absolute – for now.  The law 
of gravity is a placeholder. If new scientific information changes the law of 
gravity, then the new law would replace the law of gravity. The scientific 
argument proposes an adherence to a claim by providing a fresh new direction. 
What is the purpose of scientific rhetoric? According to Walter Beale, rhetoric 
moves in the direction of science when “it seeks to establish stable and 
incontrovertible propositions of understanding” (Beale 96). Replacing of an 
insight with a more “stable” insight demonstrates a crucial variation of 
dissociation: one that quests for truth, understanding, and argumentative 
adherence. Like any rhetorical device, there is no consummate logic to 
dissociation (Gross 333); argumentation and rhetoric cooperate as advocated 
by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. Rhetoric accounts for language, human 
opinion, audience, and context (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 5-9). The 
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rhetorical dimension of this unification protects the audience from absorbing, 
and philosopher/scientist from projecting, false absolutism.  Therefore, Plato 
may use a matrix of dissociations to argue his point as absolute in the 
Phaedrus; however, we know that dissociative conclusions are surely 
rhetorical adaptive and flexible.   
Rhetoric is situational (Charland 119-120). A rhetorical understanding 
of dissociation ensures that dissociative truths are flexible and adaptive. 
Dissociative arguments occur in response to the ebb and flow of cultural 
movements and awarenesses. Religion is one cultural area where these shifts 
occur – and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca certainly make this clear in their 
textual examples. In The New Rhetoric, to show dissociation at work, the 
authors refer to John Locke’s argument against the unity of Church and State 
(412) as well the theological disagreements of the Early Christian Church 
(415). However, one of the most monumental instances of dissociative 
argumentation in the history Western religious thought, the 16th Century 
Protestant Reformation, is an historical instance neglected in Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s textual examples. The Protestant Reformation and Martin 
Luther’s pivotal work provides other examples of dissociation that differ from 
Plato’s Phaedrus – and brings us closer to contemporary definitions of religion 
and spirituality, and the accompanying cultural motivations.  
The argumentative devices found in the Protestant Reformation are 
largely dissociative. Protestants protest-ed against Roman Catholicism. This 
movement did not merely voice grievances to tear down the Roman Catholic 
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Church, but instead to reform the Roman Catholic Church. Luther was 
certainly an outspoken and radical critic of Roman Catholicism (and he 
earnestly admits this [216-217]) – but his criticism was meant to reform, that 
is, to overhaul Roman Catholicism. This is seen throughout many of his 
famous texts. For instance, among a myriad of criticisms and propositions in 
To the Christian Nobility, Luther posits “we ought to abolish church 
anniversary celebrations outright, since they have become nothing but taverns, 
fairs, and gambling places, and only increase the dishonoring of God and foster 
the soul’s damnation” (183); he then develops this argument using rhetorical 
questions and scriptural evidence. Luther proposes a new philosophy based on 
an argument, instead of merely claiming that the church anniversary 
celebrations are wrong because they dishonor God. Luther does not discuss 
what is wrong with the Church, but how it should be solved; and based on the 
solutions that Luther posits, a new church is founded that subsumes these 
changes. In other words, Protestantism ideologically dissociates from Roman 
Catholicism; all of the other Protestant branches (e.g. Anabaptists, Calvinists, 
Episcopalians) then dissociate from Lutheranism and Roman Catholicism 
alike. Institutional dissociations followed the ideological dissociations. 
 What does the Protestant Reformation demonstrate about dissociation? 
More evident than the example from the Phaedrus, the Protestant reformation 
shows a reliance on cultural attitudes and values: a reliance that leads to 
cultural action. Like Plato, Luther used texts to inspire action and change; 
however, Luther’s words are merely a powerful articulation of already existing 
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cultural yearnings in Europe for a renewal of the Church (MacCulloch 567-
584).12  In other words, religious dissociation occurs because cultural 
understandings of the world had shifted. The public desired more democratic 
and individual empowerment; and the desires reached a critical mass. 
Dissociation becomes the product of amassed frustration – and the dissociation 
is successful. It is adhered to by the masses, because the public desires it. As a 
writer and rhetor, Luther plays a pivotal role as the harbinger of the 
dissociative movement by effectively articulating the frustration and call for 
action via effective rhetorical and kairotic public writing.     
 
Contemporary Dissociations of Spirituality  
Is America seeing a paradigm shifting religious/spiritual dissociation, 
similar to the Protestant Reformation, albeit with subtler dissociative devices? 
Is spirituality dissociating from religiousness? How do these devices work in 
the contemporary age of postmodernity? Moreover, are cultural desires fueling 
the dissociation?  
In asserting a dissociative mode of truth, the Protestant Reformation 
was progressive in the Renaissance; similarly, the growing international 
interfaith dialogues are a progressive force in the contemporary era.  Many of 
these dialogues discuss spirituality as common discussion point that can lead to 
harmonious interfaith relations. For example, in 1996, the Dalai Lama, Mary 
Margaret Funk, Fr. James Wiseman, Donald W. Mitchell, and assorted !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 As can be seen in numerous ways: e.g. John Wyclif, Lollardy, a revived interest in 
humanism based on ancient texts that surfaced in the Middle Ages (567-584) !
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Buddhist and Christian spiritual, contemplative, and monastic authorities from 
various traditions, participated in the “Gethsemani Encounter.” The 
Gethsemani Encounter was organized by the MID (Monastic Interfaith 
Dialogue) to engage in a formal interfaith dialogue and share spiritual 
understandings to aid one another’s spiritual journeying (xi).  Located at the 
Abbey of Gethsemani, close to Louisville, Kentucky, the Gethsemani 
Encounter participants “gathered the well-ripened fruits of a long interfaith 
collaboration” which were initially planted by American Trappist monk 
Thomas Merton. Merton maintained a strong relationship with the Dalai Lama 
and the Buddhist tradition in the 1960s; therefore, the Gesethmani Encounter 
offered an extension and continuation of Merton’s monumental interfaith 
dialogues - and the reason why the 1996 dialogues were located at the Abbey 
of Gethsemani: the location where Merton spent much of his time (Mitchell 
xi).  
Donald W. Mitchell and James Wiseman captured, organized, and 
edited The collaborative dialogues. The book, The Gethsemani Encounter: A 
Dialogue on the Spiritual Life by Buddhist and Christian Monastics, was 
released in 1997. The text is comprised of topical sections that alternate 
between Buddhist and Christian perspectives of spirituality.  Consequently, a 
dissociative distinction is made between religiousness and spirituality, 
especially in the sections involving the Dalai Lama. In his captured dialogues, 
he understands and promotes the differences in religions. Religions encompass 
differ philosophies and viewpoints; however, individuals require different 
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viewpoints for spiritual sustenance. Therefore, based on individual differences 
and needs, all religions should be respected and the differences should be 
embraced in a discourse of spirituality (Mitchell 46-48). In other words, 
according to the Dalai Lama, all religions should be embraced because they 
provide arenas of spiritual nourishment for individuals.  
Tolerance of individual belief and subjectivities are largely agreed upon 
within the discourse of spirituality found in the Gethsemani cohort. In the 
words of the Dalai Lama: “we cannot say ‘This religion is better, that religion 
is not good.’ That we cannot say. However, on an individual basis we can say 
that a particular religion is good for us. For example, the Buddhist way is best 
for me. There is no doubt! But this does not mean that Buddhism is best for 
everyone” (48). As this passage indicates, the individual is celebrated, but 
practical flexibility is also celebrated: flexibility not found in stricter evangelist 
dominations like Christian fundamentalism. In the Gethsemani Encounter, 
several Buddhist members discuss the problem of evangelical Christianity. In 
particular, Havanpola Ratanasara and Samu Sunim mention the toxicity of 
proselytizing; they both urge Catholic members of the Gethsemani Encounter 
to pressure evangelical Christian communities to stop contributing to 
ideological disharmony (246-247). The Dalai Lama punctuates this point, 
emphasizing to the Christian community that dialogue “builds a healthy spirit 
of harmony on the basis of mutual understanding. With full knowledge of our 
differences and our similarities, we have developed mutual respect and mutual 
understanding” (248). 
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The Dalai Lama, Havanpola Ratanasara, and Samu Sunim offer a 
discourse of spirituality, a discourse of “mutual understanding” as a solution in 
contrast to Christian evangelism. Subjective spiritual experiences differ; 
religious traditions differ. And as the Dalai Lama posits, these differences can 
be respected and understood within a discourse of spirituality. However, where 
does the “healthy spirit of harmony” come from? What are the “similarities” 
shared by individuals and religious traditions? What is the common ground 
that fuels that dissociates spirituality from religiousness?  
Firstly, difference can be seen as consensus, however, not in an 
unproductive “agree to disagree,” Lyotardian legitimation crises,” or “name 
calling” manner that can occur in heated argumentative writing and speaking 
(Faigley 189-190). Rather, the sphere of spirituality is a sphere of experiential 
subjectivity. Therefore, every individual is right. There is no objective proof. 
There is only what experientially works for individuals. Therefore, there is 
common ground: a common celebration of experiential relativity. And this is a 
celebration not emphasized as rigorously in religiousness. 
The dissociation is clarified in Robert Wuthnow’s 1998 investigation of 
social patterns of America spirituality. By examining case studies, he draws the 
distinction between “religious dwelling” and “spiritual seeking” “Religious 
dwellers” tend to accept institutional authority whereas “spiritual seekers” are 
dependent on their own autonomy, which takes precedence over traditional 
doctrine or external authority. Spiritual seekers can borrow across many 
traditions because they have the freedom and power as individuals to do so. 
! 145!
Spirituality dissociates from religiousness based on different priorities and 
emphases (Wuthnow; Dillion, Wink, Fay 428).  
Differing priorities and emphases dissociate spirituality from 
religiousness, but not in an aggressive way; rather, the dissociation is gentle, 
reasonable, and persuasive. The dissociation occurs within the religious sphere, 
thus implying that spirituality is not breaking off ties completely from religion, 
but rather providing a fresh understanding and development of religious 
experience. A textual example of this can be found in an epideictic text 
regarding the contemporary practice of Ignatian (Jesuit) spirituality, Inner 
Compass: An Invitation to Ignatian Spirituality (2008/1999) by Margaret Silf. 
Silf begins in the first chapter as so: 
 
The Invitation … 
Is made out in your name. 
But who are you? 
Who is this person who feels drawn to explore the spiritual treasures 
that lie within you? 
Yes, within you… 
Not in some closet in the sky or the bishop’s office. 
Not in some divine database, to which only the elect hold the password.  
But in you. (3) 
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What is Silf doing here? What are her very first words establishing for the 
audience? “The Invitation.” The term hold a strong appeal to pathos, building a 
rhetorical bridge with the audience; “invitation” connects the audience to the 
message. More importantly with this passage, she dissociates spirituality from 
religiousness.  Spirituality, referred to as “spiritual treasures,” contrasts 
religious concepts (“bishop’s office,” “divine database,” etc.).  In this short 
introductory piece of text, Silf dissociates spirituality as internal (“within you”) 
rather than external (“in the sky,” “bishop’s office,”); Silf dissociates 
spirituality as inclusive rather than exclusive (“password,” “the elect”). Similar 
to Luther, she mentions a negative claim as a gateway into to a new claim. As I 
have shown, in many of Luther’s works that respond to Roman Catholicism, 
Luther states that a aspects of Roman Catholicism “should not be,” and 
instead, the religion “should be” reformed into something new. Luther 
dissociates reform away from Roman Catholicism. Silf’s introduction, in a less 
agonistic manner, dissociates spirituality away from religiousness by using the 
“Not this… But this” construction. She is offering something new that differs 
from religiousness. And what is the “something new”? It is something unique 
to the individual. It is “in you.” Later in the same introduction, Silf clarifies 
that the “spiritual treasures” are not merely “in you,” but they “who you are” as 
well (3-5). Silf dissociates spirituality from religiousness by tethering 
spirituality to individual members of the audience, the readers; simultaneously, 
Silf dissociates the discourse of spirituality found in Inner Compass from more 
religious, perhaps exclusively Catholic, discussions.     
! 147!
Silf’s introduction demonstrates that dissociative devices found in the 
discourse of spirituality can increase the inclusivity of the audience. Audience 
can identify with spirituality more so because it celebrates difference and 
individuality rather than suppressing individuality between a heavy 
institutional vice.  However, this is not to say that Silf, and other contemporary 
Catholic and Anglican writers of spirituality and contemplation, are creating a 
clean cut binary that is removed from religiousness. Instead, writers such as 
Silf, spotlight a dimension of the religion and dwell in that topic for the 
duration of the text. Silf is drawing her discussion from the Ignatian tradition, 
updating the Jesuit tradition for contemporary audiences; unlike Luther, she is 
not overhauling or reforming the tradition.  
 
An Evolution of Inclusivity 
Ignatius of Loyola (1491-1556) was progressive for his time. In a way, 
he was responding to Renaissance call for more democracy in religion: a call 
that propelled the Protestant Reformation. Ignatius’ The Spiritual Exercises 
(1524) provide much more individual agency in the contemplative process than 
the medieval mystical texts that came before. Highlighting autonomous 
faculties such as individual imagination and will, Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises 
give agency to the practitioner; however, the instructive mediations do not 
have the faculties romp wildly away from Catholic teachings. In the text, 
Ignatius maintains a balance, accounting for Catholic rules and guidelines for 
spirituality in his exercises. Throughout The Spiritual Exercises, Ignatius 
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emphasizes the use of faculties such as individual intellect, memory, 
imagination, and will. The tiers effectively balance spirituality and 
religiousness. For example, in the “First Exercise” of The Spiritual Exercises, 
Ignatius has the practitioner run through three mediations. The first meditation 
is to use memory and intellect to meditate on the sins of the angels; the second 
mediation is to remember and understand the sins of Adam and Eve in the 
Garden of Eden; however, the Third Mediation shifts toward active audience 
subjectivity. It is not directly based on Scripture, nor any mystical revelation of 
the author (a technique as seen in many medieval spiritual writings), but rather, 
the audience must become the active practitioner. The practitioner must 
integrate their own subjectivity and set of experiences. The Third Meditation 
urges the practitioner to ponder the meditative focus: someone in the world 
that has sinned. Ignatius’ Third Meditation guideline read as follows, “use the 
same method on the third sin, the particular sin of anyone who has gone to hell 
because of one mortal sin; and further, of innumerable other persons who went 
there for fewer sins than I [the practitioner] have committed” (Genss 138 [52]). 
Therefore, the practitioner must pick someone whom they know has sinned, 
and then, meditate upon the sins, and imagine “the innumerable other 
persons,’’ and “finish by using the will” to combat such sinning behavior. Via 
the faculty of imagination, the practitioner is given the power of free 
interiority; via the faculty of the will, the practitioner is given the power of free 
exteriority. Rather than being suppressed by more traditional prescribed 
prayers and catechisms, the subjectivity and freedom of the practitioner is 
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celebrated. In the final section of the exercise, the “colloquy,” Ignatius has the 
practitioner discern their own actions, reflecting on their own sins via a 
combination of prayer and questions (Genss 138 [53]). The exercise is 
punctuated with interiority, self-reflection, and agency. 
As a 16th Century Roman Catholic authority writing to a Christianized 
Europe, Ignatius founded a school of spirituality which emphasized personal 
growth, however Ignatius was not in the position to explicitly dissociate 
spirituality from Roman Catholic religion, as done by Silf. Rather, for Ignatius, 
spirituality and religion were two sides of the same coin. In the 21st Century, as 
shown by Silf’s articulation of Ignatian spirituality, the dissociation of personal 
spirituality away from doctrinal religion is more explicit and thus more 
inclusive and persuasive to more diverse audiences. More global, more 
tolerant, and more postmodern Christianities demand this type of dissociation; 
therefore, rhetors of contemporary spiritual texts are indebted to the Jesuit 
tradition, while simultaneously propose a more progressive interpretation of 
the Jesuit tradition. 
As alluded to throughout Burke’s Attitudes Toward History, attitudes 
and values are in flux throughout the course of history. Cultural and 
intellectual tides are always rising and falling. So it may seem obvious that 
epistemological and ontological understandings of religion and spirituality 
have somewhat changed since the 16th century. However, a similar evolution 
can be seen within the postmodern period itself. The dissociation that I have 
shown in Silf’s The Inner Compass not only updates the 500 year old Jesuit 
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tradition, but also updates contemporary contemplative perspectives to be more 
contemporary.  For example, Thomas Merton is a Trappist monk who is 
known for being progressive for his 20th century understandings of 
contemplation and spirituality.  Yet, in the 1961 text, The New Seeds of 
Contemplation, Merton praises Catholic authority and dogma as integral to 
proper Christian spirituality. Like Ignatius, Merton binds Catholic dogma and 
spirituality together so that without a deep and correct understanding of 
Catholic interpretation, a practitioner’s spiritual state would be deficient. In the 
chapter “Tradition and Revolution,” Merton dispels the notion that the mystics 
rebelled against (i.e. dissociated from) the authority of the Church (146).  
Spirituality, he states, is inseparable from the authority of the Church – and 
Catholic mystics were always bound to the Church. Merton goes on to write:  
 
The dogmas defined and taught by the Church have a very precise, 
positive and definite meaning which those who have the grace to do so 
must explore and penetrate if they would live an integral spiritual life. 
[…] Every Christian ought to have as deep a comprehension of his 
belief as his state will allow him. And this means that every one ought 
to breathe the clean atmosphere of orthodox tradition and be able to 
explain his belief in correct terminology - and terminology with a 
content of genuine ideas. (147)  
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As a “progressive” Catholic perspective, Merton reads a bit conservative here. 
However, Merton is writing in 1961 as a cloistered monk at the Abbey of 
Gethsemani. Merton was certainly influenced by the American cultural 
context, the Catholic context, and his own life experiences during the time 
when he composed New Seeds of Contemplation. Contrary to the conservative 
sentiments here, New Seeds of Contemplation, was indeed “new” for 1961. 
However, as seen in Silf, more contemporary articulations distance spirituality 
more explicitly from religiousness. Silf’s articulation of spirituality is 
explicitly and implicitly removed from the “clean atmosphere of orthodox” 
Roman Catholic tradition.  Consequently, Silf’s articulation is inclusive to 
those outside of the Roman Catholic tradition; while Merton can potentially 
lose the adherence of a more general audience who may not have the “correct 
terminology.”  
This difference can be examined through lenses of antifoundationalism 
and foundationalism.  Spirituality compromises of both antifoundationalism 
and foundationalism; whereas traditional religion is merely a construction of 
foundationalism.  In Toward a Civil Discourse: Rhetoric and Fundamentalism, 
Sharon Crowley discusses these implications. She explains that foundational 
belief systems hold ideologically noncontigent “first principles” as universal 
and noncontextual (13). Since all beliefs systems depend on such first 
principles in some way, every belief system is foundational; therefore, in 
Crowley’s eyes, these belief systems are fundamentalisms in which subscribers 
hold foundational ideologies as favorable over other available alternatives (13-
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14).  This is a natural understanding of religious sects and denominations: loyal 
to foundationalism and fundamentalism, unwavering and proud.  As Crowley 
explains, fundamentalism “delineates a particular strategy (and tone) that 
permeates defenses of … religious belief systems: a desire to preserve one’s 
own founding beliefs from threat at any cost” (14). However, spirituality 
dissociates itself from fundamentalism while still maintaining foundationalism.  
Spirituality, as demonstrated earlier, is aware of and celebrates individual 
subjectivities while still maintaining foundational principles. How does it 
implement this both/and relationship? The foundational principles of 
spirituality are broad and flexible enough to be interpreted by the subjects in 
different ways. The foundational principles found in the discourse of 
spirituality concern experiential communion with (an) ineffable greater 
Being(s), force(s), or power(s) outside of the self. These central foundational 
principles indicate awareness directed outside of the self that believers can 
believe in.  The methods of communion differ; the experiences differ; the 
understandings and traits of the awareness differ. And these differences are 
based on subjective interpretation from the spiritual practitioner. Spiritual 
foundations are more inclusionary than strictly religious foundations; 
spirituality provides a home for subjectivity and personal difference (many 
times in the form of personal narrative, which is found in every contemporary 
Catholic and Anglican epideictic text about spirituality that I have analyzed. 
See Chapter Six.). And this home is not merely an afterthought, but it is a 
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central dwelling place of spiritual practice and discourse: a major rhetorical 
difference between spirituality and religiousness.  
Interfaith dialogues between Buddhist and Christian spiritualties are 
brimming with broad spiritual foundations that combat aggressive 
fundamentalisms (Mitchell 18-19; With One Voice).  However, this broadness 
is also evident in non-dialogic spiritual expressions: epideictic texts about 
spirituality and contemplation. The definitions of God found in the texts 
demonstrate this broadness at work. Unlike more theological discussions of 
God which referentially debate the traits of God, Biblical meanings, and the 
“problem of evil,” contemporary writers of spirituality do not narrow the 
definition of God so to not exclude audiences – and this sets this discourse 
apart from religious discourse. In Into the Sunlit Land, Martin Laird defines 
God as “Being of our being” and riffs off of Augustine indicating that “God is 
our homeland” (1-2); in Thoughts Matter: The Practice of the Spiritual Life, 
Mary Margaret Funk defines God as “our heart’s desire” and mentions that 
“we must renounce our own images of God so we can enter into contemplation 
of God as God” that is, via interior experience rather than external definition 
(9); Basil Pennington defines God in Centered Living, as a “God of immense 
love” revealing “Godself” throughout creation and throughout the depths of 
“inner Reality” (xxiv). Moreover, he explains that,  
 
Our rational mind wants to distinguish these [theological] things, sort 
them out, and organize data accordingly. But if we insist on always 
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doing this in our minds, such compartmentalization may well carry 
over into our lives. This we do not want. We want to experience the 
fullness of the theological Reality very practically in our everyday 
lives; we want it to flow through all we say and do. (xxv)    
 
The broad definitions of God certainly are inclusive, allowing audiences of 
different orientations, sects, and philosophies to adhere to the message. 
Simultaneously, as indicated by Funk and Pennington specifically, the 
experiential emphasis of spirituality requires abstractness. Discussion of 
spirituality requires celebration of the abstract, whereas Christian 
religiousness, many times requires theological totalizing meta-narrative 
consisting of specifics. Therefore, as shown by these examples, the 
foundationalism of spirituality is broad enough to empower the audience via 
subjective experience – and thus, the foundationalism of spirituality is 
strategically dissociated from the foundationalism traditionally found in 
Christian religiousness.  
 
Spiritual Subjectivity: Georges Bataille  
What does this simultaneous celebration of the abstract and subjective 
look like outside of religion? Using Georges Bataille’s postmodern theory of 
inner spiritual experience, I can demonstrate that a rhetoric of experience 
dissociates spirituality from religion. This will show the distinct subjectivity of 
spirituality in and against the external world. This fairly complex conceptual 
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navigation shows a dissociative “both/and” function of inner experience and 
spirituality of which audiences can adhere.  
In 1954, Georges Bataille, a provocative and underappreciated French 
theorist, wrote Inner Experience (L’ experience Interieure). The text is a 
treatise that examines the collision of ineffable spiritual experience, human 
transgression, and individual sovereignty. The text is ambitious, unique, and 
profound – and although Bataille is surely atheist (without ever referring to 
himself as atheist), he provides a knowledgeable and intellectual perspective 
into the dissociative properties of spirituality (without ever using the term 
”dissociation”).   
Bataille uses of the term “inner experience” because it, although it has 
mystical qualities, cannot be directly associated with mysticism – because to 
him, mysticism is too narrow of a definition (3).  Instead, inner (spiritual) 
experience is a place of “wildness,” “bewilderment,” and “nonsense”: a place 
of “non-knowledge.” Bataille is so celebratory of spiritual subjectivity that he 
claims that even the notion of God becomes an obstacle to the self. He writes,  
 
If I said decisively: ‘I have seen God’, that which I see would change. 
Instead of the inconceivable unknown – wildly free before me. Leaving 
me wild and free before it - there would be a dead object and the thing 
of a theologian – to which the unknown would be subjugated, for, in 
the form of God, the obscure unknown which ecstasy reveals is obliged 
to subjugate me. (3) 
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Bataille boldly dissociates inner experience away from God; he understands 
inner spiritual experience to be a unity with the unknown, that is “the fusion of 
object and subject, being as subject non-knowledge, as object the unknown” 
(9). Bataille’s extreme conflation as well as his later conflation of Presence and 
Absence within inner experience, separates his version of internal spirituality 
from external religious authority. He states that due to the subject’s 
experiential intelligence of “the extreme limit of the possible,” philosophical 
and religious authority is no longer needed (7-8).  Inner experience contains 
“all value and authority”; inner spiritual experience negates all other values 
and authorities; it takes on positive existence and “becomes itself positively 
value and authority” (7).  
Bataille rigorously defends subjectivity; however, the idea of 
“experience as sole authority” has gravitas. Batailles realizes that inner 
spiritual experience can be related to external religious objectives within 
Christian ritual, prayer, and godheads; and similarly, in Chapter Three of this 
investigation, I have shown that spirituality can serve pragmatic functions that 
extend into the material world. Bataille understands this externality. However, 
in Inner Experience, Bataille wrestles with “inner experience” for the sake of 
itself. The anti-telos becomes a crucial property that can dissociate it from the 
telos-filled external world.  
Unlike the scheme of unlimited development that involves an 
unattainable telos, the Bataillian inner experience perspective is devoid of telos 
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and just merely “is”: a spiritual seeker is lost in a “labyrinth” that is being 
defined as he/she moves through it (xv). Although unlimited development has 
a place in contemporary texts about spirituality, the Bataillian anti-telos 
perspective can be found in the texts as well.  Serving a complimentary 
rhetorical function, contemporary Catholic and Anglican texts also combat 
pragmatism and telos to rhetorically dissociate spirituality from teleological 
dualities found in Christian religiousness.    
For example, Martin Laid, in Into the Silent Land, discusses Christian 
ritual and technique, specifically the Feast of Pentecost, Baptism, and 
Eucharist, in relation to inner spirituality. However, he breaks from the 
discussion, changing direction in a dissociative manner. Separating into a new 
paragraph (A spatial and organizational separation which rhetorically enhances 
the dissociation.), Laird writes: “Union of God is not something we acquire by 
a technique but the grounding truth of our lives that engenders the very search 
for God” (15). As seen in Luther and Silf, the sentence construction indicates a 
dissociative shift. Laird asserts that spiritual unity is not solely found via 
external action, but rather from the permeating being of God, self, and the 
world. He continues: “The fact that most of us experience throughout most of 
our lives a sense of absence or distance from God is the great illusion that we 
are caught up in; it is the human condition” (15). Similar to Bataille, albeit less 
Nietzschean and more Christian, Laird separates spirituality from 
religiousness.  Laird contrasts spirituality of consistent permeating Being and 
humanness (the synthesis of creator and creation), with religious ritual and 
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external technique. The techniques found in Christian religion help seekers 
move toward a telos; whereas spiritual truths merely “are.” Laird does so not 
just to clarify and explain, but rather to argue the reasonableness of spirituality 
and increase audience adherence. The truth of God is always within every 
human being; therefore, all audience members can potentially adhere to Laird’s 
perspective; Laird includes all human beings in his audience. Similar, to Silf’s 
technique, the dissociation increases inclusiveness by accounting for 
individuality and shared experience of Being.  
Many contemporary Anglican and Catholic authors of spiritual 
discourse such as Funk, Bourgeault, and Fox, do not reference Christian rituals 
and feast days in their texts. The dissociation implied by such absence suggests 
that spirituality can be found outside of religious rites. The separation still 
occurs despite the authors not bringing attention to the separation like Laird 
and Silf had done. There is an implied inclusivity in the absence of religious 
holidays and rites.  By not including these references, there is more emphasis 
on the subjective inner spiritual experience: an emphasis promoted by Georges 
Bataille as a human experience that we all categorically share.  
 
Shared Reality 
Bataille’s atheistic perspective into spiritual inner experience provides 
a look into extreme subjectivity, but how does spirituality facilitate a common 
reasonable perspective? How does the discourse of spirituality help the 
audience share what Kenneth Burke defines as a “social basis of reference” 
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(Attitudes 342)?  The deflation of agonistic binaries, a deflation of truth claims 
such as “my religion is right and all dissenters are wrong,” enables effective 
communication. Emphasis on subjectivity and tolerance for difference 
facilitates this deflation. However, a cooperative contradistinction seals the 
spiritual vision in a harmonious way: communion via a shared type of reality.  
As I have mentioned in Chapter One, practitioners of spirituality and 
contemplation share a type of common reality: experiencing a unity with a 
greater Being / life force. Subjective experiences can and certainly do differ; 
however, the type of spiritual experience is common. Therefore, despite 
dogma, denomination, and religious persuasion, spirituality is a dimension that 
is shared between different traditions. In the words Sister Pascaline Coff of The 
Gethsemani Encounter, “conversation” about spirituality becomes 
“communion” since the “profound spirituality reality” touches all practitioners 
in one way or another (3). In fact, Merton claims that that the spiritual life puts 
practitioners in “the fullest possible contact with reality – not as we imagine it, 
but as it really is” (No Man ix): a panentheistic sentiment that, as we have seen, 
is shared by Matthew Fox as well. 
In the contemporary Christian tradition, this is many times referred to 
as the “Cosmic Christ.” In the previous chapter, I have analyzed Matthew 
Fox’s title of The Coming of the Cosmic Christ in terms of the unlimited 
development argumentative scheme. Matthew Fox is certainly a champion of 
the Cosmic Christ as a concept. But what exactly does it mean? How does it 
indicate a shared reality and dissociative strategy? Before every chapter in The 
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Coming of the Cosmic Christ, Matthew Fox lists a number of quotations from 
spiritual authorities. Before Fox’s first chapter about the Cosmic Christ, he 
quotes 4th century archbishop Gregory of Nazianzus: “Christ exists in all things 
that are” implying that God/Christ permeates all of cosmic creation. The quote 
is curt and clear and packs strong ethos. Moreover, it rhetorically implies that 
the Cosmic Christ concept is foundational to Christian thinking as early as the 
4th century (75). Fox allows the quotation to speak for itself; he does not need 
to explain this concept at length. Audiences “get it.” It is a natural part of being 
human to inquire about the nature of “all things that are.”  It establishes a 
common terrain between Fox and the audience – and audience members with 
each other. The shared nature of cosmos allows all people to ponder beyond 
the cosmos as to what essence may permeate the cosmos – and therefore, this 
is a shared inquiry, shared practice, and shared experience.   
From the inclusivity found within the shared type of spiritual inquiry, 
practice, and experience, the Cosmic Christ is an ecumenical term that is 
powerfully persuasive. The concept can be translated into spiritual traditions 
outside of Christianity. In The Gethsemani Encounter dialogues, Buddhist 
Dhammarakkhita explains what the Cosmic Christ implies: negotiation of 
difference while simultaneously embracing interfaith unity. He says that the 
Christian notion of the Cosmic Christ includes “the vertical depth of God and 
the horizontal reach of the cosmos” while his Buddhist perspective emphasizes 
the vertical depth of purity of the mind (which he says is mysteriously infinite) 
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and the horizontal dimension of service to the world.  He explains that these 
shared concepts are united and can create a “global spirituality” (Mitchell 253).  
The cosmos is traditionally seen through a scientific lens: as the stuff of 
the universe, materiality, a complex tapestry of matter and energy. Christ, on 
the other hand, is the anointed incarnation of God: human and divine, a 
connection with the theological, a link to God. The term “Cosmic Christ” 
rhetorically promotes the collision of these two areas, spirituality and science. 
Similarly, spirituality also serves a similar referential function as science: 
arriving at a common ground that is shared by all people. In Permanence and 
Change, Kenneth Burke points out that spiritual practitioners seek a “sounder 
basis of certainty” than those contingent on the “flux of history”; the mystic 
“seeks the ultimate motive behind our acts; that is he seek an ultimate situation 
common to all men” (222).  Burke goes on to clarify the commonalities: “By 
examining a multitude of situations individually distinct, the scientist attempts 
statistically to extract a generalization common to all. The mystic makes 
somewhat the same attempt by looking within and naming as the ultimate 
motive a quality of experience common to all” (Burke, Permanence 222). The 
shared type of experience, fueled by inquiry and aided by referential function, 
sets spirituality apart from religiousness. Spirituality lends itself to global 
communion with truth:  “a generalization common to all,” a type of universal 
language, similar to science. Whereas religiousness embraces exclusive 
membership, in which members need to be initiated into the specific religious 
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essences, assume roles within the faith, and adopt vocabulary particular to the 
religion.  
By no means is this shared reality and inquiry a new notion. Pre-
Socratic philosopher, Heraclitus of Ephesus, posited this approach thousands 
of years ago. Heraclitus believed that the cosmos was a shared reality and 
therefore the root of all things that we ponder and experience. According to 
Heraclitus, the shared cosmos is the ultimate unity to all; the shared unity is 
thus superior to all differences and contrasts; opposites are ultimately the same; 
contrasts are undercut by an underlying sameness. These concepts have been 
renamed since the ancient era, but remain a driving emphasis in spirituality 
(Kroner 93). The emphasized unity between the cosmos, Nature, and other 
human beings pervades contemporary discourse of spirituality: a unity revealed 
in the panentheistic Comic Christ, a notion that dissociates spirituality from 
religiousness. Although, Christian religion may insist on universal love of 
Creation and other human beings, spirituality insists on a common unity that is 
innately human and permeates all religions. The idea of spiritual unity is a very 
old idea; it is not advocated only by Christians, Kenneth Burke, and Pre-
Socratic Greeks. Numerous religions promote the same unity: Judaism, 
Hinduism, Sufism, Shamanism, and Buddhism (With One Voice).  It has 
survived through thousands of years of cultural differences and religious strife.  
A dissociative emphasis on cosmic unity within the discourse of spirituality 
has more explicitly emerged in the last sixty years, and offers a return to Pre-
Socratic ideas of spirituality, found not only in Heraclitus, but also in 
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Pythagoras and Anaximander.  These profound yet simple ideas of 
commonality can bridge the gaps between religions; these are ideas that 
throughout history have been many times obscured by competition for the 
Truth and religious factions.  
The shared inclusive unity seems to gain traction by implicitly 
distancing itself away from religious tradition, doctrine, and commandment. 
But what do restrictive religious rhetorics look like? One example is the most 
recent version of the post-Second Vatican Council Catechism of the Catholic 
Church: a book that explicitly unifies a “synthesis of the essential and 
fundamental contents of Catholic doctrine” (11 [11]). The catechism is surely a 
book of religiousness, rather than spirituality. The book tells seekers, and 
already existing believers, “what they are supposed to believe” in the Catholic 
Church.  As indicated in the catechism, the book is designed for teaching (12 
[12]). Contemporary epideictic discourse of spirituality involves teaching as 
well; however, contemporary discourses of spirituality generally does not look 
to convert audiences to the religion; rather, as I have shown throughout this 
investigation, the discourse of spirituality inclusively guides audiences through 
reasonable attitudes and practices.  Catechisms, on the other hand, are used for 
conversion or maintaining commonly held beliefs.  Many Catholic educations, 
such as Catholic university religion classes and Catholic conversion classes, 
such as RCIA classes (the Roman Catholic Initiation of Adults) require 
catechesis. For example, Catholic colleges such as Holy Family University in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania require undergraduate students to study the 
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catechism in theology classes; RCIA classes at Providence, Rhode Island’s 
Cathedral of Saints Peter and Paul require students to own the Catechism upon 
entering the first class – and subsequently read selections of the catechism 
before each class.13  
How does the catechistic rhetoric work differently than contemporary 
discourse of spirituality? The catechism embraces objective truths that an 
audience must believe. In the Catechism of the Catholic Church, readers are 
told that truths are solely found in the Scriptures and “Sacred Tradition” (31 
[80-82]); in other words, according to the catechism, audiences cannot trust 
their own spiritual autonomy.  As we have seen from the writers studied in this 
investigation, contemporary authorities in the Catholic and Anglican Churches 
have countered this catechistic approach. As I have shown, contemporary 
authorities have written epideictic texts to instruct seekers how to embrace 
their own spiritual autonomy; simultaneously, in these texts, seekers are 
persuaded to adhere (consciously or subconsciously) to the solidarity founded 
in shared experience of reality. The dissociative properties of the unity and 
peace contrasting the correctness of religious exclusivities, permits spiritual 
discourse to work between differing religions, rather than against them. 
This is not to assert that “religious” texts completely neglect peace and 
unity. For example, according to the prescribed beliefs of the Catechism of the 
Catholic Church, “there is solidarity among all creatures arising from the fact 
that all have the same Creator and are all ordered to his glory” (99-100 [344]).  
Although first half of the reason aligns with the Pre-Socratic perspective of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!13!Both!examples!are!based!on!personal!experience!and!observation!(2013=2014)!!
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shared reality, the catechism punctuates the reason with “and are all ordered to 
his glory.” The punctuation implies that Catholics should embrace solidarity 
because they are commanded to do so by an authority, i.e. God. From the 
examples I have shown throughout my investigation, it is clear that 
contemporary Catholic writers of spirituality resist such outright appeal to 
authority. Unlike the catechism and other religion centered discourses, spiritual 
texts embrace Bataillian “Being” and Heraclitian “is-ness” found in the world 
and in ourselves.  In other words, the discourse of spiritual dissociates its 
claims and reasons away from a commanding theistic authority – and gives the 
agency to the practitioner to arrive at spiritual truth. These spiritual truths 
involve human solidarity (Merton, No Man; Mitchell; Pennington 193-200; 
Funk, Tools 122-39) and connectedness to the essence of the physical world 
(Teilhard de Chardin, Fox). 
Outside of the rigid taxonomies found in religious catechism, there are 
also rigid taxonomies of spirituality that are endorsed by the Church.  One such 
taxonomy: The Spiritual Life: A Treatise on Ascetical and Mystical Theology 
by Adolphe Tanquerey, published and made imprimatur by the Catholic 
Church in 1930. The text portrays spirituality in a rigidly religious manner, 
demonstrating that the use of the term “spirituality” is not a “catch-all” 
emancipating term; it can still be used to restrict the autonomy of a reader. The 
Spiritual Life promotes the pervading assertion that is that Dogma is central to 
the spiritual life (vii).  Tanquerey asserts that the supernatural “transcends 
nature” and pantheism does not have a place in a true (Catholic) spiritual life 
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(32). In The Spiritual Life, Tanquerey attempts to harness spirituality under the 
firm restrictions of religion, dogma, and logic – and he makes his motive clear 
in the “Author’s Preface” (vii-viii). His overall approach resembles the firm 
yoke of Aquinas’ summas and other medieval ontologies. Like Aquinas, there 
is room for Tanquerey to embrace panentheism (“all things in God and God in 
all things”) rather than pantheism (“all things are God”); however, the rigid 
type of taxonomic discourse does not allow an effective and adequate 
expression of panentheistic playfulness. In other words, more open playful 
discourse (i.e. not taxonomic or doctrine-based discourse), more adequately 
can capture panentheistic spirituality. This is seen throughout the history of 
spiritual discourse: from Francis of Assisi’s writings in the 12 century to Pierre 
Teilhard de Chardin in the 20th century.  Unlike Tanquerey’s Catholic 
approach to spirituality, more recent Catholic discourse of spirituality opens 
itself up to panentheistic perspectives in a Herocaclitian manner: via shared 
experience. Many Catholic spiritual authorities may not explicitly endorse 
panentheism as a vehicle of solidarity, such as Matthew Fox (Coming 57). 
However, spiritual authorities may subtly imply the panentheistic dimensions 
of individual spirituality, such as Mary Margaret Funk (See Chapter Four) who 
explains that “lectio-ing” experience or nature may be a practical way to reach 
a union with God (Tools Matter 16).  
 
American Spiritual Trends 
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As I have pointed out in Chapter One using recent PEW Institute 
research, Americans are increasingly identifying with spirituality rather than 
religion. Also, contemporary Americans are resisting against older dogma-
centered spiritualties (Tanquerey’s The Spiritual Life). The evolution of 
Ignatian spirituality found in Silf’s Inner Compass reveals this as well. The 
persuasive power of dissociative strategies within contemporary Catholic and 
Anglican texts can sync with an evolving history.  However, a more profound 
dimension is at work than mere historical trending: dissatisfaction with the 
present and anxiety of the future. In Permanence and Change, Kenneth Burke 
states that there is a natural dissociation that comes with spiritual inquiry and 
adherence.  Spirituality and mysticism mark separation from practical, 
contingent “concepts of duty.” Spirituality (which Burke titles “mysticism”) 
sees “behind these contingencies”; spirituality becomes more relevant “when 
the contingent criteria of action are frustrated or have in some other way have 
been brought into disrepute.” Spirituality provides judgment criteria in which 
the “whole ailing world of contingent demands can be appraised. Otherwise, 
one is trapped in a circle of self-perpetuating judgments … ad inf. and ad 
nauseum” (223). In other words, spirituality is looked to when practical day-to-
day activity and duties are deficient of human purpose and meaning. To link 
this with dissociative argumentation, spirituality is looked to when the practical 
day-to-day functions of religion, that is the “contingent criteria of action are 
frustrated” or “brought into disrepute.”  “Mysticism,” Burke writes, is the 
“furthest reach of the search for new perspectives” (223). It is a dissociative 
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reach for an ultimate dissociation: a yearning for an overhaul of human activity 
that moves beyond the traditional and the comfortable.  Mysticism and 
spirituality, as Burke explains, “may be expected to flourish at periods when 
traditional ways of seeing and doing (with their accompanying verbalizations) 
have begun to lose their authority” (223). Contemporary interest in spirituality 
demonstrates a desire for a renewed sense of purpose that is currently not being 
found in tradition.  In this Burkean perspective of spirituality, dissociation is 
evident: a break from comfortable tradition into a renewed fresh energy.  In a 
sense, spirituality contains a restless revolutionary spirit. This indicates a 
persuasive dimension of dissociation found within a discourse of spirituality: 
finding one’s active place in the present and unknowable future, rather than 
passively defining oneself by the past. 
An emphasis on the present and future syncs again with Heraclitus’ 
version of cosmic spirituality, a similar spirituality found in contemporary 
Catholic and Anglican discourse of spirituality. As I have shown earlier, 
writers such as Mary Margaret Funk and Matthew Fox use traditional Christian 
mystics as historical reference points to teach certain aspects of spirituality and 
contemplation; however, the writers are very practical about practicing 
contemplation in the present moment as means to improve the future. Also, in 
other chapters, I have also shown that spirituality and contemplative practice is 
flexible to kairos and subjective states.  Similarly, Heraclitus also admits that 
nothing remains the same: rivers flow, the sun moves, and people change (94). 
Heraclitus posits that constant change is inevitable; according to Heraclitus, it 
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is futile to create a semblance of consistency through religious conversion or 
even dialectical thinking (94). Instead, there is a natural unity to the world via 
shared reality, and shared types of experiences and inquiries. From this 
perspective, Heraclitus celebrates the mystery found within present and future 
moments. After all, Heraclitus famously proclaimed “no man ever steps in the 
same river twice” (94): an adage depicting the flux of present and future. This 
is something found in spiritual practice. Rather than in recycling tradition and 
trying to “step in the same river twice,” spirituality offers adaptive solutions 
for the present and future. The differing temporal emphasis dissociates 
spirituality from tradition based religious argumentation. 
Based on Burke’s understanding of spirituality, Americans may be 
embracing spirituality because they are wrestling with present and future crisis. 
Americans may not be satisfied with their current state; they may not be happy 
with the inheritance of authority and tradition. This public dissatisfaction is 
nothing new.  Robert Wuthnow examines the American ebb and flow of 
religious and spiritual seeking and dwelling in his 1998 sociological 
investigation of spirituality.  In After Heaven, Wuthnow plots a shifting 
historical narrative. In the 1960s, he discusses, Americans looked to individual 
spiritual experimentation and secular freedoms to “fully participate in the 
world” rather than be cloistered in religious communities (78). After the 1960s, 
a general upsurge returned Americans to more institutional spiritualties, and 
back into the arms of religion. While 1960s and early 1970s celebrated 
freedom, the late 1970s and 1980s celebrated religious strictness, asceticism, 
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and fundamentalism (85). In the 1990s, the trend took another turn: taking care 
of the “inner self” became increasingly popular.  The perspective that “all that 
exists is what one is able to experience” becomes a prevalent philosophy, along 
with deep questions about the meaning/meaninglessness of life; consequently, 
therapy as well as self-help was bound to spiritual questing in the 1990s (146-
149). Contemporary Catholic and Anglican spiritual texts indicate that the 
yearning to take care of the “inner self” is more prevalent in the 21st century 
than ever.  Even in religious spheres, such as Catholic and Anglican spheres, 
spirituality is being rhetorically dissociated from religious rhetorics. This 
rhetorical shift in these religious spheres could be a natural reaction to 21st 
century cultural desires. Similar to Luther’s dissociative rhetorical construction 
that articulated many popular sentiments regarding the Catholic Church in the 
16th century, contemporary Catholic and Anglican writers of spirituality and 
contemplation are adapting to an emerging and current popular trend.  Writers 
of these spiritual texts provide avenues for audiences to seek beyond religious 
doctrine, techniques to embrace subjective experience for spiritual 
nourishment, and the freedom to personally question and affirm God.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
Dissociation between spirituality and religiousness occurs in 
contemporary spiritual texts as a means to guide, teach, and persuade 
audiences; however, it would be reductionist to categorize texts as “solely 
spiritual” or “solely religious.” The contemporary texts that I have investigated 
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highlight spirituality; yet, there still exists an underlying religiousness that is 
not fronted. Religiousness is not dissociated into oblivion; religiousness is 
dissociated into the background; the argumentation within contemporary 
spiritual discourse does not depend on doctrine, dogma, or formal logic as seen 
in catechisms or religious taxonomies of spirituality such as Tanquerey’s The 
Spiritual Life. As shown throughout this chapter, argumentation is displayed in 
a liberal manner in contemporary spiritual texts: in a more rhetorical manner 
rather than a dialectical manner. This dissociative property separates it from 
more traditional religious discourse and allows it to sync with postmodern 
awarenesses and adhere contemporary audiences.  
In turn, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s mission is illustrated by the 
schema of dissociation shown in contemporary Anglican and Catholic 
discourse of spirituality. The cultural context since the 1960, and especially 
since the 1990s into today, has been more resistant to authoritative and 
traditionally religious truth claims. As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain, 
dissociative schemas allow incompatibilities to be diffused by “remodeling our 
conception of reality” (413). The resolution through separation prevents the 
same incompatibilities from being as abrasive. The method of “ironing-out-
differences-by-highlighting-difference” creates a better understanding of the 
relationship and prevents differences from being disruptive in the future. 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca state that at a practical level “the dissociation 
of notions amounts to compromise, but, on the theoretical level, it leads to a 
solution that will also be valid for the future,” and still, the authors are sure to 
! 172!
mention, “it preserves, at least partially, the incompatible elements” (413). 
Religion, religious rhetoric, and religious modes of truth are not being 
obliterated via the scheme of dissociation. Rather, spirituality is being offered 
as a solution that can propel the discussion productively into the future. It 
provides practical spiritual perspectives and contemplative action that adhere 
contemporary postmodern audiences – within religions, between religions, and 
outside of religions.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
COOPERATION OF SCHEMA, IMPLICATIONS, AND AVENUES OF 
INQUIRY 
 
Within today’s postmodern climate, scholarly conversations about the 
nature of religion and God are deep, wonderfully expansive, and complete in 
their incompleteness. Many of these investigations embrace the complexity of 
religious experience, apophatic theology, and the limits of communication. The 
momentum from my previous chapter about spiritual dissociation can 
gracefully move my inquiry into realms of postmodern religious and spiritual 
studies such as the recent critical work of John D. Caputo (The Insistence of 
God: A Theology of Perhaps, 2013), Amy Hollywood (Sensible Ecstasy: 
Mysticism, Sexual Difference, and the Demands of History, 2002) or Richard 
Kearney (Anatheism: Returning to God After God, 2011). This work is rich 
with relevant cultural implications regarding postmodern spirituality. Yet, 
instead of moving further into the out to sea, I will end my study by returning 
to shore: grounded, practical, and humanistic.  
Based on the previous chapters of analysis, I will navigate the necessity 
of creative rhetorics, inclusivity, and plurality as displayed by the discourse of 
spirituality; this closely relates to the cooperation of associative argumentative 
schema and dissociative argumentative schema found in this discourse. I will 
then discuss how the discourse of spirituality promotes action, service, and 
global resolution. Finally I will remark upon the importance of the study. 
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Based on these concluding but not final discernments, I will extract 
implications for the field of Rhetoric and Composition and future inquiry.   
 
 
Ideology and Symbols: Cooperation of Association and Dissociation 
To begin to explore the necessity of creative rhetorics, plurality, and 
action within the discourse of spirituality, I must explain the relationship 
between rhetoric and ideology. In the contemporary discourse of spirituality, 
experience is persuasively shared: both uniquely subjective and categorically. 
Despite spirituality becoming more popular (as shown via the PEW research), 
the discourse of spiritualty does not currently occupy hegemonic status 
(“Nones”; “U.S. Landscape”).  Such hegemonic expository discourse is 
generally occupied by science (Crowley 66); however, as I have shown vis a 
vis Kenneth Burke in Permanence in Change, spirituality can serve a similar 
mission as science: creating general commonalities, and thus, referential 
solidarity (222-223).  Due to the integral subjectivity found in the discourse of 
spirituality, spirituality is removed from the objectivity of science; spirituality 
is also removed from a reliance on hegemonic ideology. Ideology, as defined 
by Sharon Crowley, is “any system within which beliefs, symbols, and images 
are articulated in such a way that they assemble a more or less coherent 
depiction of reality and/or establish a hierarchy of values”; hegemonic 
ideology is the dominant version of ideology (65-66). It seems that spirituality 
occupies a unique position. Discourse of spirituality dissociates itself from 
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hegemonic discourse – and also separates itself from discourses that, Crowley 
tells us, aggressively fight for hegemonic domination (e.g. apocalypticism, 
Christian evangelism).  
Spirituality and the discourse of spirituality seem to revolve around 
what Crowley entitles, ideological belief. Ideological belief differs from 
hegemonic discourse and practices. Ideological belief is more readily 
questioned and not blindly accepted; it concerns a population of fewer people 
and demands more defense because ideological belief does not “go without 
saying” like hegemonic ideology (Crowley 66).  As previously stated, the 
celebration of individual subjective experience and interpretation is a crucial 
dissociative component of spirituality and the accompanying discourse.  To 
rhetorically facilitate this dissociative component within spiritual discourse, 
ideological belief relies upon symbols (Crowley 65).   
Symbols produce and maintain belief as well as represent belief. 
Symbols are representational vehicles of belief; the representations are 
indeterminate and potentially unstable (Crowley 65).  This interpretative 
digestion of symbols by the subject allows the subject to construct the meaning 
of the epideictic discourse of spirituality in respect to the subject’s spiritual 
experience.  The use of symbolic discourse specifically found in metaphor, 
parable, and imaginative narrative is more prevalent in the discourse of 
spirituality (historical mysticism as well as contemporary epideictic discourse 
of spirituality) than in Catholic and Anglican religious discourse. Certainly, 
symbols pervade religious discourse, as they always have; however, the 
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meanings of religious symbols are usually dictated in an objective manner. 
Again, religious catechisms provide examples of this religious rigidity. Roman 
Catholic and Anglican catechisms define religious symbols and symbolic rites 
so that religious practitioners will be united in ideological interpretation (The 
Catholic Catechism; The Catechism of the Protestant Episcopal Church; St. 
John). This type of objectivity/intersubjectivity deflates the persuasive strength 
of symbol-using. When there is more emphasis on “belief” rather than the 
“ideology,” as found in the discourse of spirituality, the subject is empowered 
to interpret the symbol subjectively, more intimately commune with the 
message, and adapt the message to personal kairos.  
For example, the post-Second Vatican Council Catholic Catechism 
presents a “synthesis of the essential and fundamental contents of Catholic 
doctrine” (9), which accordingly “should be seen therefore as a unified whole” 
(11); moreover, the text explicitly mentions that the catechism “does not set 
out to provide the adaptation of doctrinal presentations and catechistical 
methods required by the differences of culture, age, spiritual maturity, and 
social and ecclesial condition among all those to whom it is addressed” (11). 
The text is referential and rigid. The text is also rhetorical in the Burkean sense 
of realizing the “possibilities of classification in its partisan aspects “ in 
relation to groups (Rhetoric of Motives 22): the group of Roman Catholics in 
relation to other religions.  However, the interpretative power of the symbolic 
is deflated. Symbols, such as commandments, components of matrimony, and 
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even literary symbols within The Lord’s Prayer, are defined for the 
community.  
In contrast, the symbolic elements found in the discourse of spirituality 
work in a different manner: symbolic interpretation fuels the discourse.  The 
history of Christian mysticism is filled with examples: Teresa of Avila’s 
Interior Castle, John of the Cross’ The Dark Night of the Soul, and The Cloud 
of Unknowing, just to name a few. From the titles alone, we can see a blatant 
emphasis upon the symbolic and metaphor.  In the contemporary discourse of 
spirituality, the symbolic tradition has not waned. Martin Laird’s work is 
brimming with symbols that facilitate his teaching. In Into the Sunlit Land, he 
has chapters entitled “The Wild Hawk of the Mind” and “The Three Doorways 
of the Present Moment”; in A Sunlit Absence, he has chapters entitled 
“Standing at the Gate of the Heart,” “Our Collection of Videos,” and “The 
Open Porches of the Mind: On Silence and Noise.”  Laird develops the 
symbols in each chapter and frequently refers to them throughout the texts.  
How does symbolic work within spiritual discourse? Beyond the basic 
Saussurian signification of words, symbols work at a higher level within 
spiritual discourse. Since ineffable content resists linguistic expression, 
symbolic language provides a more complex vocabulary to combat referential 
incompetency. Symbols are abstract and flexible, thus conveying and mirroring 
a similar type of message: abstract and flexible. Moreover, the symbolic allows 
heightened subjective participation in the discourse.  Kenneth Burke explains 
this symbolic function in The Rhetoric of Motives:   
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The Symbolic should be at peace, in that the individual substances, or 
entities, or constituted acts are there considered in their consequences, 
hence outside the realm of conflict. For individual universes, as such, 
do not compete. Each merely is, being its own self-sufficient realm of 
discourse. […] Within the rules of Symbolic, the individual is treated 
merely as a self-subsistent unit proclaiming its particular nature. (22-
23) 
 
In other words, symbols leave room for individual agency and subjectivity, 
which can diffuse the dangers of competitive vying for objective truth. Of 
course there are different degrees of the symbolic. Poetry and aesthetic 
symbolism allows this Burkean “peace” to be much more consummate. There 
is no right answer in such interpretative symbolism; therefore, there is no 
conflict or competition.  However, in contemporary epideictic discourse of 
spirituality, the writers provide interpretative direction for the audience; 
rhetoric’s role is to lead the audience to a general interpretation and tame the 
wildness.  
For instance, in the chapter “The Wild Hawk of the Mind” found in 
Into a Sunlit Land, Martin Laird tells the personal story where a man walks 
through open vast fields with four dogs. Three of the four dogs bounded in 
front of the man through the fields, taking advantage of the freedom and space. 
The fourth dog stayed close to the owner and ran in tight circles. Why did the 
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fourth dog not run through the open fields? The fourth dog spent most of its 
life in a cage; therefore, to “run” only meant to run in tight circles. The dog 
didn’t know how to run with absolute freedom. Laird compares this to the 
human condition. He says that we are free but the “memory of the cage 
remains”; like the fourth dog, we remain running tight small circles even 
though we’re “immersed in open fields of grace and freedom”, i.e. spiritual 
grace and freedom (Into the Sunlit Land 19-20). 
The concepts of “grace” and “freedom” are difficult to explain in 
respect to spiritual awareness, experience, and action. Through the narrative 
representation, Laird uses metaphoric thinking to convey these ideas in a 
persuasive and practical manner. This aligns more with I.A. Richard’s 
understanding of metaphor rather than the Aristotelian understanding of 
metaphor (Foss 33). Laird uses metaphor to show a common relationship 
between two group of concepts: the first is personal anecdote about dogs and 
the second group concerns spiritual states of mind and heart. As in the 
Richardian view of metaphor, the association between the story and spiritual 
concepts provides the experience that an audience needs to understand spiritual 
referents (Foss 33). Metaphor provides some of the experience needed for 
audiences to adhere to the message. To quote Richards “what is needed for the 
wholeness of an experience is not always naturally present, and metaphor 
supplies an excuse by which what is needed may be smuggled in” (240).  
Richards is particularly relevant here because he emphasizes the centrality of 
experience. The discourse of spirituality pivots upon the development of 
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subjective experience and the transferring of messages about subjective 
experience; contemporary epideictic discourse of spirituality promotes 
contemplative and spiritual action as well. Therefore, metaphor, in the 
Richardian sense, a vehicle of experience transference, is a crucial 
communicative and rhetorical component in this discourse.   
Metaphor as used to convey experience is not relied upon so heavily in 
the discourse of religion as it is throughout the discourse of spirituality. One 
reason for this is that religion is a broad area. It covers an array of specifics: 
church law, ethics, prayer, philosophy, homiletics, and spirituality. The 
pervasive use of metaphor as seen in the writing of Laird, moves the discourse 
of spirituality outside of religious discourse.  Through literary devices and 
through the inherent negotiation of subjective experience found in metaphor, 
spirituality is dissociated from religion. The type of metaphor emphasizes 
subjective experience in way that highlights something different than religion: 
belief rather than ideology.  
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain that writers choose to “awaken 
a metaphor” as means to dissociate literal meaning from metaphorical meaning 
if the discussion demands such rhetorical maneuvering (410). Discussions of 
spirituality, which are experience-based discussions, demand metaphorical 
transferences due to the nature and content of the discussions themselves. 
Simultaneously, metaphor functions in an associative manner as well. 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca categorize metaphor under “The Relations for 
Establishing the Structure of Reality,” Chapter Three of The New Rhetoric 
! 181!
(398-410). They classify metaphor as a type of analogy: a useful associative 
tool (399). How does analogy work? Analogy compares a point of discussion 
(the “theme”) to a comparable point of reference outside of the discussion (the 
“phoros”). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain that analogies (and 
therefore, metaphor) play especially crucial roles in arguments that associate 
themes “from the spiritual domain” with phoros from the “domain of senses.” 
They explain: “the analogy makes it possible to build the theme with a 
structure that seems plausible, and this is particularly helpful since the 
structure cannot be known directly” (381).  So in the aforementioned context 
of Laird’s work, we see the use of metaphor, a more sophisticated form of 
analogy.  Laird connects spiritual concepts of “grace” and “freedom” to the 
“domain of the senses”: fields, dogs, running.  
Why have I spotlighted metaphor in such depth? First, the rhetorical 
use of metaphor in the discourse of spirituality provides an emphasis on belief 
rather than ideology. This rhetorical strategy actively engages readers’ 
individual subjectivities, increasing audience inclusivity and agency.  As I 
have shown in Chapter Five, the inclusivity is a dissociative property of the 
discourse. Yet the dissociative properties of metaphor does not mean that 
associative properties disappear. Metaphor demonstrates the cooperation of 
associative schemes and disassociation schemes of argumentation. Each 
mechanism works simultaneously and depends on one another. Based on the 
categorical layout of The New Rhetoric (i.e. the separate sections for 
association and disassociation), it may seem that associative strategies may not 
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work harmoniously with dissociative strategies. However, Perelman and 
Olbrecht-Tyteca clearly state that the techniques compliment each other and 
imply one another: “the same form which unities various elements into a well-
organized whole dissociates them from the neutral background from which it 
separates them” (190). Metaphorical constructs, as consistently relied upon by 
writers of contemporary discourse of spirituality, show this harmonious 
working of dissociative separation and associative unity.  
 
The Discourse of Spirituality as Educational Discourse 
Many religious texts seek to convert audiences and such conversion 
offers a clear persuasive agenda; however, epideictic texts regarding 
spirituality, as I have shown in this study, do not seek to convert audiences but 
rather to allow audiences to understand particular existing spiritual realities via 
display – and this requires much more subtle persuasive operations. Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca suggest that epideictic discourse is educational and “less 
directed toward changing beliefs than to strengthening the adherence to what is 
already accepted” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 54). What is “already 
accepted” in spiritual epideictic discourse? That there is something greater than 
ourselves, and that people can sync with this “something greater” and have 
subjective spiritual experiences. Via epideictic discourse, writers of spirituality 
attempt to “strengthen the adherence” by justifying and specifying to audiences 
of this subjective reality. Since the existence of spiritual reality may oppose 
accepted perspectives (e.g. material reality), specific justification and 
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description of spirituality is required from the writer. As seen throughout 
history, there has been a distinct need to justify one’s personal truths despite 
accepted norms and threats of persecution (Foucault, Discipline and Punish); 
simultaneously, there is a supplementary need for convincing and persuasive 
delivery in order to convey the reasonableness of these truths and resist such 
persecution. Overall, the rhetoric of spirituality operates differently than 
merely converting audiences to devotional belief. In the rhetorical composition 
of spirituality, writers do not adapt audiences to their point of view, but rather 
allow audiences to see their point of view in reasonable manner. 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca rightly posit that all arguments unfold 
in relation to an audience; audience receptivity is the source of an argument’s 
strength and effectiveness (5; Crosswhite, Rhetoric Unconsciousness 393). 
Reasons, evidence, and proof are typical components of strengthening 
audience receptivity; however, the discourse of spirituality involves arguments 
that do not have these components as clearly defined. As we have seen in 
Chapters Three through Five, spiritual awarenesses are subjectively 
experienced and subjectively perceived as truth by the writers – the writers 
nudge readers into a similar understanding. 
 For a clearer version of subjective perceptions found in discourse of 
spirituality, I consult Michel Foucault who addresses subjectivity throughout 
his corpus. Since Foucault is an important philosopher of subjectivity, I find 
that I must acknowledge his contribution to the subject of spirituality – even if 
I am differentiating myself from Foucault’s research approach. Overall, the 
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discussion of Foucault helps elucidate dimensions of subjectivity, conviction, 
and conversion found in the discourse of spirituality. How do I use Foucault? 
As a contrast. In doing so I demonstrate how a goal of my study was not to 
investigate subjectivity, but rather to demonstrate findings about discourse and 
rhetorical construction. Why is this difference is important for me to establish? 
A reader of my study may raise objections or questions regarding belief, 
conversion, and expressions of truth. The work of Foucault, despite the 
differences, helps illuminates my study and perspective in relation to potential 
avenues of discussion or objection – and clarifies the discourse of spirituality 
as Perelmanian epideictic discourse which does not seek to convert audiences 
but rather to educate audiences. 
Where and how does Foucault address spirituality and discourse? 
Foucault specifically discusses subjective spirituality and the expression of 
truth in The Hermeneutics of the Subject (1981-1982 lectures) and The 
Government of Self and Others (1982-1983 lectures). In these lectures, 
Foucault considers the intersection of rhetoric, argumentation, and pedagogy in 
relation to the subjective expression of truth and spirituality. In The 
Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault states, “spirituality postulates that the 
truth is never given to the subject by right…The truth is only given to the 
subject at a price that brings the subject’s being into play” and “It [spirituality] 
postulates that for the subject to have right of access to the truth he must be 
changed, transformed, shifted, and become, to some extent and up to a certain 
point, other than himself.” (15). So according to Foucault, spirituality is not 
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something that one can exclusively grasp via external knowledge. The subject 
plays an integral role in spirituality, in particular, active contemplation, rather 
than passive contemplation (See Chapter One). For contemporary Catholic and 
Anglican writers of spirituality as well as Foucault, the subject does not 
passively receive spiritual truths as external knowledge, but the subject must 
actively integrate one’s being into such spiritual truths. What does this 
integration of one’s being suggest? It suggests that spiritual awarenesses do not 
lean on material realities but rather, it allows for spiritual realities of non-
reality, or worlds of simulation (Baudrillard).  The communicative signs within 
this type of discourse can be “treated as if they were reality and are no longer 
taken to represent reality” (Brummett 6). Therefore, the discourse of 
spirituality can be seen as a discourse of subjective experience that points to a 
reality of non-reality.  This overall complex nature of spiritual realities makes 
it to be a problematic topic when linguistically represented and argued; yet this 
does not mean that it should not be taken seriously. If a statement is written 
and the writer is motivated to write that statement, then the statement possesses 
some type of importance; as Foucault rightly posits about linguistic 
representation, “a sentence cannot be non-significant; it refers to something, by 
virtue of the fact that it is a statement” (Archaeology 90); therefore, based on 
this understanding, investigations regarding such “sentences” and “statements” 
of spirituality are warranted. 
Foucault discusses spirituality as a subjective conversion experience 
that can remove ‘the subject from his current status and condition” (eros), or 
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may require “work of the self by the self” (askesis) (Hermeneutics 15-16); 
however, Foucault makes a crucial move from private experience to the public 
statements about private experience or private truth. Foucault defines this type 
of expression of truth as parresia. More specifically, he defines parresia as 
“the frankness, freedom, and openness that leads one to say what one has to 
say, as one wishes to say it, when one wishes to say it, and in the form one 
thinks necessary for saying it” (Hermeneutics 372). Although he discusses 
parresia in The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault fully unpacks this 
concept in The Government of Self and Others lectures. As the title of these 
second lectures suggest, he ultimately uses parresia to illuminate the 
subjective expression of truth and power in the political sphere; however, he 
recognizes its place in numerous other fields, stating that the subject tethers 
herself to the truth differently via different contexts and roles, such as “seer, 
prophet, philosopher, or scientist in a scientific institution” (69). The writer of 
personal spiritual truths within the discourse of spirituality seems to be 
somewhere in between “seer,” “prophet,” and “philosopher.”  
As I have shown throughout this study, discourse analysis seems to 
play a large part in understanding specific modes of parresia since parresia 
concerns types of expression, rhetoric, and argumentation; however, Foucault 
warns against this type of analysis. He states that parresia is truth-telling via 
philosophical discourse; the philosopher is “the parrhesiaist, the only 
parresiaist, which the rhetorician, the man of rhetoric cannot be or function as.” 
(Walzer 6; Government 336). In more temperate explanation, Foucault clarifies 
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that parresia can “call upon the methods of rhetoric. But this is not necessarily 
the objective and purpose of parresia” (Government 53). Since it is not crucial 
to rhetoric that the discourse speaks the truth, Foucault mentions, parresia 
should not be understood from the angle of rhetoric; in other words, parresia 
does not “belong” to rhetoric. He also cautions that parresia should not be 
understood as exclusively demonstration or debate (i.e. argumentation), or 
pedagogy (53-56).  
Foucault’s via negativa explanation of parresia includes a key caveat 
that relates directly to my study. Foucault cautions against analyzing discursive 
strategies as a means to analyze parresia. Foucault states, and rightly so, that 
the speaker should be analyzed, not the discourse, as a means to understand 
parresia (56). However, in my investigation of rhetorical epideictic discourse 
of spirituality, I inverted the terms. Why did I do that? Because my goals are 
different. This is not a study of subjectivity. My research aims are different. 
Instead of understanding the nature of parresia as an aim, I am exploring the 
nature of discourse as an aim. In other words, my investigation sought out 
parresia, specifically spiritual parresia which “call on the methods of rhetoric,” 
in order to better understand the rhetorical construction, argumentation, and 
epideictic discourse. Also, as Arthur Walzer highlights in his 2013 Rhetoric 
Society Quarterly article, “Parresia, Foucault, and the Classical Rhetorical 
Tradition,” parresia can be very rhetorically artful if seen through the lens of 
rhetorical tradition, rather than seen as exclusively philosophical through the 
lens of Foucault.  Parresiastic spiritual texts are far from Foucault’s unartful 
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version, yet still maintain Foucault’s emphasis on subjective sincerity. 
Spiritual texts involve balanced parresia; they convey risky and frank truthful 
content, yet do so in an artistically rhetorical manner. Walzer’s perspective 
syncs with the view of rhetorical argument as techne that I have framed in 
Chapter Two. The discourse of spirituality, as seen through the lens of 
composition and rhetoric, demonstrates Atwill’s techne – as well as McKeon’s 
“architectonic productive art.” 
How does this understanding relate to “conversion”? The parresiastic 
aspect of spirituality involves the communication of subjective truth; when 
used alongside Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s term “adherence of minds,” it 
seems that the audience needs to be converted to the truth of the writer. 
However, as previously stated, spiritual texts are epideictic and educational, so 
conversion is not necessary. How does the adherence of minds work in an 
epideictic manner within spiritual discourse? Although, Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca do not define “adherence,” the common use of the word is 
implied in their work: “sticking together” or to “resist being parted” (Goodwin 
216). Moreover, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca recognize not one ontological 
“adherence” in the “adherence of minds,” but rather, the adherence of minds is 
characterized by “variable intensity” and that “nothing constrains us to limit 
our study to a particular degree of adherence characterized by self-evidence” 
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 4; Goodwin 217). In the context of discourse 
of spirituality, there are two important adherences to factor into the matrix of 
rhetoric and argumentation: (1.) the adherence of the writer/speaker to their 
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own spiritual convictions, and (2.) the audience’s adherence to the spiritual 
convictions of the writer/speaker. There are other adherences involved with 
communication, but for the sake of the discourse of spirituality, these two 
adherences of conviction are the most important.  The second form of spiritual 
conversion adherences is a possible effect of the discourse: an adherence that 
possesses more intensity since it alters an audience’s subjective conviction or 
conception of the truth. However, spiritual or religious conversion of an 
audience does not seem to be the primary goal of contemporary Catholic and 
Anglican spiritual texts, but rather, as stated previously, teaching seems to be 
the primary goal.  
Conviction is a strong adherence, especially in Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s use of the term. Conviction is not directed to the external 
state of things, but rather it is directed to the inner meanings or importances of 
those external states of things (Goodwin 220). Conviction requires active 
participation of the subject in order to sustain the conviction state; moreover, a 
conviction may very well be a truth that the subject will theoretically die for: a 
similar martyr aspect to that of Foucault’s parresia (Government 56).  And 
also, similar to parresia, conviction is bound to the subject’s identity of “who a 
person is” (Goodwin 222). Unlike this subjective adherence of the 
speaker/writer to their own conviction, an audience’s adherence to a 
writer/speaker’s conviction has no necessary relation to their own conviction 
of the truth. An audience must adhere to the writer/speaker’s conviction insofar 
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as it aids the activity of learning. As Jean Goodwin points out in her article 
“Perelman, Adhering, and Conviction,”  
Adherence, the sticking of a person and a proposition, is not necessarily 
the result of a choice for which a person is responsible; a person need 
not give adherence in order to have an adherence. It is only by 
admitting such unchosen adherences that we can make sense of the 
notion that arguments have force. A proposition with a solid argument 
can compel a person toward adherence. Faced with a solid argument 
presented by another, a person feels not that she sticks to it, but that she 
is stuck with it. She has not chosen to be so, although she may have 
some choices about how she responds to her predicament. In such cases 
the sources of the stable contiguity between the person and the 
proposition lies at least in part outside the person; adherence is not 
something she does. (230)   
As I have shown throughout the numerous textual examples found in this 
study, Catholic and Anglican spiritual texts revolve around Goodwin’s type of 
rhetorical adherence: not the conversion of audience conviction, but rather the 
type of adherence, albeit temporary, formed by argumentation and persuasion. 
This type of adherence fuels the pedagogical aspects of the epideictic discourse 
of spirituality – and reveals that the discourse is meant for education than 
conversion.  Clearly, this is an inclusive rhetorical purpose that enables an 
inclusive “universal audience” more than a limited audience. Moreover, this 
type of educational discourse creates a “disposition to act” rather a “decision to 
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act,” aligning the discourse of spirituality with the functions of philosophical 
thought, giving agency to individual readers of the text, and combating 
audiences’ temptations to fall prey to “violent argumentation” or propaganda 
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 54).  From this perspective, the discourse of 
spirituality can be seen as a boon to inclusive democratic practice - effectively 
acknowledging difference(s) and aligning epideictic discourse with educational 
display rather than ceremonial praise or blame.14  
 
Dangers within Pluralism and Inclusivity 
The inclusive educational perspective of spirituality is not without its 
dangers. As Jeffery Ringer (College English 75.3) and Michael DePalma (CCC 
63.2) point out, the overlap of identity, belief, and religion found in writing 
about faith requires rhetorical awareness. As I have shown throughout my 
investigation, the discourse of spirituality requires rhetorical awareness as well. 
Ringer mentions that this can be seen through the lens of Kenneth Burke’s 
“casuistic stretching.” Casuistic stretching is a process of updating where “one 
introduces new principles while theoretically remaining true to old principles” 
(Burke, Attitudes 229; Ringer, 274); the “truly liquid attitude” toward language 
leads to a “firmer kind of certainty” without the deceptive qualities of 
ideological persuasion (Burke, Attitudes 230-231; Ringer 274). Clearly, 
casuistic stretching is similar to McKeon’s commonplace of commonplaces: 
using memory and invention to innovate pluralistic solutions for the present !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!14!As!active!freedom!fighters!that!fought!for!the!Jewish!resistance!and!against!Nazi!Germany,!Perelman!and!Olbrechts=Tyteca!would!certainly!applaud!these!dimensions!of!contemporary!spiritual!discourse.!
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and future. Unlike McKeon, Burke points out that the stretching process, 
absorbing past perspectives into new perspectives, can be impure. A rhetor can 
pervert the casuistry as a means to intentionally deceive an audience. In other 
words, the rhetor can manipulate old perspectives in a way that audiences will 
be willing to assume new principles without realizing it. This would clearly be 
an unethical form of persuasion: identities manipulated without the audience 
being consciously aware. Moreover, the rhetor can potentially deceive and 
manipulate herself, as she inadvertently stretches old principles into new 
principles in making particular discourse choices (Ringer 274). The 
manipulative strategies are concealed:  at work without her actively aware of 
them.  Again, she is not consciously aware of the identity shift. Through the 
choices within the discourse, she feels that she is remaining true to past 
principals, however, she is truly altering her beliefs and identity without 
knowing it. As Burke explains, impure casuistic stretching can lead to 
“demoralization,” undercutting an individual’s morals and beliefs (Attitudes 
229; Ringer 274).  
Can “demoralization” be evident in the discourse of spirituality? 
Possibly. Casuistic stretching does not only happen in the movement between 
one belief to another belief. It also occurs when one is moving from absolute 
truth or dualism to relativism. This move into a productive relativism is 
described by McKeon as a move from traditional “commonplaces” to a 
“commonplace of creativity” / “commonplace of commonplaces.”  Since the 
discourse of spirituality celebrates a form of relativism, a casuistic stretch 
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drives more objective religious ways of understanding into more relative 
spiritual ways of understanding. This movement could potentially undermine 
the original morals and beliefs of the individual. In other words, although the 
rhetor and audience think they are maintaining past beliefs while updating 
them, they are in fact overhauling their beliefs.   
This is a danger that is a legitimate concern as the discourse of 
spirituality evolves into the future. After all, is it right for a discourse to 
overwhelm an audience into abandoning their right of absolute truth? As 
DePalma, Ringer, and Webber explain in their article, “(Re)Charting the 
(Dis)Courses of Faith and Politics, or Rhetoric and Democracy in the 
Burkean Barnyard”: exclusivities have a role in healthy democracy. A truly 
democratic society allows the freedom of close-mindedness to exist - and this 
serves a productive function. Furthermore, in his 2013 College English article, 
Ringer uses William Perry’s work in composition pedagogy to explain that in 
the college student population, many students, upon the immersion into 
pluralism, will retreat back into dualism as a coping mechanism. Therefore, not 
every individual or population celebrates casuistic stretching. In fear of 
demoralization, individuals can maintain old principals without absorbing the 
new principals. 
This retreating away from casuistic stretching may seem like stagnation 
that counters McKeon’s call for a future oriented pluralism of creativity and 
pragmatism.  However, the approach remains pluralistic if the individuals 
remain actively thinking about the casuistic stretching, subjecting it 
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“continually to conscious attention” as Burke advocates (Attitudes 232; Ringer 
274). Within the discourse of spirituality, individuals have the power and 
opportunity to either accept the casuistic stretching found in the discourse of 
spirituality or to retreat back into dualism. Either way, the discourse of 
spirituality provides a safe haven of discussion and instruction where all 
audiences are welcome and those choices are free to be made.  
 
Contemplative Action / Contemplatives in Action 
In Chapter One, I mention that I would explore how the discourse of 
spirituality propels audiences into action.  We have seen that the discourse of 
spirituality advocates for a spirituality with pragmatic ends (e.g. the 
organization of one’s life, peace, etc.). Spiritual texts adhere audiences to a 
message and convince audiences to try particular contemplative strategies as a 
means to help improve the individual lives of the practitioners. As I have 
shown in Chapter Three, this type of pragmatic argumentation leads to real 
world action. But do these contemporary texts explicitly call the practitioners 
to action? Is spirituality a vehicle for social action, rather than individual 
action?  We have seen that the texts instructive contemplative action (i.e. 
seeking and uniting with God); however do the texts instruct audiences how do 
be, what Ignatius of Loyola referred to as “contemplatives in action”? 
Firstly, what does “contemplatives in action” mean? Jeronimo Nadel, a 
16th century companion and biographer of Ignatius describes that Ignatius 
“perceived and contemplated the presence of God and an attraction to spiritual 
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things, being a contemplative person while in the midst of action” (Genass 44). 
For Ignatius, a loving union with God is not confined to prayers, but is also 
enacted through external loving actions and service (Genass 231). The 
contemporary discourse of spirituality embraces this spiritual philosophy and 
adapts it for the present age. For a majority of the texts that I analyzed, the 
writers call the audiences to action at the conclusion of their texts, the last 20-
30 pages. These calls to action not only imply spiritual and rhetorical 
inclusivity but also active call for solitary and resolution that extends into the 
social sphere.  
Unlike many of the rhetorical and argumentative techniques that I have 
discerned and deciphered in detail, the calls to social action are explicit: 
expository and rhetorical. For instance, Thomas Keating, in “Invitation to 
Love” (published in 1992), writes, “This [spiritual] commitment addresses the 
whole of our being and all our activity, whatever our states of life may be” 
(242). Spirituality is external and internal; it affects activity; it “does 
something in the world”; therefore, it can positively influence the world.  
Moreover, Keating is sure to mention that spirituality extends externally for all 
committed practitioners of all “states of life”: monastics, clergy, the laity, 
young, old, men, and women. The externality speaks to everyone; and 
therefore helps the rhetorical aim of inclusivity. Keating qualifies the 
externality in the last sentence of the essay, He writes, “the Holy Spirit is 
inviting lay persons and those in active ministries to become contemplatives 
where they are, to move beyond the restricted world of selfishness into service 
! 196!
of the communities, and to join all others of goodwill in addressing the global 
problems of our time: poverty, hunger, oppression, violence, and above all, the 
refusal to love” (242).  In this statement, Keating equates “becoming 
contemplatives” with “service of communities” in which the contemplative 
joins “all others of goodwill.” Contemplation combats the “restricted world of 
selfishness” and embraces social justice.  
Other examples of social justice and communal service found in 
contemporary spiritual discourse can be found in Matthew Fox’s works. An 
exemplary instance similar to Keating is found in Fox’s Original Blessing. 
While discussing the “newness” and “metanoia” of his action driven “New 
Creation” mysticism/spirituality, Fox explains,  
What is newest about our times is the global demand of our 
consciousness. The global pain, and global interconnections of beauty 
and pain. The invitation to create a global civilization of love/justice 
and ecological harmony is a new invitation. And so too are the global 
means to carry out the New Creation. […] The New Creation will be 
God’s work and our work. We will truly be co-creators in this process 
of transformation. (256)  
Although perilously coming close to “cult-like rhetoric” here, Fox’s “New 
Creation” refers to the utopian goal sought after through global mystical 
practice and experience. And as he explains, the harmony will be “co-created”; 
therefore, a divine union between human beings needs to be first established 
via spiritual/mystic practice. Like Keating, Fox sees spirituality as positively 
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affecting social justice and communal relations. Also like Keating, Fox uses 
the word “invitation”: a term that rhetorically urges all readers to accept the 
invitation and join the cause. 
The rhetorical movement from internal spiritual practice into social 
justice is clear in this discourse; but how exactly does it work? How does the 
internal spiritual practice lead to external influence? What is the logic behind a 
seemingly large jump? Two terms used in the Fox passage can illustrate the 
logic: “global interconnections” and “ecological.”  Spirituality and 
contemplation allows practitioners to feel beyond the self, beyond the ego, 
beyond separateness. In her 1990 essay about postmodern spirituality, Joanna 
Macy emphasizes a “false reification” of the self: a myth concerning the 
separate individual as “unit of survival.” She posits that effective human 
survival does not demand that individuals fight against other species or against 
the environment – but rather, the individual must cooperate interdependently 
with other species and environments (40). Spirituality and methods of 
pondering beyond the self, can tap into these larger survival attitudes: natural 
interdependence of environment, life, and human solidarity. Therefore, 
spirituality pressures practitioners to not only to behave more altruistically, but 
also to embrace behaviors that are beyond altruistic. As Macy points out, 
altruism implies the sacrifice of an individual ego (45); since spirituality 
stresses the natural interdependence of life and the world, deliberate sacrifice 
of the ego is unnecessary. In sum, Macy understands spirituality as 
practitioners harmoniously syncing with the “ecology” of our world: the 
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environment and other human beings.  Through this perspective, social justice, 
community, and external action are natural products of spirituality: “a 
homecoming to our natural interexistence with all life forms, home to our deep 
ecology” (47). Macy’s homecoming allows for global community, goodwill, 
and love: components endorsed by both Keating and Fox. 
As I have shown, the discourse of spirituality promotes global 
community and action, but do the texts offer any active communities of 
spiritual practice outside of religion? Do the texts foster communal 
organization in a more direct and practical manner?  Yes. All of the sample 
texts regarding Centering Prayer conclude their texts in a similar manner: 
emphasizing community and action. As the writers explain, Centering Prayer 
can be a social occasion: like-minded (open-minded) contemplatives gathering 
together to practice contemplation, strengthen each other’s methods, and 
combat spiritual isolation.     
As Basil Pennington explains in the last chapter of Centering Living: 
The Way of Centering Prayer, it is natural to want to share good things with 
other people; however, spirituality does not seem like something that should be 
shared because it is such a private endeavor (143). American culture, due to the 
separation between church and state, places spirituality and religion in a sphere 
of privacy – especially if the population is composed of varying religions 
(144). Pennington advocates that contemplatives should share the gift of 
Centering Prayer with others as a “social responsibility.” Centering Prayer can 
help “heighten our moral consciousness as a nation.” He explains “There is 
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probably no way to raise consciousness more effectively, with the highest 
respect for the individual, than to help others find their true self in God” (145). 
So, according to Pennington, contemplatives should delicately offer Centering 
Prayer to others as a “gift.”  
The social potentialities found through spiritual practice allows for 
support systems to be constructed. These support systems discourage 
potentially dangerous spiritual isolation and the “bad spiritual experiences” 
found when first trying contemplative methods. Contemplative experiences are 
intense experiences. Although in the popular sphere, contemplation is many 
times conflated into “meditation,” they are two separate activities.  In the 
Benedictine contemplative process of lectio divina, a method promoted in 
much of contemplative Catholic and Anglican discourse of spirituality (e.g. 
Funk’s texts and many texts regarding Centering Prayer), meditatio is merely 
the second step of a four-step process toward contemplatio, the union with 
God; in fact, by classical Christian usage, meditation is merely a “concentrated 
effort of the faculties” (Bourgeault, Centering 66-67). In other words, that 
which is popularly understood to be mediation (e.g. yoga) is certainly a 
spiritual experience– but it is scratching the surface of true contemplation and 
spiritual potentiality. According to the Catholic and Anglican discourse of 
spirituality, mediation is useful, but cannot be equated to the spiritual intensity 
of contemplation. Based upon this kind of contemplative intensity, novice 
contemplatives can easily fall into “bad experiences,” physically and mentally. 
Through Pennington’s years of involvement with Centering Prayer, he has 
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noticed that “bad experiences” are not uncommon – and these “bad 
experiences” come from novice contemplative trying too hard. Physical 
afflictions can be headaches, fatigue, or tenseness; mental afflictions can be 
contemplatives retreating into painful memories that may emerge during 
Centering Prayer (Pennington 183-184).  Although spiritual practice is an 
individual practice, spiritual communities (inside religions, interreligions, or 
outside religions) have a pragmatic purpose of resolving these dangers: 
through coaching, instruction, and post-contemplation discussions.  
Pennington discusses pedagogical attitudes and methods to effectively 
deliver this “gift” to others. He also explains that prayer groups are a beneficial 
place to practice and share the gift. Church parishes are most appropriate 
environment for Centering Prayer Groups; however, in a dissociative move, 
Pennington also sees spiritual prayers happening outside of churches: as a 
school program, as a YMCA program, or at a meditation center (165). There 
are resources outside of prayer groups as well. In his book The Path of 
Centering Prayer, David Frenette offers free online resources on his website 
and other websites to encourage support and combat spiritual isolation (212). 
As he explains, resources are made available by contemporary spiritual 
authorities as part of the Contemplative Outreach program, which is an 
informational formal community of Centering Prayer.  
      The Contemplative Outreach revolves around its website, a key vehicle 
of “outreach” to the public.  The website is public, extending resources, 
readings, and retreats primarily to Christians; however, the Contemplative 
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Outreach welcomes all people: all Christians and anyone willing to partake in 
Christian rhetoric. Similar to the attitudes expressed in the texts that I have 
examined, the Contemplative Outreach website is epideictic writing; it is 
inclusive and rhetorically effective in its inclusivity. Firstly, the organization is 
not meant to convert readers to Christianity. According to the “Administrative 
Principals” found in the “Vision” section of the website: “As members of this 
evolving community we are responsible to foster and transmit the Vision of 
Contemplative Outreach. We fulfill our Vision through attraction to the 
Centering Prayer practice not by proselytizing.” Although it does not seek to 
convert audiences, the website organization is still primarily Christian. So 
since it is primarily a Christian dwelling place, does the Contemplative 
Outreach take its orders from any church institutions? According to the Vision: 
“We cooperate with church authorities in the areas where we work, but do not 
seek to become a religious or lay institute.” Moreover, to ensure inclusivity of 
the audience, the organization tells readers “We wish to remain accessible to 
every one. For this reason, we do not endorse particular causes or take part in 
public controversies, whether religious, political or social.” The Contemplative 
Outreach active resists any type of message that may isolate or segregate 
communities: by avoiding controversial subjects in their public writing, 
contemplation is promoted as an inclusive activity of which all people can 
adhere. Furthermore, like I have shown in the spiritual texts, Contemplative 
Outreach discourse is adaptable to present and future needs. They indicate this 
in the very first Administrative Principal of their vision: “Contemplative 
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Outreach is an evolving community with an expanding vision and deepening 
practice, serving the changing needs of Christian contemplatives.” The 
community is adaptable to kairos: an appropriate awareness for a kairos-
centered medium (i.e. online writing), and appropriate to the flexibility and 
pragmatism found in contemporary spiritual practice.  
      I highlight the Contemplative Outreach online discourse of spirituality 
for several reasons. First, it demonstrates a public realm of writing and activity 
that is found within the contemporary discourse of spirituality: a rhetorical 
move that is many times overlooked. It is a rhetorical move that is included in 
books. Within the discourse community, writers of books point to online 
spaces to continue the conversation. This allows for natural evolution of 
spiritual discussion, the planning of collaborative social interactions between 
practitioners, and kairotic adaptability of the discourse itself. Of the texts that I 
examined, Frenette promoted online resources the most emphatically. 
Frenette’s text was also one of the most recent contemporary texts that I 
examined (published 2012). This indicates a clear technological direction of 
which the discourse of spirituality is moving. 
      Spirituality is a private practice of seeking; however, it also extends 
into the public sphere in generative, flexible, and inclusive ways. The 
discourse of spirituality does not concern only the subjectively experiences but 
also external social support networks and global service. The Contemplative 
Outreach is evidence of this. And most importantly, Contemplative Outreach is 
effective. It is rhetorically successful. The blend of private spiritual practice 
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with public writing, collaboration, and service has adhered thousands of 
people. According to the website, Contemplative Outreach serves over 40,000 
people, supports over 120 active contemplative chapters in over 39 countries, 
supports over 800 prayer groups, teaches over 15,000 people in locally-hosted 
spiritual workshops, and formally publishes texts on contemplation and 
spirituality (Contemplative Outreach: About Us). Fox, Keating, and 
Pennington may call audiences into action and service, using spirituality as a 
catalyst; Frenette and the Contemplative Outreach shows publically effective 
action taking place in the discourse of spirituality. 
 
Other Directions of Inquiry 
      Contemplative Outreach is by no means the only online space of 
spiritual discourse. There are other Christian spiritual organizations such as the 
Center for Action and Contemplation as founded and directed by Richard 
Rohr, as well as New Age spiritual wellness organizations such as Deepack 
Chopra’s Chopra Center for Wellbeing. These organizations have an active 
online presence that composes a large part of the contemporary discourse of 
spirituality.  My investigation into textual, published discourse of spirituality is 
but one dimension.  I work through a variety of questions; I put a sample of 
contemporary discourse under a microscope of rhetorical analysis. However, a 
constellation of other implications can still be investigated. As I have shown, 
the “contemporary discourse of spirituality” machine involves a number of 
complex gears and levers; it also involves a number of agents and operators.  
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The field of rhetoric and composition is an optimal discipline in which such 
investigations can take place.   
Which areas in particular may prove generative? As I have shown, an 
examination into the mechanisms of online discourse of spirituality: not only 
formal organizations like the Contemplative Outreach, but also online forums 
and the blogosphere.  Since these online spaces involve more deliberative 
rhetorics than published texts or more static websites, it would be an 
opportunity to plot how deliberative discourse of spirituality organically and 
dialogically unfolds.  
Another potential area is to investigate the uses and purposes of 
spirituality in the composition classroom. As I have discussed, the discourse of 
spirituality is rhetorically inclusive and can be dissociative from religiousness. 
This complicates the already existing scholarship regarding religion in the 
classroom. Much scholarship has been done on evangelicals in the composition 
classroom (Ringer; Vander Lei; DePalma). This scholarship attempts to solve 
the problem of faith in the classroom by accounting for the generative tensions 
(Vander Lei; Vander Lei and Fitzgerald) and the pedagogical uses of rhetorical 
understandings (Ringer; DePalma). However, dualistic thinking and 
closemindedness in the classroom seems to be easily resolved by introducing 
spirituality in the classroom. The rhetorics of spirituality, if taught as a vehicle 
of inclusivity, invites plurality and collaboration, rather than stubbornness and 
competition. In other words, why not transform the classroom into a 
McKeonian “commonplace of creativity” using spirituality as a touchstone?  
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Similarly, in the field of Composition and Rhetoric, not much research 
has been done regarding seminarian students and writers in the monastic 
vocation. Within these spirituality centered discourse communities, members 
write about their personal faith within the religion and to audiences outside of 
the religion – and also, using writing, they communicate spirituality to 
themselves and to God. How do they write these deeply personal artifacts? 
What motivates these processes? What does the rhetorical composition look 
like?  Exploring these questions with further study can help better understand 
the spiritual discourse community and better understand how faith and belief 
works in the writing process: implications that can transfer into the 
composition classroom and into postmodern discussions regarding religion. 
The current study can be seen as laying the groundwork for future 
investigations of spiritual writing processes and practices.  Unfortunately, the 
field of Composition and Rhetoric has not explored the discourse of spirituality 
in depth; nor has the field explored contemporary Catholic and Anglican 
discourse in depth.  With this study as a foundation, I think the field can move 
into these areas with a more informed understanding of the discourse of 
spirituality.  
Catholic and Anglican discourse is but one expressions of spiritual 
discourse.  This is a discourse that weaves through self-help culture, religions, 
and anti-religions.  Due to the rhetorical flexibility and usefulness of 
spirituality, it turns up in some of the most unlikely places.  In The End of 
Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason, a contemporary “New York 
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Times Bestseller” that harshly critiques the usefulness and ethics of organized 
religion, Sam Harris posits that mysticism and spirituality has some value in 
our society because it is a “rational enterprise” involving a “natural propensity 
of the mind” whereas religion does not celebrate the mind (221).15 Similarly, 
Richard Dawkins seems to laud spiritual awareness in respect to science. 
Dawkins understands experiences with nature to be filled with awe: the 
individual becoming aware that he/she is part of the scientific tapestry of the 
world. Although Dawkins does not admit that he is referring to “spirituality,” 
he occasionally discusses the experiential spirituality of nature in much 
broader understandings of the term (Atheism Tapes). The possible collision of 
anti-religious and religious spheres within the discourse of spirituality allows 
for interesting research regarding the dialogic debates between believers and 
non-believers. Since religion/anti-religion debate is an ongoing tension in 
America, this research in the field of Composition and Rhetoric can provide 
generative perspectives with implications for deliberative discourse, online 
writing, and uses for religion/anti-religion argumentation in the composition 
classroom.    
 
Final Remarks 
In Chapter Two, I indicated that by analyzing a sample of 
contemporary discourse of spirituality, I would be illuminating Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s mission: “the justification of the possibility of a human 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!15!Sam!Harris!has!written!a!book,!Waking$Up:$A$Guide$to$Spirituality$Without$Religion!(will!be!released!Fall!2014),!more!thoroughly!discussing!the!subject!of!spirituality.!!
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community in the sphere of action when this justification cannot be based on a 
reality or objective truth” (514). Throughout my analysis, I have shown 
argumentative strategies used by writers of spiritual texts. These strategies use 
association and dissociation simultaneously to allow audiences to adhere to the 
epideictic discourse. As I have shown, the content of the discourse, spiritual 
experience and ineffable unions with God, resist immediate linguistic 
expression and resist scientific explanations. Due to the obscurity of spiritual 
truths, empirical referents and Cartesian truths are not adequate means to reach 
a common ground with an audience. In other words, “justification cannot be 
based on a reality or objective truth.”  Spirituality permits a type of reality in 
which audiences can experientially agree upon and this communion permits 
communication. This common ground that is deemed reasonable through the 
use of argumentative strategies, provides the framework for community (As 
shown in this chapter.) as well as action and service (Also shown in this 
chapter.).  
Most importantly, spirituality revolves around social inclusivity. The 
community of spirituality is not a small community of like-minded people 
based on past truths; instead, the community is extended to all human beings. 
By the use of associative and dissociative argumentative schema, the discourse 
of spirituality can adhere an inclusive audience. The discourse is based on 
common type of experience: the largeness of what is beyond ourselves. This is 
a type of experience that all people can feel and have felt.  And this categorical 
understanding and experience is the primary reference needed to commune 
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with the message. The audience of the discourse is not only devout Catholics 
or practicing Anglicans. The reasonable and inclusive rhetoric allows lapsed 
Catholics or non-practicing Anglicans to commune with the message.  
Moreover, the inclusivity of spirituality does not scare away other religious or 
non-religious readers. Atheists and agnostics can read these texts without 
beings offended; Buddhists and New Age practitioners can also commune with 
these spiritual messages. Overall, the inclusivity of spirituality would not be 
effective if not for effective writing and rhetorical communication. After all, as 
Joshua Gunn rightly asserts about the rhetoric of occult, a rhetoric that, like the 
rhetoric of spirituality, pivots upon ineffable content matter: “The notion of 
ineffability itself necessitates a rhetoric to express the negativity of 
ineffability” (43). The discourse of spirituality depends upon designed and 
crafted rhetorical architecture, such as associative “structures of reality” and 
dissociations from religiousness, to heighten the “adherence of minds” and 
widen the inclusivity of the audience. Like Gunn points out, ineffable subject 
matters require rhetorics. Without the operative application of McKeonian 
rhetoric, “architectonic productive artistry,” found with the discourse of 
spirituality, spirituality would not be in such a momentous and popular 
position (“Nones”; “U.S. Religious Landscape”). 
The writers of the discourse of spirituality make adherence accessible. 
As I have shown, epideictic discourse of spirituality is practical, pragmatic, 
and reasonable. Unlike mystical texts of Early and Medieval Christianity, such 
as Pseudo-Dionysius’ Mystical Theology or John of the Cross’ The Dark Night 
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of the Soul, contemporary discourse of spirituality can relate to real-world 
applications, and can work within and around the daily lives of everyday 
people.  The discourse of spirituality demonstrates that even a topic and 
discourse as seemingly lofty and transmundane still must obey human 
constructions –and inevitably solve human problems. The contemporary 
discourse of spirituality is a postmodern response to religion. Contemporary 
spirituality flirts with objectivity while remaining indebted to individual 
subjectivity. Contemporary spirituality allows pluralistic dialogue and 
resolutions within institutional religious spheres. Contemporary spirituality 
offers us a creative “commonplace of commonplaces” which will continue to 
foster pluralism and democracy into the future.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!
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